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language?”
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Wiens, John. “The niche, biogeography and species interactions.
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Woese, C. & Goldenfeld. “How the Microbial World Saved Evolution from the
Scylla
Wuketits, F.M. “Evolutionary epistemology: A challenge to science and
philosophy
Wynn, Thomas, et al. “‘An Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.
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Zaeef, Abdul Salam. My Life with the Taliban.
Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical Explanation.
Citations collected in 2012
(works listed above):
“Since the Discourse, philosophy has fallen into the bondage of scientific
treatises, and no one seems able to tell whether or not there lies a truth
behind the scientific fabric we have made of the world. This pessimistic
view of the influence of Descartes’s philosophy is most clearly expressed
when Jaspers speaks of Descartes:
‘In him one can see the origin and beginning of what will later be the
enduring enemy of philosophizing, even in that place where one seeks his
own truth. Descartes is a historical fate, in the sense that everyone who
philosophizes has to decide about himself in the unavoidable appropriation
of Descartes, through the manner in which he appropriates him.’”
Van Leeuwen, Evert. “Method, Discourse, and the Act of Knowing.” Pp.
224-241. From Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Rene Descartes.
1993. Oxford University Press. P.224. Subquote is from Jaspers, Karl.
Descartes und die Philosophie. 1956. Berlin. P. 102.
“The triple-inheritance version of human gene-culture coevolution differs
from the earlier dual-inheritance versions in several respects. Two of the
inheritance systems ..., genetic and cultural inheritance, are the same
... Now, however genetic inheritance is directed by natural selection
stemming from every kind of niche construction, and not just cultural
niche construction.” Odling-Smee, F. John, Kevin Laland & Marcus Feldman.
Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution. Princeton
University Press. 2003. P. 252.
“Ecological inheritance is explicitly directed by niche construction, and
it potentially includes human artifacts. It follows that human cultural
inheritance may influence human genetic inheritance in two ways instead of
one: first, directly, by influencing differential survival and
reproduction, as already assumed by sociobiology, human behavioral
ecology, and evolutionary psychology, and second, indirectly, by
contributing to cultural niche construction, and thence to a human
ecological inheritance that includes culturally modified natural selection
pressures.” Odling-Smee, F. John, Kevin Laland & Marcus Feldman. Niche
Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution. Princeton University
Press. 2003. P. 252.
“The kind of scientific realism we have inherited from the seventeenth
century has not lost all its prestige even yet, but it has saddled us with
a disastrous picture of the world. It is high time we looked for a
different picture.” Putnam, Hilary. “Is There Still Anything to Say about
Reality and Truth?” Pp. 11-28. From McCormick, Peter. 1996. Starmaking:
Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism. MIT Press. P. 15.
“The problem, in a nutshell, is that thought itself has come to be treated
more and more as a ‘projection’ by the philosophy that traces its pedigree
to the seventeenth century. The reason is clear: we have not succeeded in
giving the theory that thought is just a primitive property of a
mysterious ‘substance,’ mind, any content.” Putnam, Hilary. “Is There
Still Anything to Say about Reality and Truth?” Pp. 11-28. From McCormick,
Peter. 1996. Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism. MIT Press.
P. 19.
“Modern Objectivism has simply become Materialism. And the central problem
for Materialism is ‘explaining the emergence of mind’.” Putnam, Hilary.
“Is There Still Anything to Say about Reality and Truth?” Pp. 11-28. From
McCormick, Peter. 1996. Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism.
MIT Press. P. 20.
“The overwhelming case against perception without conception, the pure
given, absolute immediacy, the innocent eye, substance as substratum, has
been so fully and frequently set forth–by Berkeley, Kant, Cassirer,
Gombrich, Bruner, and many others–as to need no restatement here. Talk of
unstructured content or an unconceptualized given or a substratum without
properties is self-defeating; for the talk imposes structure,
conceptualizes, ascribes properties.” Goodman, Nelson. “Words, Works,
Worlds.” Pp. 61-77. From McCormick, Peter. 1996. Starmaking: Realism,
Anti-Realism, and Irrealism. MIT Press. Pp. 64-5.
“Whereas classical evolutionary theory sees the organism as the key that
has to fit into the environment’s lock, both ecological developmental
biology and niche construction see interactions between them. Niche
construction emphasizes the ability of the organism to alter its
environment; eco-devo emphasizes the ability of the environment to alter
the developing organism.” Laland, Kevin, J. Odling-Smee & S. Gilbert.
“EvoDevo and Niche Construction: Building Bridges.” 2008. Pp. 549-566.
Journal of Experimental Zoology (Mol Dev Evol) 310B:549-566. P. 550.
“A subset of EvoDevo has given rise to ecological developmental biology,
which stresses the roles of developmental plasticity in evolution,
especially in the formation, preservation, and prevention of novelty. The
focus is the ability of the developing organism to sense cues from its
environment and to modify its development to become more fit in a
particular habitat.” Laland, Kevin, J. Odling-Smee & S. Gilbert. “EvoDevo
and Niche Construction: Building Bridges.” 2008. Pp. 549-566. Journal of
Experimental Zoology (Mol Dev Evol) 310B:549-566. P. 549.
“From the niche-construction perspective, with its emphasis on reciprocal
causation, evolutionary change is not solely explained by changed
selection, but also requires consideration of what causes these changes in
selection pressures–and often the answer is the earlier niche construction
of ancestral populations. Accordingly, the niche-construction perspective
explicitly recognizes an additional process to natural selection, which
could potentially be the source of directionality in evolutionary
responses, namely the organism itself, and the changes it brings about in
its selective environment. This means that, in addition to chance and
natural selection, there is a third explicitly recognized source of
evolutionary innovation, which occurs when gene-informed, directed,
nonrandom, yet novel, acts of niche construction bring about consistent
chances in environments.
“If individuals select or manufacture a novel environment, they and their
descendants will be exposed to novel selection and novel developmental
conditions.” Laland, Kevin, J. Odling-Smee & S. Gilbert. “EvoDevo and
Niche Construction: Building Bridges.” 2008. Pp. 549-566. Journal of
Experimental Zoology (Mol Dev Evol) 310B:549-566. Pp. 560-1.
“The conceptual leap that niche construction theorists embrace is to
regard niche construction as an evolutionary process in its own right. In
other words, niche construction is viewed as an initiator of evolutionary
change rather than merely the end product of earlier selection.” Laland,
Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and Archaeology.” 2010.
Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 17:303-322. Pp. 304-5.
“However, Jones and his collaborators point out that many species of
ecosystem engineers can regulate energy flows, mass flows, and trophic
patterns in ecosystems to generate an ‘engineering web’–a mosaic of
connectivity comprising the engineering interactions of diverse species,
which regulates ecosystem functioning in conjunction with the well-studied
webs of trophic interactions.” Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche
Construction Theory and Archaeology.” 2010. Journal of Archaeological
Method and Theory. 17:303-322. P. 306. Reference is to Jones, C. G.,
Lawton, G. & Shachak, M. 1994. “Organisms as ecosystem engineers.” Oikos.
69, 373-386.
“Niche construction may be inceptive or counteractive and may occur
through perturbation of the environment or through relocation in space.”
Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and Archaeology.”
2010. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 17:303-322. P. 307.
“The argument that human cultural niche construction has been a
co-director of recent human evolution is essentially the conclusion
reached by the geneticists analyzing the human genome, who observe that
many genes subject to recent selective sweeps are responses to cultural
activities.” Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and
Archaeology.” 2010. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory.
17:303-322. P. 308.
“They [Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman] concluded that, because cultural
processes typically operate faster than natural selection, cultural niche
construction probably has more profound consequences than gene-based niche
construction.” Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and
Archaeology.” 2010. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory.
17:303-322. P. 310. Reference is to Laland, K, Odling-Smee, F & M.
Feldman. “Cultural niche construction and human evolution.” 2001. Journal
of Evolutionary Biology. 14: 22-33.
“... rather than slipping into the assumption that the external
environment (e.g., climate change) triggers an evolutionary or cultural
response, NCT [niche construction theory] enthusiasts are from the outset
inclined to consider those additional hypotheses stressing
self-constructed (and other organism-constructed) conditions that
instigate change. In this respect, NCT can be viewed as more in accord
with the perspective of most archaeologists, who are highly attuned to the
active agency of their subjects, than standard evolutionary theory.”
Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and Archaeology.”
2010. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 17:303-322. P. 312.
“Many counteractive niche-constructing behaviors regulate the environment
in such a way as to buffer against particular natural selection
pressures.” Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and
Archaeology.” 2010. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory.
17:303-322. P. 313.
“First, it [niche construction theory] offers a broad, biologically and
culturally informed conceptual framework suited to the human sciences–one
that recognizes the active agency of humans as part causes of their own
development, history, and evolution. Second, it recognizes niche
construction as an evolutionary process and ecological inheritance as a
second general legacy that organisms inherit from their ancestors, thereby
providing researchers with additional explanatory mechanisms. Such
mechanisms are particularly relevant to archaeologists, given that human
niche construction is frequently a manifestation of acquired characters
and human ecological inheritance includes a rich material culture.” Laland,
Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and Archaeology.” 2010.
Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 17:303-322. P. 318.
“Our agent-based models of language games are beginning to show how
symbol-based communication systems with properties similar to human
natural languages can arise and be culturally transmitted. But a crucial
assumption we had to make in all these models so far is that the agents
are ‘ultrasocial’ instead of Darwinian. Sociality here means that agents
are programed to cooperate fully in order to make their verbal
interactions a success.” Steels, Luc. “Is sociality a crucial prerequisite
for the emergence of language?” Pp. 36-57. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight.
2009. The Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. P. 37.
“Joint attention means (i) that speaker and hearer have a sufficiently
shared context so that the possible meanings of an utterance are highly
constrained, (ii) that they are engaged in a shared cooperative activity
so that both can gauge whether their communication was successful or not,
and (iii) that they have the means to correct miscommunication by
additional dialog or by motor behaviors such as pointing.” Steels, Luc.
“Is sociality a crucial prerequisite for the emergence of language?” Pp.
36-57. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The Prehistory of Language.
Oxford University Press. P. 50.
“One thing is sure: that sociality is a crucial prerequisite for language
and that language in turn must have helped maintain sociality in our
species.” Steels, Luc. “Is sociality a crucial prerequisite for the
emergence of language?” Pp. 36-57. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009.
The Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. P. 57.
“There is one kind of niche construction that we have not yet explicitly
considered, ‘social niche construction.’ The social niche is the subset of
natural selection pressures in an evolutionary niche that stem from
interactions with other organisms in their social groups. It constitutes
the resources (e.g. food), services (e.g. grooming), and other outputs
(e.g. threats) provided by organisms for each other. It also includes all
the ways in which individual organisms can actively defend themselves,
compete with, form alliances with, cooperate, exploit, or manipulate,
other organisms, and by doing so modify some of the natural selection
pressures they encounter in their niche.” Odling-Smee, John & K. Laland.
“Cultural niche construction: evolution’s cradle of language.” Pp. 99-121.
From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The Prehistory of Language. Oxford
University Press. Pp. 106-7.
“It concerns the construction of communication links and networks in
social groups, without which adaptive group living is probably impossible.
We call it communicative niche construction. In general, communicative
niche construction depends on the ability of organisms to convey
meaningful information to and from each other through their bodies,
products, or activities.” Odling-Smee, John & K. Laland. “Cultural niche
construction: evolution’s cradle of language.” Pp. 99-121. From Botha,
Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The Prehistory of Language. Oxford University
Press. P. 108.
“The organization of animal societies, and their communication networks,
can be transmitted across multiple generations of a population as an
ecological inheritance. Thus, it is possible for communicative niche
construction to modify one or more natural selection pressures in
populations of social organisms repeatedly and consistently, and thereby
to affect their evolution in a directional manner. If that happens,
communication fully qualifies as another kind of niche construction.”
Odling-Smee, John & K. Laland. “Cultural niche construction: evolution’s
cradle of language.” Pp. 99-121. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The
Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. P. 109.
“Humans transmit more learned information across generations than any
other species. Conversely, animals typically depend primarily on
horizontal transmissions based on simple forms of social learning. A
comparative perspective thus implies that the earliest forms of social
transmission were probably horizontal, and that the lineage leading to
Homo sapiens has been selected for increasing reliance on vertical and
oblique cultural transmission. The theoretical analyses of the evolution
of culture, described above, imply that a shift towards increased
transgenerational cultural transmission reflects a greater constancy in
the environment over time. Such a shift is difficult to reconcile with
culture being favored by variation in an autonomous external environment
because there is no evidence to suggest that environments have become more
constant over the last few million years, but rather the opposite, and if
they had, other protocultural species would also be expected to show more
transgenerational transmission than they do. Richerson and Boyd have
suggested that independent (e.g. climatic) sources of environmental
variation are the primary selection pressures favoring the human capacity
for cultural transmission, but these vary on entirely the wrong scale.
“To us, a more compelling hypothesis is that our ancestors constructed the
environmental conditions that favored hominid reliance on culture,
building niches in which it paid them to transmit more information to
their offspring. The more an organism controls and regulates its
environment, and the environment of its offspring, the greater should be
the advantage of transmitting cultural information across generations. For
example, by tracking the movements of migrating or dispersing prey,
populations of hominids increase the chances that a specific food source
will be available in their environments, that the same tools used for
hunting will be needed, and that the skin, bones, and other materials from
these animals will be at hand to use in the manufacture of additional
tools. Such activities create the kind of stable social environment in
which related technologies, such as food preparation or skin processing
methods, would be advantageous from one generation to the next, with
methods repeatedly socially transmitted across generations. Once started,
cultural niche construction may become an autocatalytic process, with
greater culturally generated environmental regulation leading to
increasing homogeneity of the social environment as experienced by old and
young, favoring further transgenerational cultural transmission.” Odling-Smee, John & K. Laland. “Cultural niche construction: evolution’s cradle
of language.” Pp. 99-121. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The
Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. Pp. 118-9.
“The response of a player redefines and/or limits another’s intent; thus,
the shared semantic understandings of objects, actions, and/or gestures
that signal, query, or motivate the next move emerge as a function of this
interaction. Co-constructed intentions are inherently shared, and salient
gestures, sounds, and ‘incipient acts’ evoke the meaning of moves that
have been played into existence. Because play actions, movements, and
gestures are often without their ‘real world’ consequences or instrumental
functions, these salient acts can become free to ‘stand for’ or re-present
their meaning in non-play contexts. In social play as in language,
participants negotiate hierarchically ordered moves and exchanges that can
be modified and rearranged through repetitive actions and shared goals
into normative, rule-governed behavior. We propose that these dialogic
structural and normative functions make social play a proper model for
understanding the emergence of language, as a negotiated, self-organizing
system rather than a system of communication limited to modern human
societies.” Ragir, Sonia & S. Savage-Rumbaugh. “Playing with meaning:
normative function and structure in play.” Pp. 122-141. From Botha, Rudolf
& C. Knight. 2009. The Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. P.
122.
“Play is one of many forms of negotiated, self-organizing, dynamic systems
that emerge during ontogeny. This fundamentally communicative activity
dominates the developmental phase of performance-dependent neural and
muscular specialization in animal and human young and participates in the
structuring of neural networks, modularization of function, and cognitive
specialization. Form and meaning are co-constructed in play, and they
serve in public systems of representation and not simply as signs of
emotional states over which the individual has no control. Ape social play
and perhaps all social play is first and foremost a negotiation about what
is possible, what is permitted, and how to do it effectively with others.
The normative and reflexive qualities of social play suggest that play has
not only a proximal autoletic function but also the distal effect of
generating a neural substrate that support the shared fields of behavioral
and social understanding necessary for complex communication.” Ragir,
Sonia & S. Savage-Rumbaugh. “Playing with meaning: normative function and
structure in play.” Pp. 122-141. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The
Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. P. 140.
“The theoretical frameworks of computationalism and connectionism are
often construed as a search for cognitive mechanisms, the specific
structures and processes from which cognitive phenomena arise. In
contrast, the framework of dynamicism is generally understood to be a
search for principles or laws–mathematical regularities that govern the
way cognitive phenomena unfold over time. In recent philosophical
discourse, this difference between traditional and dynamical cognitive
science has been framed as a difference in scientific explanation: whereas
computationalist and connectionist explanations are mechanistic
explanations, dynamical explanations take the form of covering-law
explanations.” Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical Explanation.”
2011. Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 2. Pp. 238-263. P. 238.
“Kelso’s explanation of bimanual coordination is not in fact
representative of dynamical explanation in general, and many dynamical
explanations actually resemble mechanistic explanations rather than
covering-law explanations.” Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical
Explanation.” 2011. Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 2. Pp. 238-263. P.
245. Reference is to Kelso, J. 1995. Dynamic Patterns: The
Self-Organization of Brain and Behavior. MIT Press.
“Thelen et al. and Beer each offer a dynamical explanation of a
(minimally) cognitive phenomenon. In each case, the explanation proceeds
by identifying the component parts and operations of a mechanism and by
showing how the organized activity of these parts and operations produces
the phenomenon being explained.” Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical
Explanation.” 2011. Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 2. Pp. 238-263. P.
255. References are: Thelen, E., G. Schoener, C. Scheier & L. Smith. 2001.
“The Dynamics of Embodiment: A Field Theory of Infant Perservative
Reaching.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 24:1-34. Beer, R. 2003. “The
Dynamics of Active Categorical Perception in an Evolved Model Agent.”
Adaptive Behavior. 11 (4): 209-43.
“Coupling is a technical term that applies whenever two or more dynamical
systems mutually influence one another’s change over time. In the
philosophical literature, such mutual influence is more commonly known as
continuous reciprocal causation.” Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical
Explanation.” 2011. Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 2. Pp. 238-263. P.
258.
“The moral of the story is that the tools and concepts of dynamical
systems theory can be used to describe mechanisms that exhibit continuous
reciprocal causation. Although important questions do remain about the
degree to which Beer’s methods will scale up to larger and increasingly
realistic systems in which continuous reciprocal causation is increasingly
prevalent. Beer’s analysis shows that continuous reciprocal causation does
not necessarily preclude mechanistic explanation.” Zednik, Carlos. “The
Nature of Dynamical Explanation.” 2011. Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No.
2. Pp. 238-263. P. 260. Reference is to Beer, R. 2003. “The Dynamics of
Active Categorical Perception in an Evolved Model Agent.” Adaptive
Behavior. 11 (4): 209-43.
“... those dynamicist researchers who seek to provide mechanistic
explanations rather than covering-law explanations may be steering toward
reconciliation with proponents of representationalism. By describing
cognitive mechanisms rather than principles or laws, these researchers
describe structures that are amenable to what Chemero and Silberstein have
called representation hunting–characterizing the components of a mechanism
as representation producers and representation consumers and understanding
their operations in terms of the transfer and manipulation of
information.” Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical Explanation.” 2011.
Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 2. Pp. 238-263. P. 261. Reference is to
Chemero, A. & M. Silberstein. 2008. “After the Philosophy of Mind:
Replacing Scholasticism with Science.” Philosophy of Science. 75: 1-27.
“Culture, broadly conceived as all that individuals learn from others that
endures to generate customs and traditions, shapes vast swathes of human
lives. Cumulative cultural achievements, from technology to social
institutions, have allowed our species to invade and exploit virtually
every region of the planet. Accordingly, this special capacity for culture
is often thought to represent a qualitative distinction between our
species and the rest of nature, and our relative independence from the
Darwinian forces that shape the natural world.” Whiten, A., R. Hinde, K.
Laland C. Stringer. 2011. “Introduction: Culture evolves.” Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366, 938-48. P. 938.
“Our understanding of the cumulative cultural achievements of the Stone
Age has been transformed over the last dozen years or so by the integrated
exploitation of a diverse range of evidential sources, often depending on
extremely careful, painstaking and effortful work. These sources include (i)
the primary one of archaeology, which in this period has established much
earlier dates than known before, both for the emergence of lithic
tool-making and for skilled knapping; (ii) inferences drawn by highly
skilled re-creation by scientists of knapping techniques that produce the
kinds of artefacts recovered; (iii) linked observations of knapping and
other techniques used by peoples such as the Irian Jaya, who preserved a
complex lithic tool culture; and (iv) the careful refitting of recovered
sets of flakes to their cores, allowing the retro-construction of the
knapping sequences used by their makers. Here Stout builds on these
combined sources to generate a systematic analysis of the complexity of
manufacturing techniques, tentatively concluding from this that through
the whole Stone Age (extending beyond the Acheulian to later, more
sophisticated achievements such as the Levallois), there has been an
approximately exponential increase in quantifiable complexity of
techniques.
“Intriguingly, such progress appears remarkably lacking in the Oldowan.
The above-listed sources of evidence applied to the oldest known Oldowan
artefacts show their manufacture to have relied on a good appreciation of
fracture processes in stone-working, which exceeded that apparent in the
efforts of great apes who have knapped sharp flakes in recent experimental
contexts. Over the next approximately 1 Myr, Oldowan artefacts showed
little if any progress beyond this–indeed, later ones often appear less
sophisticated.
“However, Oldowan knapping itself may plausibly have represented a
cumulative step built on the prior use of stone tools for butchery, which
recent evidence dates back to about 3.4 Ma.” Whiten, A., R. Hinde, K.
Laland C. Stringer. 2011. “Introduction: Culture evolves.” Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366, 938-48. Pp. 942-3. Reference is
to Stout, D. 2011. “Stone toolmaking and the evolution of human culture
and cognition.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366,
1050-1059.
“Each of the last four phases, from around 120 Ka on, is marked by
accelerating cultural achievements (echoing the analysis of Stout
referring to even earlier times) and greater diversity.” Whiten, A., R.
Hinde, K. Laland C. Stringer. 2011. “Introduction: Culture evolves.”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366, 938-48. P. 944.
References are from Foley, R. & M. Mirazon Lahr. 2011. “The evolution of
the diversity of cultures.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society: B. 366, 1080-89 and from Stout, D. 2011. “Stone toolmaking and
the evolution of human culture and cognition.” Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society: B. 366, 1050-1059.
“... cultural change can occur through ‘cultural selection’ (for example,
people select the most efficient axes) and/or ‘natural selection’ in the
conventional sense (the reproductive success of the best axe makers
promotes the evolution of those axes).” Whiten, A., R. Hinde, K. Laland C.
Stringer. 2011. “Introduction: Culture evolves.” Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366, 938-48. P. 944.
“The critic wishes a word, ‘Are you trying to say that nothing exists
until there is some kind of relationship? There is no physical world, no
mountains, trees, a sun, and so on? This just seems absurd.’ In reply,
this is not precisely what is being proposed here. We should not conclude
that ‘nothing exists’ before the moment of co-action. Whatever exists
simply exists. However, in the process of co-action whatever there is
takes shape as something for us. It comes to be ‘mountains,’ trees,’ and
‘sun’ in terms of the way we live.” Gergen, Kenneth. Relational Being:
Beyond Self and Community. 2009. Oxford University Press. P. 37.
“As I converse with you, my utterances are candidates for meaning.
However, these candidates are not my possession, but the byproducts of a
relational history. Without this history of constraint, I would have
nothing to say. At the same time, provided we share in a tradition of
conversation, my utterances and actions carry a pre-figuring potential.
That is, they indicate a domain of what is possible for you to say and
do.” Gergen, Kenneth. Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community. 2009.
Oxford University Press. P. 40.
“Why are deontic powers so important? They are the glue that holds human
society together. What is the power of the glue? The answer is that to the
extent that people recognize the validity of Status Functions, they
recognize them as having a deontic status, and for that reason, they
recognize them as giving reasons for action which are independent of their
immediate inclinations. I will abbreviate this idea by saying that Status
Functions provide desire independent reasons for action.” Searle, John.
“The Basic Reality and the Human Reality.” Pp. 19-44. Franken, Dirk, A.
Karakus & J. Michel, Eds. John R. Searle: Thinking about the Real World.
2010. Ontos Verlaag. P. 36.
“Institutional facts = Status Functions –> deontic powers –>
desire-independent reasons for action –> possible motivations for action.
“In plain English, all and only institutional facts are Status Functions,
Status Functions contain deontic powers, and deontic powers, where their
validity is recognized, provide desire-independent reasons for action, and
these in turn provide possible motivations for actions.” Searle, John.
“The Basic Reality and the Human Reality.” Pp. 19-44. Franken, Dirk, A.
Karakus & J. Michel, Eds. John R. Searle: Thinking about the Real World.
2010. Ontos Verlaag. P. 37.
“Ethics is essentially concerned with desire-independent reasons for
action.” Searle, John. “The Basic Reality and the Human Reality.” Pp.
19-44. Franken, Dirk, A. Karakus & J. Michel, Eds. John R. Searle:
Thinking about the Real World. 2010. Ontos Verlaag. P. 39.
“What we want to deny, however, is that what happens can be called a
speech act. A speech act or, to be more precise, an illocutionary act is
something that can be performed by a single speaker or a group of
speakers, simply by uttering linguistic expressions with the appropriate
meaning-intentions. To perform Searle’s ‘maneuver’, on the other hand,
speakers have to get all the others to accept their speech acts as well.
So, what speakers have to do goes far beyond performing an illocutionary
act.
“Searle says that he wants ‘to introduce a very strong theoretical claim’
in his new book: ‘All institutional facts [...] are created by speech acts
of a type that 1975 I baptized as ‘Declaration.’‘ But if we are right and
the ‘maneuver’ Searle describes cannot be understood as a speech act at
all, there is no strong theoretical claim any more, at least none that
goes beyond what is said in The Construction of Social Reality. If we are
right, Searle is entitled only to the claim: ‘All institutional facts
[...] are created by [a maneuver with certain analogies to] speech acts of
a type that 1975 I baptized as “Declaration.’‘
“Moreover, the analogy to declarations suffers from the fact that one of
the relata of the two directions of fit is not the same in both cases. On
the one hand individual people represent an institutional fact with the
word-to-world direction of fit. On the other hand, it is the collective of
all people in the community representing the institutional fact that
creates it. In this case, the direction of fit is not between the
institutional fact and an intention of an individual, but between the
institutional fact and a collection of intentions.” Prien, Bernd, J.
Skudlarek & S. Stolte. “The Role of Declarations in the Construction of
Social Reality.” Pp. 163-171. Franken, Dirk, A. Karakus & J. Michel, Eds.
John R. Searle: Thinking about the Real World. 2010. Ontos Verlaag. P.
169.
“Multicellularity has evolved many times along the history of eukaryotes
and, apparently, even in geologically recent times. For example, starting
from unicellular ancestors the green algae have recently given rise to the
multicellular Volvox lineage within the last 75 million years.
“Arguably, multicellularity evolves easily, provided that cell-adhesion
molecules are available, but the eventual long-term stability of a
multicellular organism depends on the balance between the benefits
eventually obtained by the individual cells being part of a multicellular
assemblage and the decrease in individual fitness associated with the same
condition. In fact, cooperation among cells will easily benefit the group,
but can be costly to the individual cooperating cells....”
“... the persistence of cell-to-cell competition helps to explain several
key features of metazoan organization, including the origin of tissues,
sexuality, cuticles, and others. Common to all these evolutionary events
is cell-cell signalling, which can be regarded as a mechanism that allows
one cell to gain control of the intracellular signalling of another cell.
Terminal differentiation of cells can thus be interpreted as a result of
metabolic control under the influence of successful neighbouring cells.”
Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution.
Oxford University Press. P. 19.
“Selection will easily favour cells or cell lineages producing mutants
able to manipulate environmental conditions, for example by opening within
a multicellular assemblage new channels through which materials can
circulate (a kind of primitive angiogenesis). In this model, developmental
mechanisms evolve because of the immediate metabolic advantage they may
produce, not because of any morphogenetic effect eventually deriving by
the operation of the same mechanisms in future generations, something we
all too often assume when reconstructing the ‘origins’ of some feature in
modern animals.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal
Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 20.
“The evolutionary step from the unicellular condition of the
flagellate-grade ancestors of metazoans to the multicellular condition of
the latter involved extensive loss of genes.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009.
Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P.
23.
“... fossil evidence, and molecular evidence all largely concur to confirm
metazoan monophyly.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal
Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 30.
“The issue of individuality–that is, of what actually defines the
spatiotemporal boundaries and the historical continuity of an
individual–emerges time and again in the analysis of living beings, at
different structural levels. In zoology, the most obvious grey area is
multinucleate units without cytoplasmic boundaries, whereas morphological
(junctions) and functional (electrical coupling, exchange of molecules)
ties between neighbouring epithelial cells are less permissive than the
links provided by the plasmodesmata in plant cells, to the extent that in
plants the very notion of cells is sometimes disputed.” Minelli,
Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford
University Press. P. 113.
“Thus, rather than taking the cell, typologically, as a standard unit of
morphological organization, it seems advisable to regard it as a unit of
function, integrating a complex network of local dynamics, whose
independence as a distinct module of form, is not always granted, as the
widespread occurrence of syncytia amply demonstrates.” Minelli,
Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford
University Press. P. 113.
“In 1934, Studnicka proposed a terminology that attempted to combine
origin and organization of these multinucleate structures, using
‘symplasma’ for multinucleate systems whose cytoplasmic continuity results
from incomplete cytokinesis but which otherwise remain independent,
‘syncytia’ for multinucleated structures whose cytoplasm is not organized
around centrioles, and ‘plasmodia’ for multinucleated tissues formed by
fusion of separate cells or by division of nuclei in a growing cell.
Irrespective of the merits of those distinctions, current literature has
increasingly adopted the term ‘syncytium’ for all these structures.”
Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution.
Oxford University Press. P. 113.
“Syncytial structures are present virtually everywhere that is, in the
most diverse body parts of the most different animal groups. Syncytia are
known, in fact, from groups as diverse as Silicea, Placozoa, Cnidaria,
Acoela, Gastrotricha, Syndermata, Gnathostomulida, Rhabditophora, Nematoda,
Arthropoda, Echinodermata, and Chordata. Clearly, this condition has been
obtained independently a great many times.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009.
Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P.
114.
“A lot of effort was devoted for a while in the search for what (say, the
expression of a particular gene, or a particular metabolic condition)
might turn a ‘normal’ Dictyostelium amoeba into the founder of a
multicellular group. But it was eventually realized that no founder cell
may actual exist. Rather, aggregation starts wherever two amoebae touch,
and this happens simply because they were close enough to have a better
chance of one to be hit by the chemical signal produced by the other. That
is, no founder, no project.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in
Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 138.
“It has been suggested that multicellular organisms passed through a pre-Mendelian
phase where context-dependent properties of self-organization were much
more important than the canalization or determination of processes derived
from gene expression, as generally happens in today’s multicellular
organisms. According to this hypothesis, the morphological features of the
earliest multicellulars were mainly the outcome of epigenetic processes.”
Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution.
Oxford University Press. Pp. 138-9. Reference is to Newman, S. “The pre-Mendelian,
pre-Darwinian world: shifting relations between genetic and epigenetic
mechanisms in early multicellular evolution.” 2005. Journal of
Biosciences. 30: 75-85.
“It has been poignantly remarked that even cells devoid of a nucleus, as
are mammalian red blood cells, can still regulate their behaviour as a
function of their environmental context.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009.
Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P.
139.
“... the progression of a given developmental stage to one with very
different organization is likely to be accompanied by a dramatic shift in
the profile of the genes that are expressed. This has been shown by
Arbeitman et al in their longitudinal analysis of the expression of 4028
genes during the embryonic and post-embryonic development of Drosophila.
For some 80% of these genes, the lowest level of expression during the
whole span of the fly’s development is at least four times lower than the
highest level of expression of the same gene. The embryonic segment of the
life cycle was the most eventful, in terms of transcription, as
three-quarters of the studied genes were expressed then, and for
two-thirds of these the level of expression changed significantly during
embryonic life. But the beginning of post-embryonic life did not
correspond to the beginning of a transcriptionally stable period, as the
level of expression of a total of 445 genes changed during larval life,
646 during the pupal stage, and more than 100 during the first 5 days of
adult life. Thus, a complex life cycle is based on a subtly orchestrated
pattern of gene expression, in which dramatic switches occur.” Minelli,
Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford
University Press. P. 154. Reference is to Arbeitman, M., E. Furlong, & F,
Imam. 2002. “Gene expression during the life cycle of Drosophila
melanogaster.” Science. 297: 2270-2275.
“It may thus be useful to revisit Anderson’s concept of ‘hybrid habitat’,
introduced (in botany) to describe the environmental conditions where a
population is likely to maintain an unusually elevated variation such as
deriving from recent hybridization. Similarly, I think that of the
environmental scenarios proposed as the theatre of singularly active
evolutionary change, those pointing to the ‘creative’ nature of
transitional or ecotonal environments are the most plausible, in principle
at least. Those environments are more likely to support the existence of
organisms that simultaneously present alternative ways to survive, such as
terrestrial as well as aquatic respiration, a peculiarity which can be
exploited sequentially during an animal’s life, as in dragonflies and
frogs, as long as these animals remain in the transitional environments,
but can also eventually be fixed in the condition opposite to the original
one.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny &
Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 232. Reference is to Anderson, E.
1948. “Hybridization of the habitat.” Evolution 2: 1-9.
“Nowadays, cell differentiation is a typical example of a biological
process dependent on strictly controlled and spatiotemporally restricted
gene expression, but this is arguably an acquired condition, probably
preceded by a stage when alternative phenotypes within a multicellular
organism were just variants within an environmentally inducible
polyphenism.... In this scenario, what is new in the multicellular
organisms is the evolution of cell-cell interactions that allow the
coexistence of alternative phenotypes, while the production of the latter,
as such, was already manifested by their unicellular precursors.” Minelli,
Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford
University Press. P. 238.
“In short for Darwin and his many followers, the evolution of species in
nature was also an evolution out of it, in so far as it progressively
liberated the mind from the promptings of innate disposition. Ever since,
Western science has cleaved strongly to the view that humans differ from
other animals in degree rather than kind. Darwin, it is said, finally
showed us that the idea of an absolute Rubicon separating the human
species from the rest of the animal kingdom is a myth. He did not,
however, dispense with the dichotomy between reason and nature, or between
intelligence and instinct; rather his whole argument was couched in terms
of it.” Ingold, Tim. 2006. “Against Human Nature.” Pp. 259-281. From Gontier,
Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. Springer. Pp. 264-5.
“Darwin’s commitment, in The Descent of Man, to an imperialist doctrine of
progress according to which the morally and intellectually well-endowed
are bound to supplant their inferiors, not only ran counter to the whole
argument of The Origin of Species, but was also deeply racist. Whereas in
the Origin Darwin had shown that the mechanism of natural selection always
operates in such a way as to make species better adapted to their
particular environmental conditions of life, in the Descent he argued that
it would inevitably bring about absolute advance along a single, universal
scale–from the lowest of animals to the highest of men–regardless of
environmental conditions, leading from instinct to intelligence, and
reaching its ultimate conclusion in modern European civilisation. And in
bringing the rise of science and civilisation within the compass of the
same evolutionary process that had made humans out of apes, and apes out
of creatures lower in the scale, Darwin was forced to attribute what he
saw as the ascendancy of reason to hereditary endowment. For the theory to
work, there had to be significant differences in such endowment between
‘tribes’ or ‘nations’–or between what we might today call populations....
“We now recognise that the brains of hunter-gatherers are just as good,
and just as capable of handling complex and sophisticated ideas, as the
brains of Western scientists and philosophers....
“What was self-evident to Darwin and most of his contemporaries–namely
that human populations differed in their innate intellectual capacities on
a scale from the primitive to the civilised–is no longer acceptable
today.” Ingold, Tim. 2006. “Against Human Nature.” Pp. 259-281. From Gontier,
Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. Springer. Pp. 266-7.
“But this [Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1, “All human
beings are endowed with reason and conscience.”] left the Darwinians with
a problem on their hands. How was the doctrine of evolutionary continuity
to be reconciled with the new-found commitment to universal human rights?
If all humans are alike in their possession of reason and moral
conscience–if, in other words, all humans are the kinds of beings who,
according to Western juridical precepts, can exercise rights and
responsibilities–then they must differ in kind from all other beings which
cannot. And somewhere along the line, our ancestors must have made a
breakthrough from one condition to the other, from nature to humanity.
“Faced with this problem, there was only one way for modern science to
go—that is, back to the 18th century. Indeed the majority of contemporary
commentators on human evolution appear to be vigorously, if unwittingly,
reproducing the 18th century paradigm in all its essentials. One process,
of evolution, leads from our ape-like ancestors to human beings that are
recognisably of the same kind as ourselves; another process, of culture or
history, leads from humanity’s primitive past to modern science and
civilisation. Taken together, these two axes of change–the one
evolutionary, the other historical–establish by their intersection a
unique point of origin, without precedent in the evolution of life, at
which our ancestors are deemed to have crossed the threshold of true
humanity and to have embarked on the course of history.” Ingold, Tim.
2006. “Against Human Nature.” Pp. 259-281. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van
Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and
Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. Springer. P. 268.
“Following this line of argument, so far as their evolved capacities are
concerned there should be little or nothing to distinguish today’s
scientists and engineers from the hunter-gatherers of 50,000 or even
100,000 years ago. What makes them different, apparently, is a separate
process of history, or what many have taken to calling cultural (as
opposed to biological) evolution.” Ingold, Tim. 2006. “Against Human Nature.”
Pp. 259-281. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts,
Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. Springer. P. 269.
“Short of reverting to the racially stratified scenario of Darwin, with
its populations of more or less well-endowed men, the only way in which
humans can be made to appear different in degree, not kind, from their
evolutionary antecedents is by attributing the movement of history to a
process of culture that differs in kind, not degree, from the process of
biological evolution!” Ingold, Tim. 2006. “Against Human Nature.” Pp. 259-281.
From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors.
Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. Springer. P. 270.
“The search for absolute, defining attributes of common humanity does
indeed seem a hopeless endeavour, since whatever attribute you choose,
there will bound to be some creature born of man and woman in which it is
lacking. Remember that for modern biology, reconstructed along Darwinian
lines, the criterion for species membership is genealogical. Basically,
this means that you are a human being if your parents are. If it is human
nature to walk on two feet, what of the congenitally crippled? Is he not
human? If it is human nature to communicate by means of language, what of
the child who is deaf and dumb? Is she not human? If it is human nature to
join in forms of social life based on a mutual awareness of self and
other, what of those individuals who suffer from autism? Are they not
human?
“The argument can be turned around the other way as well. Whatever
attribute you choose, there is a possibility that some creature of
non-human ancestry may turn out to possess it–if not now, then at some
time in the future. The way a species evolves is not predictable in
advance. It is perfectly possible that the descendants of chimpanzees, a
million years hence, will have developed a fully linguistic capability and
be walking on two feet. They have already been shown to be capable of such
things up to a point, as well as of other things once thought
distinctively human, like making tools. Would they then have become human?
In genealogical terms that is an impossibility, yet if it is human nature
to walk and talk, then these chimpanzees of the future would have to count
as human too.
“I have shown that the contemporary appeal to universal human nature, in
the name of evolutionary biology, is a defensive reaction to the legacy of
racist science left by Darwin’s account of the evolution of the moral and
intellectual faculties in The Descent of Man. But it is an appeal fraught
with contradictions. While insisting on the continuity of the evolutionary
process, it also reinstates the twin distinctions between biology and
culture, and between evolution and history, setting an upper limit to the
world of nature that humans alone appear to have breached. More than that,
it asserts that human nature is fixed and universal while attributing its
evolution to a theory–of variation under natural selection–that only works
because the individuals of a species are endlessly variable. That is why
evolutionists find themselves in the curious position of having to admit
that whereas in the non-human world, biology is the source of all
variability and difference, in the human world it is what makes everyone
the same!” Ingold, Tim. 2006. “Against Human Nature.” Pp. 259-281. From Gontier,
Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. Springer. Pp. 277-8.
“Probably the most widely applicable mechanism for generating indirect
fitness benefits for cooperation is population viscosity, or limited
dispersal, leading to genetic structuring of populations. This means that
even indiscriminate altruistic behavior incurring a personal cost and
providing a benefit to neighboring individuals could enhance the actor’s
inclusive fitness because those neighbors are on average closely related
kin.” Gardner, Andy & K. Foster. “The Evolution and Ecology of Cooperation
– History and Concepts.” Pp. 1-36. From Korb, Judith & J. Heinze, Editors.
Ecology of Social Evolution. 2008. Springer. P. 17.
“Nevertheless, considerations of kin structure and genes alone are often
not sufficient to explain the social phenotype and its inter- and
intraspecific variation. In fact, many features of insect societies appear
to be remarkably robust against variation in genetic colony structure. For
example, whether worker reproduction occurs or not appears to be much less
influenced by relatedness than predicted by theory and several recent
studies have documented sex ratio specializations without the expected
underlying variability in relatedness asymmetries.
“Instead, variation in environmental factors, such as climate, resource
availability, the occurrence of competitors, predators, or parasites,
etc., appears to be as influential as variation of genetic composition at
least for some features of the insect society. The importance of ecology
in social evolution is clearly emphasized by factors b and c in Hamilton’s
rule, i.e., the benefits and costs of helping, and numerous researchers
have investigated ecological influences on the social phenotype. However,
the magnitude of environmental constraints is often difficult to measure
and many hypotheses about the interrelations of the social phenotype and
the environment are therefore not strongly supported by empirical data.”
Heinze, Juergen. “Social Plasticity: Ecology, Genetics, and the Structure
of Ant Societies.” Pp. 129-150. From Korb, Judith & J. Heinze, Editors.
Ecology of Social Evolution. 2008. Springer. Pp. 130-1.
“This increase in dispersal as sexuals makes adaptive sense for log
dwelling termites like C. secundus because as the log diminishes, so too
does the probability they will be able to reproduce in the natal colony
before the wood runs out. A central component of this response is the
termites’ impressive ability to detect changes in the size of their log
and so predict colony longevity. In C. secundus the loss of wood from the
log occurs gradually by the termites own consumption of the wood but also
suddenly when cyclones or heavy thunderstorms fragment their trees.
Correspondingly, the termites cannot rely on extended excavations to
measure wood availability. Instead, the termites continually sense the
amount of wood from the vibrations generated during wood gnawing. These
vibrations constitute reliable and fast cues of food availability. This
predictable variation in food availability/colony longevity probably
selects for the flexible development of workers in OP termites [One-piece
termites “live in their food and spend their entire colony life in a
single piece of wood that serves as both food source and shelter”]. This
situation contrasts with the MP termites [Multiple-pieces type termites
which “live in a well-defined nest that is more or less separated from the
foraging grounds”] that leave their nest to exploit resources. They reduce
the long-term food variability but experience short-term variation in food
supply that lacks predictable cues allowing a plastic developmental
response.” Korb, Judith. “The Ecology of Social Evolution in Termites.”
Pp. 151-174. From Korb, Judith & J. Heinze, Editors. Ecology of Social
Evolution. 2008. Springer. Pp. 157-8, 152.
“Accordingly, two prerequisites, which birds and mammals usually lack, are
necessary for the transition to eusocialiity: (a) a high fecundity and (b)
large numbers of offspring that can stay at the nest and are not ‘forced’
to leave because there is no competition at the nest for food. Under most
conditions, offspring are selected to disperse from the nest to avoid
competition among siblings. Two mechanisms can overrule this: a high
abundance of food at the nest that lasts reasonably long (i.e., for at
least two generations that can co-exist) and/or high ecological
constraints which make dispersal difficult. The latter is commonly
included in many models on the evolution of sociality, while the former is
often only implicitly assumed. The comparison with termites, therefore,
suggests that the general lack of eusociality in vertebrates might be
because they can only achieve small families due to their low fecundity
and the difficulty to have enough food to overcome local resource
competition for more than two generations to coexist as individuals are
large and rather long-lived compared to their food source. Thus, the
finally limiting trait accounting for the rarity of eusociality in birds
and mammals would be their body size. Correspondingly, the only groups in
which eusociality occurs are rodents, which are comparatively small
mammals with a short generation time, high fecundity and long-lasting food
sources.” Korb, Judith. “The Ecology of Social Evolution in Termites.” Pp.
151-174. From Korb, Judith & J. Heinze, Editors. Ecology of Social
Evolution. 2008. Springer. P. 167.
“In a curious sense the study of the organisms is really a study of the
shape of the environmental space, the organisms themselves being nothing
but the passive medium through which we see the shape of the external
world. They are the iron filings of the environmental field. Most
evolutionary biologists would reject such a description of their science
and would insist that it is the organisms themselves that are the primary
objects of interest–yet the structure of adaptive explanation of traits
points in the opposite direction.”
“Adaptive explanations have both a forward and a backward form. In the
forward form, usually invoked for extant species, a problem for the
organism is described on the basis of knowledge of or supposition about
what is important to the organism. Then some anatomical, physiological, or
behavioral feature of the species is proposed as the organism’s solution
to the problem. The backward form, usually used for extinct species known
from fossil material, starts with a trait as a solution and searches for
the problem that it has solved.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix:
Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. Pp. 44-5.
“But the claim that the environment of an organism is causally independent
of the organism, and that changes in the environment are autonomous and
independent of changes in the species itself, is clearly wrong. It is bad
biology, and every ecologist and evolutionary biologist knows that it is
bad biology. The metaphor of adaptation, while once an important heuristic
for building evolutionary theory, is now an impediment to a real
understanding of the evolutionary process and needs to be replaced by
another. Although all metaphors are dangerous, the actual process of
evolution seems best captured by the process of construction.
“Just as there can be no organism without an environment, so there can be
no environment without an organism.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix:
Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 48.
“An environment is something that surrounds or encircles, but for there to
be a surrounding there must be something at the center to be surrounded.
The environment of an organism is the penumbra of external conditions that
are relevant to it because it has effective interactions with those
aspects of the outer world.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene,
Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. Pp. 48-9.
“The concept of an empty ecological niche cannot be made concrete. There
is a non-countable infinity of ways in which the physical world can be put
together to describe an ecological niche, nearly all of which would seem
absurd or arbitrary because we have never seen an organism occupying such
a niche.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and
Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 49.
“It is, in general, not possible to understand the geographical and
temporal distribution of species if the environment is characterized as a
property of the physical region, rather than of the space defined by the
activities of the organism itself.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix:
Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 53.
“The microclimate near the soil surface is quite different from that
between two lower leaves of a maize plant, which is again quite different
from the microclimate for leaves near the growing top of the plants. The
zones change as the plant grows taller and as the leaves grow longer and
touch the leaves of neighboring plants. These microclimatic variations
play an extremely important role in growth and production because it is
the intensity of solar radiation and the carbon dioxide concentration at
the surface of the leaves that determine the rate of photosynthesis and
thus the growth rate and productivity of the maize plant. So the rate of
growth determines the microenvironment, which determines the rate of
growth.
“Not only the rate of growth but the exact morphological pattern of leaves
is an important variable. The spacing of leaves along the stem and their
position around the stem, the shape of each leaf, its angle of repose
against the stem, the hairiness of its surface determine how much light,
moisture, and carbon dioxide reach the leaves and how rapidly oxygen
produced by photosynthesis is carried away. And all of these affect the
plant in a way that is characteristic of the pattern of development.
“The practical consequence of all this complexity is seen in the science
of plant engineering. In an attempt to increase the productivity of crops,
plant engineers make detailed measurements of microclimate around the
plant and then redesign the pattern of leaves to increase the light
falling on the photosynthetic surfaces and the available carbon dioxide.
But when these redesigned plants, produced by selective breeding, are
tested it turns out that the microclimatic conditions for which they were
designed have now changed as a consequence of the new design. So the
process must be carried out again, and again the redesign changes the
conditions. The plant engineers are chasing not only a moving target but a
target whose motion is impelled by their own activities. As we will see,
this process is a model for a more realistic understanding of evolution by
natural selection.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism,
and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. Pp. 56-7.
“The notion that organisms are chasing a moving target during their
evolution has a wide currency. In 1973, Leigh Van Valen pointed out a
seeming paradox in evolutionary theory. If organisms are constantly
adapting to the outer world, then as evolution goes on species should be
better and better able to survive the rigors of the environment and so
they should endure for longer and longer periods. But when Van Valen
examined the fossil record he found that the time between first appearance
and disappearance of forms has not grown longer over evolutionary time.
His conclusion was that the environment is constantly changing so that
adaptation to yesterday’s environment does not improve the chance of
survival tomorrow. He called this the ‘Red Queen Hypothesis’ after the
chess queen in Through the Looking Glass who found that she had to keep
running just to stay in the same place because the ground was moving under
her feet. The Red Queen, however, is not the same as a constructionist
view of the organism and its environment. Even if the external world is
changing in ways that are completely independent of the organisms,
organisms will still have to run to keep up. The constructionist view is
that the world is changing because the organisms are changing. The Red
Queen’s running only makes the problem worse.” Lewontin, Richard. The
Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University
Press. Pp. 57-8. Reference is to Van Valen, L. “A new evolutionary law.”
1973. Evolutionary Theory 1: 1-30.
“The common external phenomena of the physical and biotic world pass
through a transforming filter created by the peculiar biology of each
species, and it is the output of this transformation that reaches the
organism and is relevant to it. Plato’s metaphor of the cave is
appropriate here. Whatever the autonomous processes of the outer world may
be, they cannot be perceived by the organism. Its life is determined by
the shadows on the wall, passed through a transforming medium of its own
creation.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and
Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 64.
“The growing environmentalist movement to prevent alterations in the
natural world that will be, at best, unpleasant and, at worst,
catastrophic for human existence cannot proceed rationally under the false
slogan ‘Save the Environment.’ ‘The environment’ does not exist to be
saved. The world inhabited by living organisms is constantly being changed
and reconstructed by the activities of all of those organisms, not just by
human activity.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and
Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. Pp. 67-8.
“Part of the success of naive reductionism and simplistic analysis comes
from the opportunistic nature of scientific work. Scientists pursue
precisely those problems that yield to their methods, like a medieval army
that besieges cities for a period, subduing those whose defenses are weak,
but leaving behind, still unconquered, islands of resistance.” Lewontin,
Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard
University Press. Pp. 72-3.
“What developmental genetics has done is to substitute a question that it
can answer for one that it cannot, but without an explicit acknowledgment
of the switch.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and
Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 75.
“A consequence of the intermediate size and internal heterogeneity of
living organisms is that they are the nexus of a very large number of
weakly determining forces.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene,
Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 92.
“An organism’s life consists of constant mid-course corrections.” Lewontin,
Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard
University Press. P. 93.
“The meaning of words does not lie in their possible referential relation
to the world, but in their use [referring to (the later) Wittgenstein’s
understanding of language]. What matters is, how these words are being put
to use, by members of the same community that partake in different
language games. Therefore, language has a social function; it enables
social relations between members of the same community that make use of
the same language. Meaning, therefore, also is explained as being
intersubjective, excluding all possible forms of a private (inner, non-
or, pre-linguistic)-language: meaning and language hence are externalized
and are supposed to be part of a community.”
“The concept meaning is, therefore, introduced for the first time, and
this notion is distinguished from truth.” Gontier, Nathalie. “Introduction
to evolutionary epistemology, language and culture.” Pp. 1-29. From
Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 5.
“In short, evolutionary epistemology is an epistemological system which is
based upon the conjecture that cognitive activities are a product of
evolution and selection and that, vice versa, evolution itself is a
cognition and knowledge process.” Wuketits, F.M. “Evolutionary
epistemology: A challenge to science and philosophy.” Pp. 1-33. From
Wuketits, F (ed.). Concepts and approaches in evolutionary epistemology.
1984. D. Reidel Publishing. P. 2. Quoted in Gontier, Nathalie.
“Introduction to evolutionary epistemology, language and culture.” Pp.
1-29. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors.
Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 9.
“Organisms (a) select their environment, (b) actively modify their
environment by their own activity, (c) define their environment in terms
of relevant variables, (d) create new environments for other organisms,
(e) transform the physical nature of an environment input as their effects
percolate through the developmental network, (f) determine by their
movements and physiological activity the effective statistical pattern of
environment, and (g) adapt to the environmental pattern that is partly of
their own creation. Further, each part of the organism is ‘environment’ to
the other parts. The conclusion of (d), (f) and (g) that organisms adapt
to and create statistical patterns of environment finally suggests that
the utilization of resources by populations not only uses up ecological
opportunities but also create new ones: The variability in resource level
may itself behave as a resource .... The traditional separation of the
world into organism and environment as mutually exclusive classes ...
leaves us with the task of then connecting them. A more dialectical
approach emphasizes the mutual interpenetration of organism and
environment.” Levins, Richard. Quoted in Hahlweg, K. 1989. “A systems view
of evolution and evolutionary epistemology.” From Hahlweg, K. & C. Hooker,
(eds). Issues in evolutionary epistemology. Pp. 45-78. SUNY Press. Then
quoted in Gontier, Nathalie. “Introduction to evolutionary epistemology,
language and culture.” Pp. 1-29. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem
& D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A
Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 15.
“So, basically, until recently only two positions could be taken up by an
anthropologist, interested in culture: an emic position or an etic
position which correlate, respectively, with an insider and outsider
position....”
“A third position to take has been developed recently, by Bourdieu and
Pinxten, called the praxiological position.”
“It aims at combining the objectivist and the subjectivist approach: the
external knowledge of ‘the other’ is internalized by the researcher and
the introspective knowledge of the researcher is externalized into the
subject of research at the same time. The dialectic between both movements
allows for a full understanding of cultural phenomena.”
“Now here is where evolutionary epistemology fits in. This is because of
the fact that we need to look at biological, neurological and cognitive
learning theories in order to understand how external knowledge is
internalized and how introspective knowledge is externalized.” Gontier,
Nathalie. “Introduction to evolutionary epistemology, language and
culture.” Pp. 1-29. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts,
Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 18-9. Subquote is from
Pinxten, R. When the day breaks: Essays in anthropology and philosophy.
1997. Peter Lang, Europaeischer Verlag der Wissenschaften. P. 68.
“As mentioned above, the Modern Synthesis focuses on two steps: the sex
cells, where genes possibly are passed on from one generation to the next,
and possible random mutations that occur within these genes. Hence the
popular idea put forward by Neo-Darwinians that animals pass on their
genes from one generation to the next.”
“This is not true: animals do not pass on their genes from one generation
to the next, they pass on their sex cells (that contain genes) from one
generation to the next, and here a horizontal element is involved: namely,
two members of the same species, of the opposite sexes, mate and if all
goes well a sperm cell penetrates an egg cell, resulting in the formation
of a cell with diploid chromosomes.” Gontier, Nathalie. “Evolutionary
epistemology and the origin and evolution of language: Taking
symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van
Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and
Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006.
Springer. P. 200.
“This crucial horizontal step is taken for granted and even ignored by
Neo-Darwinian theory, because of their focus on genes. Every mating
process, however, is a crucial horizontal (temporary merging) process of
the parents, and every fertilization is a permanent merging and
recombining of different cells that contain (mostly already existing)
genes.” Gontier, Nathalie. “Evolutionary epistemology and the origin and
evolution of language: Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From
Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 201.
“Essentialist thinking is always about distinguishing the accidental from
the essential. De Saussure for example developed his three laws. These
state that the primary concern of linguistics is about coming to terms
with the following three dichotomous relations within language: (a) the
relation between lexicon and grammar; (b) the relation between form and
meaning and (c) the relation between langue and parole. These dichotomous
relations indeed are instruments to distinguish the accidental from the
essential and hence are used to discover the core of ‘the’ language.”
Gontier, Nathalie. “Evolutionary epistemology and the origin and evolution
of language: Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From Gontier,
Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 206-7.
“Since all languages are different manifestations of one language, all
languages are uniform, meaning that there is no directionality to language
change. If there were directionality, language(s) would evolve and there
would be ‘lesser’ and ‘more’ languages, but the essential, reified, ideal,
universal language is, once evolved, evolutionless.” Gontier, Nathalie.
“Evolutionary epistemology and the origin and evolution of language:
Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P.
Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and
Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006.
Springer. P. 207.
“The universal symbiogenetic process can be implemented in the study of
language evolution in at least three ways: in the study of language
variation; language genes and within the study of conceptual blending.”
Gontier, Nathalie. “Evolutionary epistemology and the origin and evolution
of language: Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From Gontier,
Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 216-7.
“The mechanisms at the base of language variation, however, can get
comprehended as a form of horizontal evolution; just as bacteria can
exchange genetic material freely within one generation, so languages can
exchange grammatical structures, vowels, phonological elements freely.
Languages, therefore, show more resemblance to bacterial types than to
rigid species.” Gontier, Nathalie. “Evolutionary epistemology and the
origin and evolution of language: Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp.
195-226. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors.
Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 218.
“However, conceptual blending can also be understood as a form of
symbiogenesis, so therefore, I have redefined conceptual blending just to
show how symbiotic this view really is: Conceptual blending is the
combining of two or more conceptual frames that results in a new
conceptual frame with meaning not seen in the different components.”
“It is important to note that in this definition, the components
themselves are not static, unchangeable entities.” Gontier, Nathalie.
“Evolutionary epistemology and the origin and evolution of language:
Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P.
Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and
Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006.
Springer. P. 222. Reference is to conceptual blending per Fauconnier, G. &
M. Turner. The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden
Complexities. 2002. Basic Books.
“It is an old understanding in evolutionary sciences that our cognitive
phenotype evolves in similar ways as the organic phenotype does.”
Diettrich, Olaf. “The biological boundary conditions for our classical
physical world view.” Pp. 67-93. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem
& D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A
Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 67.
“But trial and error is a little bit too simple an explanation for complex
matters such as the organic or the cognitive phenotype. First of all, the
environment is not that dominant as people usually think. The selection
pressure which a certain habitat will exert on an organism living there
does not only depend on the structure of the habitat. It depends on the
structure of the organism itself as well. Horses and snakes, for example,
though they may have developed in exactly the same physical environment,
have entirely different organs of locomotion which have no structural
element in common. And, accordingly, entirely different will be the
selective pressure they have to meet. Horses have to improve the
elasticity of their limbs and the strength of their muscles. Snakes have
to improve the surface friction of their skin.” Diettrich, Olaf. “The
biological boundary conditions for our classical physical world view.” Pp.
67-93. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors.
Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 68.
“Objects are defined by their properties and properties are defined as
invariants of measuring operators. So, objects too are defined by means of
operators. As we can neither measure a property nor act upon the object in
question without the preceding application of defining operations (i.e.
defining the properties which characterise the object in question), we can
conclude that all we see and do is a matter of interaction between three
different kinds of operators: defining, measuring and acting operators. In
other words, what a perception is going to tell us, or what an acting will
bring about depends on how the object perceived is defined.” Diettrich,
Olaf. “The biological boundary conditions for our classical physical world
view.” Pp. 67-93. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts,
Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 69-70.
“The evolution of notated language has lessons that can help us understand
the origin and emergence of speech. In a study of notated language the
effects of the phonetic alphabet and literacy on the development of
deductive logic, abstract science, codified law, and monotheism were
revealed. We showed that these five developments, which emerged between
the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers and the Aegean Sea between 2000 and 500 BC,
formed an autocatalytic set of ideas that supported each other’s
development. The alphabet not only served as a convenient way to notate
speech it also taught the lessons of analysis (breaking up words into
their basic phonemes), coding (writing), decoding (reading) and
classification (alphabetization).
“From this work emerged the notion that language is both a medium of
communication and an informatics tool since the structure of a language
influences the way in which people organize information and develop ideas.
This work led to the hypothesis that speech, writing, math, science,
computing and the Internet represented six independent languages each with
its own unique semantics and syntax. It was shown that these six forms of
language formed an evolutionary chain of languages with each new language
emerging from the previous forms of language as a bifurcation to a new
level of order a la Prigogine in response to an information overload that
the previous set of languages could not handle.” Logan, Robert. “The
extended mind model of the origin of language and culture.” Pp. 149-167.
From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors.
Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 149-150. References are:
McLuhan, M. & R. Logan. 1977. “Alphabet, mother of invention.” Etcetera
34: 373-383. Logan, R. 1995. The fifth language: Learning a living in the
computer age. Stoddart Publishing.
“My earlier work with the evolution of notated language was based on the
premise that a new form of language evolved in response to the chaos
resulting from the information overload associated with the previous forms
of language. In light of this we should anticipate that the origin of
speech was also due to a response to chaos and information overload.”
Logan, Robert. “The extended mind model of the origin of language and
culture.” Pp. 149-167. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D.
Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 150.
“When the complexity of hominid life became so great that perception and
learned reactions to perceptions alone could not provide enough requisite
variety to model or regulate the challenges of day to day life a new level
of order emerged based on concepts. Percepts arise from our impressions of
the external world that we apprehend with our senses and are mediated by
neural networks in our brains. Concepts, on the other hand, are abstract
ideas that result from the generalization of particular examples. Concepts
allow one to deal with things that are remote in both the space and time
dimension. If our first words were concepts then language allowed us to
represent things that are remote is both space and time and, hence,
provide language with what Hockett defines as displacement.” Logan,
Robert. “The extended mind model of the origin of language and culture.”
Pp. 149-167. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts,
Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 151. Reference is to
Hockett, C. 1960. “The origin of speech.” Scientific American. 203:
88-111.
“Assuming that language is both a form of communication and an information
processing system it is conjectured that the emergence of speech
represented the actual transition from percept-based thought to
concept-based thought. The spoken word, as we shall see, is the actual
medium or mechanism by which concepts are expressed or represented.”
Logan, Robert. “The extended mind model of the origin of language and
culture.” Pp. 149-167. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D.
Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 152.
“The use of a word transforms the brain from one state to another and
replaces a set of percepts with a concept. A word is a srange attractor
for all the percepts associated with the concept represented by that word.
A word, therefore, packs a great deal of experience into a single
utterance or sign. Millions of percepts of a linguistic community are
boiled down by the language to a single word acting as a concept and a
strange attractor for all those percepts.” Logan, Robert. “The extended
mind model of the origin of language and culture.” Pp. 149-167. From
Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 153.
“Human beings as person can be thought of as co-ontogenetic creatures that
organize their lives and are mutually constituted with and by other
persons with whom they relate in multiple ways and roles.” Ramirez-Goicoechea,
Eugenia. “Cognition, evolution, and sociality.” Pp. 283-312. From Gontier,
Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 285.
“Two processes that are lived experientially together may share some
common neural paths. Short-sighted people hear better with their glasses
on and people hear better when they can see people’s faces or their lips
moving (not because they know lip reading!), in what has been called the
McGurk effect.” Ramirez-Goicoechea, Eugenia. “Cognition, evolution, and
sociality.” Pp. 283-312. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D.
Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 287.
“What J. Bruner called the scaffolded world we live in, full of
reifications and social artefacts, constitutes the scenario for children
to build up their own way into a selected environment, the frameworks they
will explore for meaning and (more or less) coherence, in a never-ending
process of reworking the legacy of their elders and the choices–within
constraints–of their generation-mates.
“Caregivers bring forth and structure children’s abilities thanks to: (1)
the dialogy of care-giver/child relationships; (2) body language, indirect
communication, and emotional saliency; (3) infant direct speech (IDS,
babytalk, motherese), exploratory talk, proper speech styles, and
appropriate commentaries to the situation; (4) alternate participation as
in turn-taking; (5) guided, educated attention; and (6) anticipatory
cognitive and emotional stimulation as in inter-mental developmental zone
where children learn to become inter-thinkers.
“Caregivers socialize providing the focus, the clues, the saliency, the
format and dynamic repetitive and standardized structures from which the
child will creatively build a shared world of his/her own. The education
of attention funds shared rules about ways, contexts, and relevance, of
what goes without saying, of what we trust our world to be about and of
which we have intuitive, self-evident knowledge.” Ramirez-Goicoechea,
Eugenia. “Cognition, evolution, and sociality.” Pp. 283-312. From Gontier,
Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 293-4. Reference is to Bruner,
Jerome. 1983. Child’s Talk: learning to use the language. Oxford Univ.
Press.
“But emotions are important in decision making because they point towards
saliency, relevance, value, purposes, communication and directionality for
action. Emotions and feelings tell us about how things go in the world for
us and for others. Emotions are like an ‘information holding system’,
reverberating loops that keep information active for further mental
purposes. They allow us to concentrate attention and energy on certain
aspects of the situation so we can hierarchically organize and reorganize
it. Emotional deprivation and depression have been reported as having
consequences in nexploratory activity, social intelligence, and inability
to envisage mental tasks from a whole perspective. The attribution of
emotional and intentional states, as part of a theory of mind and social
cognition has been decisivie during hominization.” Ramirez-Goicoechea,
Eugenia. “Cognition, evolution, and sociality.” Pp. 283-312. From Gontier,
Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 297-8. Subquote is from
D’Andrade, R. 1981. “The cultural part of cognition.” Cognitive Science 5:
179-195.
“Motivated knowledgeable human practices become objectified by means of
rutinization/ritualization, typification and institutionalization, that
introduce new dynamics and emergencies [emergences?] within the system.
Through this externalization, knowledge becomes objectified, communicable,
structured, knowable for others to evaluate, discuss, agree upon, and
rework. Objectifications could be understood as attractors that orient,
direct, and capture human activity in its gravitational space, in its
fluxes and exchanges as well as in its more consolidated and structured
forms.
“The externalized reification processes were started by hominids through
their social relationship, embedded in environmental
selection/appropriation/transformation (i.e. object production,
technology), language, ritual enactments–including body work.
Externalization allowed for a new kind of recursivity that may have sped
up both cross-modality and especialization as seen in the exponential
cognitive and social complexity of homo sapiens sapiens.
“Devices that were selected, biosocially created, exaptated [exapted?],
thanks to sociobiological cognitive abilities became self-organized and
relatively autonomous as new attractors that catalyzed some of these very
same capacities, giving them new strength and new direction. Once in
motion, as in Tomasello’s ratchet effect, or Vico’s history in spiral,
there is no way back.” Ramirez-Goicoechea, Eugenia. “Cognition, evolution,
and sociality.” Pp. 283-312. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem &
D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist,
Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 300.
“It is the function of religious practice in establishing essential shared
sentiments and ideas that Durkheim argues is a necessary foundation for
social life, not religious beliefs.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and
Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004.
Cambridge University Press. P. 3.
“Durkheim argued in The Division of Labor, that a sense of unity and
well-being based on shared belief, while it is comforting to group
members, ultimately threatens the security and solidarity of an advanced
division of labor because it leads inevitably to exclusive groupings
within the larger collective.”
“In arguing that religion played an essential role in establishing a
shared knowledge base, Durkheim was rejecting existing approaches to the
problem of knowledge, replacing explanations that began with the
individual with his own socially based argument that knowledge is created
by the shared experience of enacted practices.” Rawls, Anne W.
Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious
Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 3.
“Durkheim’s epistemology argument, articulated in the central chapters of
The Elementary Forms, locates the origin of the fundamental categories of
human thought, or reason, not in individual perceptions, as Hume had
argued, nor as a transcendent and innate aspect of the mind, as Kant had
argued, but rather, in the shared emotional experience of those ritually
produced moral forces created by the enactment of concrete practices in
the midst of an assembled group.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and
Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004.
Cambridge University Press. P. 10.
“Their ‘Major Transitions’ [Smith and Szathmary’s] identified
uncontroversially important episodes in evolutionary history, but each of
these episodes also changes some key evolutionary factor: the construction
of new individuals; the increasing bandwidth and fidelity of inheritance;
the establishment of new inheritance channels; the development of
open-ended sources of variation.” Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011.
The Major Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 1. Reference
is to Smith, Maynard & E. 1995. “The major evolutionary transitions.”
Nature 374: 227-232. Also their book The Major Transitions in Evolution.
1995. Oxford University Press.
“Among the major transitions are episodes of the creation of new kinds of
evolutionary agent: eukaryotic cells; multicelled animals; social insects.
These episodes of the evolution of individuality show that selection acts
on collectives of fitness-bearing agents, not just on those agents
themselves, and that higher-level selection drives evolutionary
trajectories.” Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major
Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. Pp. 3-4.
“Instead of conceptualizing life as evolving through a fixed, though
immense, space of organic design, and asking how that space is explored
over time, Maynard Smith and Szathmary conceived of the space of
biological possibility as itself evolving.” Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny,
Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 4.
“Life in this universe has an importance far beyond our understanding,
because it is life that created us from nothing. It is life that has given
us the ability to survive. It is life that has given so much beauty to
this earth. It is life through which God has given the ability to humans
to be guided by his prophets through the books that he has given to them.
“Life is God’s natural gift to humanity. People owe their life to God.
Each minute of life is being counted and is valued as much as gold. Life
is a gift that nobody can take from another, not at any price. You should
take care, treat life the way you would treat the most precious object,
and be careful to use it the right way.” Zaeef, Abdul Salam. My Life with
the Taliban. 2010. Columbia University Press. P. xlvi.
“The key to Gibson’s theory is that animals must actively explore and
attend to their environments to pick up the available information...
“This active sampling allows animals to perceive not only the ‘invariant
structure’ we described above, but also ‘perspective structure.’
“When an animal moves and transforms the optical array, this provides
information about its own locomotion–this is perspective structure. A
flowing perspective structure indicates movement, whereas an arrested
perspective structure indicates that the organism is at rest. In Gibson’s
theory, then, perception of the environment is always and simultaneously a
form of self-perception (nicely embedding the animal in its environment in
a mutualistic way). Barrett, Louise. Beyond the Brain: How Body and
Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds. 2011. Princeton University
Press. Pp. 106-7. Reference is to Gibson, J.J. The Ecological Approach to
Visual Perception. 1979. Erlbaum.
“ ... behavior is not about producing the ‘right’ response given a
particular stimulus, but often means producing the ‘response’ that
subsequently leads to the ‘right’ stimulus.” Barrett, Louise. Beyond the
Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds. 2011.
Princeton University Press. P. 139.
“Andrew Pickering, a sociologist of science, who has written a wonderful
book about the British ‘cyberneticians,’ including Grey Walter, suggests
that we should refer to the brain and what it does as ‘performative’
rather than ‘representational ....’” Barrett, Louise. Beyond the Brain:
How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds. 2011. Princeton
University Press. P. 143. Reference is to Pickering, Andrew. The
Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future. 2010. University of Chicago
Press.
“Polanyi makes the point that these three factors of production [labor,
land, and money] are not natural commodities because they are not produced
for sale. He called them ‘fictitious commodities’ for this reason.”
Jackson, Ross. Occupy World Street: A Global Roadmap for Radical Economic
and Political Reform. 2012. Chelsea Green Publishing. P. 57. Reference is
to Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation. 2001. Beacon Press.
“Polanyi argues that prior to the emergence of capitalism, the economy was
embedded in society, i.e., subordinated to politics, religion, and social
relationships, whereas a truly self-regulating market–the ideal of the
merchant class–would essentially extricate the economy from society.
Polanyi considered the very idea of an unregulated, self-adjusting market
to be a utopia that could not exist for any time without destroying both
man and his environment. It should be eminently clear that no market
system can exist without government regulations, particularly regarding
the ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, labor, and money, which do not
behave as real commodities except in the abstract models of the
economists. So in practice it is not a question of regulation or no
regulation, but how much and what kind of regulation.
“Since the emergence of capitalism in the nineteenth century, the dynamic
of what Polanyi called the ‘double movement’ has characterized the
struggle between the merchant-class supporters of this unobtainable utopia
on the one hand and needs of the citizens for a stable, secure, and
satisfying social life, and supportive natural environment, on the other.
The latter is, in its essence, a struggle for local democracy, which is
the opposite pole of a self-regulating market society.” Jackson, Ross.
Occupy World Street: A Global Roadmap for Radical Economic and Political
Reform. 2012. Chelsea Green Publishing. P. 58. Reference is to Polanyi,
Karl. The Great Transformation. 2001. Beacon Press.
“In other words Darwinian evolution necessarily involves continued
diversification, but what if the outcomes are subject to repeated
channeling? It may then transpire that the tree has a quite specific
structure, and one that it is far from a random exploration of biological
space.” Morris, Simon Conway. “The predictability of evolution: glimpses
into a post-Darwinian world.” 2009. Naturwissenschaften. 96:1313-1337. P.
1317.
“I have outlined the concept of evolutionary inherency, that is, the
notion that pre-existing configurations make subsequent evolutionary
outcomes far more likely.” Morris, Simon Conway. “The predictability of
evolution: glimpses into a post-Darwinian world.” 2009.
Naturwissenschaften. 96:1313-1337. P. 1323.
“In a remarkable survey of the available mutational pathways that confer
bacterial resistance to an antibiotic by the employment of B-lactamase,
Weinreich et al. note that in their study that although more than a
hundred pathways exist, in practice, nearly all of them are dead-ends.
Thus, they conclude ‘that intramolecular interactions render many
mutational pathways selectively inaccessible, which implies the protein
tape of life ... might be surprisingly repetitive.’
“It seems inevitable that many deeper organizational principles remain to
be discovered in biological systems.” Morris, Simon Conway. “The
predictability of evolution: glimpses into a post-Darwinian world.” 2009.
Naturwissenschaften. 96:1313-1337. P. 1326. Reference is to Weinreich, DM,
Delaney NF, DePristo MA, Hartl, DL. 2006. “Darwinian evolution can follow
only very few mutational pathways to fitter proteins.” Sciences.
312:111-114.
“... the reality in biology is not that very many things work ‘after a
fashion,’ but to the contrary out of the unimaginably large possibilities
of design hyperspace almost nothing works but when it does it usually
works extremely well.” Morris, Simon Conway. “The predictability of
evolution: glimpses into a post-Darwinian world.” 2009.
Naturwissenschaften. 96:1313-1337. P. 1331.
“The same stone, for example, may function as shelter for the crab that
hides beneath it, as an anvil for the thrush that uses it to break open
snail shells, and as a missile for an angry human to hurl at an adversary.
In Gibson’s terms, shelter, anvil and missile are all properties of the
stone that are available to be taken up. For von Uexkuell, by contrast,
they are qualities that are bestowed upon the stone by the need of the
creature in question and in the very act of attending to it. The stone
only becomes a shelter when the crab scuttles under it, an anvil when the
thrush smashes the shell against it, and a missile when the man picks it
up to throw. Outside of these activities, it was none of these things.
Thus, far from fitting into a given corner of the world (a niche), it is
the animal that fits the world to itself by ascribing functional qualities
to the things it encounters and thereby integrating them into a coherent
system of its own. To denote this system – the world as it is constituted
within the animal’s circuit of perception and action – von Uexkuell used
the term Umwelt. The life of every creature, von Uexkuell thought, was so
wrapped up in its own Umwelt that no other worlds were accessible to it.
It is as though each one were floating in its own particular ‘bubble’ of
reality.” Ingold, Tim. “Point, Line and Counterpoint: From Environment to
Fluid Space.” From: Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology
of “Umwelt”: How Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. P. 146.
References are to: Von Uexkuell, J. 1992. “A stroll through the worlds of
animals and men: a picture book of invisible worlds.” Semiotica 89(4):
319-391 (originally published in 1934).
“The human practitioner is unique in inhabiting the world of the open. To
explain what he meant, Heidegger asked his listeners to compare an
inanimate object like a stone, an animal and a human being. How do they
differ? His answer took the form of three theses: ‘The stone ... is
worldless; the animal is poor in world; man is world-forming.” Ingold,
Tim. “Point, Line and Counterpoint: From Environment to Fluid Space.”
From: Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology of “Umwelt”:
How Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. P. 147. Reference is to
Heidegger, M. 1995. “The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: world,
finitude, solitude. Translated by W. McNeil, N. Walker. Indiana University
Press. [Based on a course presented in 1929-30, originally published in
1983.]
“... an environment is that which surrounds the organism, yet you cannot
surround a bundle without wrapping it up, converting the very paths along
which life is lived into boundaries within which it is contained. Instead,
let us imagine ourselves, as did Charles Darwin in The Origin of Species,
standing before ‘the plants and bushes clothing an entangled bank.’
Observe how the fibrous bundles comprising every plant and bush are
entwined with one another so as to form a dense mat of vegetation. What we
have been used to calling the environment reappears on the bank as an
immense tangle of lines.” Ingold, Tim. “Point, Line and Counterpoint: From
Environment to Fluid Space.” From: Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009.
Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: How Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer.
P. 150.
“The acteur reseau was intended by its originators (if not by those who
have been beguiled by its translation as network) to be comprised of just
such lines of becoming. Their inspiration came, in large measure, from the
philosophy of Deleuze. As we have already seen, with acknowledgement to
Deleuze, the line of the web does not link the spider to the fly, neither
does the latter’s line of flight link it to the spider. Ensconced at the
centre of its web, the spider knows that a fly has landed somewhere on the
outer margins, as it sends vibrations down the threads that are picked up
by the spider’s super-sensitive, spindly legs. And it can then run along
the lines of the web to retrieve its prey. Thus the thread-lines of the
web lay down the conditions of possibility for the spider to interact with
the fly, but they are not themselves lines of interaction. If these lines
are relations, then they are relations not between but along. Of course,
as with the spider, the lives of organisms generally extend along not one
but multiple lines, knotted together at the centre but trailing
innumerable loose ends at the periphery. Thus each should be pictured, as
Latour has latterly suggested, in the shape of a star ‘with a center
surrounded by many radiating lines, with all sorts of tiny conduits
leading to and fro.’ No longer a self-contained object like a ball that
can propel itself from place to place, the organism now appears as an ever
ramifying web of lines of growth. This is the Deleuzeian haecceity,
famously compared to a rhizome. I personally prefer the image of the
fungal mycelium. Indeed as the mycologist Alan Rayner has suggested, the
whole of biology would be different had it taken the mycelium as the
protoypical exemplar of the living organism. For it could not, then, have
been built upon the presumption that life is contained within the absolute
bounds of fixed forms. We would rather have a biology that starts from the
fluid character of the life process, wherein boundaries are sustained only
thanks to the continual flow of materials across them.” Ingold, Tim.
“Point, Line and Counterpoint: From Environment to Fluid Space.” From:
Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: How
Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. P. 152. References: Latour,
Bruno. 2005. Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network
theory. Oxford University Press. P. 177. Deleuze, G. & F.Guattari. 2004 A
thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia. Translated by B. Massumi.
Continuum. Originally published in 1980. P. 290. Rayner, Alan. 1997.
Degrees of freedom: living in dynamic boundaries. Imperial College Press.
“Dividing an organism’s world into behavioral and biological factors has
created counterproductive explanatory problems, often presented as a
conflict between reductionism and explanation based on publicly accessible
external variables. The main purpose of this paper is to suggest that an
organism’s integrated repertoire of operant behavior has the status of a
biological system, similar to other systems, like the nervous,
cardiovascular, or immune systems.” Thompson, Travis. “Relations among
functional systems in behavior analysis.” Journal of the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior. 2007. 87, 423-440. P. 423.
“The integrated repertoire of behavioral units (operants) that have been
acquired and maintained under the functional control of motivational or
establishing operations, discriminative stimuli, mediating events conjoint
with reinforced responses, and consequences, function as a biological
system.” Thompson, Travis. “Relations among functional systems in behavior
analysis.” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. 2007. 87,
423-440. P. 423.
“Strictly speaking ‘Um-welt’ means the ‘world around’ in which animals and
humans live. It can be translated in French by ‘Milieu.’ However, for von
Uexkuell it includes the world of things in the environment, the perceived
world, the signals emitted by both the subject and the things, and the
actions that can be performed by each species. Above all, it includes the
significance or meaning of things for each animal, in that they are
potentially participating in the survival and social relations of the
animal.” Berthoz, Alain. “The Human Brain ‘Projects’ upon the World,
Simplifying Principles and Rules for Perception.” From: Berthoz, A. & Y.
Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: How Living Beings
Perceive the World. Springer. P. 18.
“Perceptual and effector worlds together form a closed unit, the Umwelt.”
Von Uexkuell, Jakob. 1934. Streifzuege durch die Umwelten von Tieren und
Menschen. Springer. English translation by C. Schiller. “A stroll through
the worlds of animals and men. A picture book of invisible worlds.” in:
Coll., Instinctive Behavior. 1957. P. 6. Quoted in Fagot-Largeault, Anne.
“Anthropological Physiology: von Uexkuell, Portmann, Buytendijk.” From:
Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: How
Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. P. 2.
“As the spider spins its threads, every subject spins his relations to
certain characters of the things around him, and weaves them into a firm
web which carries his existence.” Von Uexkuell, Jakob. 1934. Streifzuege
durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen. Springer. English translation
by C. Schiller. “A stroll through the worlds of animals and men. A picture
book of invisible worlds.” in: Coll., Instinctive Behavior. 1957. P. 14.
Quoted in Fagot-Largeault, Anne. “Anthropological Physiology: von Uexkuell,
Portmann, Buytendijk.” From: Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009.
Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: How Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer.
P. 2.
“Adolf Portmann (1897-1982) was a zoologist known for having developed the
idea that human beings were born premature, and that the extra-uterine
embryos we all were, found a second uterus in their social environment.”
Fagot-Largeault, Anne. “Anthropological Physiology: von Uexkuell, Portmann,
Buytendijk.” From: Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology of
“Umwelt”: How Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. P. 3.
“Different sensory inputs may require the same motor output, and different
sensory inputs that require the same motor output are said to form
‘categories’.” Mirolli, Marco & D. Parisi. “Language as a Cognitive Tool.”
Minds & Machines. 2009. 19:517-528. P. 521.
“What are the consequences of this reciprocal functional linking of the
sensory-motor network and the linguistic network, i.e., of possessing a
language, for the organism’s categories? The answer is that categorization
is enhanced by language. When the child hears and understands the language
spoken by others, the child’s categories tend to become better categories,
i.e., smaller and more distant clouds of points in the child’s neural
network.” Mirolli, Marco & D. Parisi. “Language as a Cognitive Tool.”
Minds & Machines. 2009. 19:517-528. Pp. 522-23.
“As Tomasello argues, the establishment of collaborative interaction, can
only be achieved by animals mutually perceiving each other’s visible
actions. It could not be achieved by way of vocalisations. A vocalisation
can draw the attention of a recipient to its source, to the originator of
the sound. But that sound cannot be used by itself to direct the attention
of a recipient to something else that is to constitute a specific object
for joint attention. One cannot point with a vocalisation. This can only
be done through a visible action that serves to link, in someway, the
actor to something in the environment in relation to which he is acting.”
Kendon, Adam. “Language’s matrix.” 2009. Gesture. 9:3, 355-372. P. 359.
“A much better approach, it seems to me, and one that takes into
consideration how utterances are actually produced in modern speakers,
would be to start with the assumption that the transition into referential
or language-like expressions involved hands and body, face and voice and
mouth, all together, as an integrated ensemble. What so many writers on
this topic – ‘gesture firsters’ and ‘speech firsters’ both – pay little
attention to is the fact that modern humans, when they speak together in
face-to-face situations, especially in the informal settings of everyday
interactions, always mobilise face and hands and voice together in complex
orchestrations.” Kendon, Adam. “Language’s matrix.” 2009. Gesture. 9:3,
355-372. P. 363.
“A more plausible approach would be to see that the diversification of
languages comes about as a consequence of the way in which linguistic
expressions serve to signify things in the world. They do this, not by
signifying things directly but by signifying the concepts in terms of
which the things in the world are construed. These concepts or conceptual
categories are not dictated by anything in the world, they are, rather,
the creations of communities of speakers....”
“There are no cognitive categories that are ‘given’ (except possibly at
some very abstract level), so that the way one group may end up setting up
linguistic categories can be rather different from the way another group
may do this. The categorisations that language creates are the products of
socially shared agreements, and these are free to vary within a very wide
range....”
“Language differences can be (and are) exploited as sources of group pride
and identity, and people may work to create and exaggerate such
differences as part of the process of group differentiation, but the
fundamental reason for language differentiation lies in the fact that
languages are conceptual categorisation systems, freely created through
local historical processes.” Kendon, Adam. “Language’s matrix.” 2009.
Gesture. 9:3, 355-372. Pp. 368-69.
“Technique thus places the subject at the centre of activity, whereas
technology affirms the independence of production from human
subjectivity.” Ingold, Tim. The Perception of the Environment: Essays in
livelihood, dwelling and skill. 2000. Routledge. P. 315.
“... technical evolution describes a process not of complexification but
of objectification of the productive forces.” Ingold, Tim. The Perception
of the Environment: Essays in livelihood, dwelling and skill. 2000.
Routledge. P. 319.
“Thus in hunting, it is commonly supposed that the animal gives itself to
be killed by the hunter who, as a recipient, occupies the subordinate
position in the transaction. The spear, arrow or trap serves here as a
vehicle for opening or consummating a relationship. If the arrow misses
its mark, or if the trap remains empty, it is inferred that the animal
does not as yet intend to enter into a relationship with the hunter by
allowing itself to be taken. In that way, the instruments of hunting serve
a similar purpose to the tools of divination, revealing the otherwise
hidden intentions of non-human agents in a world saturated with personal
powers of one kind and another. In short, whereas for farmers and
herdsmen, the tool is an instrument of control, for hunters and gatherers
it would better be regarded as an instrument of revelation.” Ingold, Tim.
The Perception of the Environment: Essays in livelihood, dwelling and
skill. 2000. Routledge. P. 320.
“Each of these sorts of phenomena–a function, reference, purpose, or
value–is in some way incomplete. There is something not-there there.
Without this ‘something’ missing, they would just be plain and simple
physical objects or events, lacking these otherwise curious attributes.
Longing, desire, passion, appetite, mourning, loss, aspiration–all are
based on an analogous intrinsic incompleteness, an integral without-ness.
“As I reflect on this odd state of things, I am struck by the fact that
there is no single term that seems to refer to this elusive character of
such things. So, at the risk of initiating this discussion with a clumsy
neologism, I will refer to this as an absential feature, to denote
phenomena whose existence is determined with respect to an essential
absence. This could be a state of things not yet realized, a specific
separate object of a representation, a general type of property that may
or may not exist, an abstract quality, an experience, and so forth–just
not that which is actually present. This paradoxical intrinsic quality of
existing with respect to something missing, separate, and possibly
nonexistent is irrelevant when it comes to inanimate things, but it is a
defining property of life and mind. A complete theory of the world that
includes us and our experience of the world, must make sense of the way
that we are shaped by and emerge from such specific absences. What is
absent matters, and yet our current understanding of the physical universe
suggests that is should not. A causal role for absence seems to be absent
from the natural sciences.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind
Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 2-3.
“Dynamical systems theories are ultimately forced to explain away the
end-directed and normative characteristics of organisms, because they
implicitly assume that all causally relevant phenomena must be
instantiated by some material substrate or energetic difference.
Consequently, they are as limited in their power to deal with the
representational and experiential features of mind as are simple
mechanistic accounts.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind
Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 5.
“Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her
but he’s unwilling to be seen with her in public.” Haldane, J.B.S. Quoted
in: Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter.
2012. W.W. Norton. P. 107. Appears to be from: Bernal, J.D., (Ed). 1967.
The Origin of Life. World Publishing Co.
“The concept of constraint is, in effect, a complementary concept to
order, habit, and organization, because it determines a similarity class
by exclusion.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from
Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 191-2.
“Constraints are what is not there but could have been, irrespective of
whether this is registered by any act of observation.” Deacon, Terrence.
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P.
192.
“This way of characterizing disorder is exemplified by an
information-theoretic means of measuring complexity termed Kolmogorov
complexity, after the theoretician who first promoted its use, the Russian
mathematician Andrey Nikolaevich Kolmogorov (1903-1987). It can most
easily be understood in terms of a method for analyzing or generating a
string of numbers. If the same string can be generated by an algorithm
that is shorter than that string, it is said to be compressible to that
extent. Such an algorithm effectively captures a form of redundancy that
is not superficially exemplified in its product.” Deacon, Terrence.
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P.
196.
“So what may appear chaotic may be merely the result of a simple operation
that tends to entwine with itself to the point that any regularity is
obscured. Alternatively, being impossible to simplify means that there are
only details to contend with, nothing simpler. Irrespective of whether all
real phenomena are maximally algorithmically complex–as extreme nominalism
would suggest–or are algorithmically compressible without residue–as
extreme realism would suggest–a constraint view of orderliness still
applies.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from
Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 196-7.
“Recasting the Realism/Nominalism debate in terms of dynamics and
constraints eliminates the need to refer to both abstract generals, like
organization, and simple particular objects or events lacking in
organization. Both are simplifications due to our representation of
things, not things in themselves. What exist are processes of change,
constraints exhibited by those processes, and the statistical smoothing
and the attractors that embody the options left by these constraints.”
Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012.
W.W. Norton. P. 197.
“For general purposes, then, it would be useful to distinguish between
changes that must be forced to occur through extrinsic intervention and
those that require intervention to prevent them from occurring....
“I will call changes in the state of a system that are consistent with the
spontaneous, ‘natural’ tendency to change, irrespective of external
interference, orthograde changes. The term literally refers to going with
the grade or tilt or tendency of things, as in falling, or ‘going along
with the flow.’ In contrast, I will call changes in the state of a system
that must be extrinsically forced, because they run counter to orthograde
tendencies, contragrade changes.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How
Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 223.
“Contragrade change is the natural consequence of one orthograde process
influencing a different orthograde process...” Deacon, Terrence.
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P.
224.
“It is simply because the world is highly heterogeneous that there can be
contragrade processes.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind
Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 224.
“Since orthograde processes ensue spontaneously, they are ubiquitously
present, even during processes of contragrade (forced) changes. A
contragrade change must therefore derive from two or more orthograde
processes, each in some way undoing the other’s effects. To put this in
the terms introduced in the previous chapter, each must constrain the
other. The tendency of one orthograde process to realize the full range of
its degrees of freedom (e.g., the diffusion into all potential locations)
must diminish the tendency of another orthograde process to realize all
its potential degrees of freedom.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature:
How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 225.
“Rather than order or disorder, then, I suggest that we begin to think of
entropy as a measure of constraint. An increase in entropy is a decrease
in constraint, and vice versa.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How
Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 228.
“We can thus describe the increase in entropy as a decrease in
constraints, and the second law can be restated as follows: In any given
interaction, the global level of constraint can only decrease.” Deacon,
Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W.
Norton. P. 229.
“Orthograde thermodynamic change occurs because it is an unperturbed
reflection of the space of possible trajectories of change for that
system. It is in this sense a consequence of the geometric properties of
this probability space. An orthograde change just happens, irrespective of
anything else, so long as there is any change occurring at all. I take
this to be a reasonable way to reinterpret Aristotle’s notion of a formal
cause in a modern scientific framework, because the source of the
asymmetry is ultimately a formal or geometric principle.” Deacon,
Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W.
Norton. Pp. 230-1.
“... Homeodynamics–coins a term that I think can more generally describe
this most basic orthograde dynamic wherever we encounter it. It is a
dynamic that spontaneously reduces constraints to their minimum and thus
more evenly distributes whatever property is being changed from moment to
moment and locus to locus.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind
Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 232-3.
“The second law of thermodynamics thus describes a tendency to
spontaneously reduce constraint, while thermodynamic work involves the
creation of constraint.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind
Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 247.
“What does this tell us in terms of morphodynamic processes in general?
Using the Benard cell case as an exemplar, it demonstrates that if there
are intrinsic interaction biases available (buoyancy differences,
viscosity effects, and geometric distribution constraints in this case),
the persistent imposition of constraint (constant heating) will tend to
redistribute this additional constraint into these added dimensions of
potential difference. Moreover, these additional dimensions are boundary
conditions, to the extent that they are uniformly present across the
system. This includes the geometric constraint, which is not derived from
any material feature of the system or its components. Because these
additional dimensions are systemwide and ubiquitous, they are also of a
higher level of scale than the constraints of molecular interaction. So
this transfer of constraints from molecular-level differences to
global-level differences also involves the propagation of constraint from
lower- to higher-order dynamics.
“The distinct higher-order orthograde tendency that characterizes the
morphodynamics of Benard cell formation thus emerges from the lower-order
orthograde tendency that characterizes fluid thermodynamics. This tendency
to redistribute constraint to higher-order dimensions is an orthograde
tendency of a different and independent kind than the spontaneous
constraint dissipation that characterizes simpler thermodynamic systems.”
Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012.
W.W. Norton. Pp. 254-5.
“Life is characterized by the use of energy flowing in and out of an
organism to generate the constraints that maintain its
structural-functional integrity. Since organisms are subject to the
incessant dissipative effects of the second law of thermodynamics, they
additionally need to constantly impede certain forms of dissipation.
Organisms take advantage of the flow of energy through them to do work to
generate constraints that block some dissipative pathways as compared to
others.” [An early description of teleodynamics] Deacon, Terrence.
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P.
263.
“... I will adopt the more descriptive term autogen for the whole class of
related minimal teleodynamical systems. This term captures what is perhaps
its most distinctive defining feature: being a self-generating system. In
this respect, it is closely related to Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis,
though referring to a distinct dynamical unit process rather than a
process more generally, for which I have reserved the more general term
tel[e]odynamic. The term autogen is also easily modified to apply to a
broader class of related forms by describing any form of
self-encapsulating, self-repairing, self-replicating system that is
constituted by reciprocal morphodynamic processes as autogenic, and
describing the process, appropriately, as autogenesis.” Deacon, Terrence.
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P.
307.
“The term [autogenesis] is reserved for simple dynamical systems that
accomplish self-generation by virtue of harnessing the co-dependent
reciprocity of component morphodynamic processes.” Deacon, Terrence.
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp.
307-8.
“One might then describe an autogen as a hierarchic hypercyclic system,
with each self-organizing component acting as supporting environment or
context for the other.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind
Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 308-9.
“Autogenic organization only exists with respect to a relevant supportive
environment. So autogenic individuation is also only defined with respect
to a particular type of environment. Identity and environment are thus
reciprocally defined and determined with respect to each other, because
the same molecular configuration in a non-supportive environment lacks any
of the defining properties of autogenesis. Indeed, the very possibility
for autogen existence can be described as one of the possible micro
configurations of a certain class of environments with the molecular
constitution conducive to autogen formation.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete
Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 310.
“Morphodynamic processes are the only spontaneous processes that generate
and propagate constraints, and autogens demonstrate that reciprocity
between morphodynamic processes can preserve and replicate constraints.”
Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012.
W.W. Norton. P. 315.
“It should come as no surprise that an organism does not maximize the rate
at which it generates entropy or the throughput of energy. Instead, an
organism uses the flow of entropy to build constraints that ultimately
divert and slow this process, increasing the amount of local work it can
extract.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from
Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 318.
“So, whereas morphodynamic processes merely propagate and amplify
constraints, teleodynamic processes additionally preserve them. This is
the common theme of both life and evolution.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete
Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 318.
“Thus morphodynamic organization emerges due to the interaction of opposed
thermodynamic processes (e.g., perturbation and equilibration), and it
results in constraint amplification rather than constraint dissipation
(i.e., increase in entropy). Analogously teleodynamic organization emerges
due to reciprocally organized morphodynamic processes, and entropy
ratcheting rather than entropy production. In this respect, autogen
formation exemplifies the defining feature of an emergent phase
transition–the appearance of a new form of orthograde organization.”
Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012.
W.W. Norton. P. 319.
“Emergence is, in effect, defined by a polarity reversal in orthograde
dynamics with ascent in scale. Thus the orthograde signature of
thermodynamic change is constraint dissipation, the orthograde signature
of morphodynamic change is constraint amplification, and the orthograde
signature of teleodynamic change is constraint preservation and
correlation. The polarity reversal that defines the emergence of
teleodynamics from morphodynamics is what characterizes life and
evolution. A fit or interdependent correspondence between constraints in
different domains is the essence of both biological adaptation and the
relationship characterizing representational relationships.” Deacon,
Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W.
Norton. P. 324.
“So long as contragrade change persists, work is involved ...” Deacon,
Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W.
Norton. P. 327.
“Work is a spontaneous change inducing a non-spontaneous change to occur.”
Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012.
W.W. Norton. P. 335.
“Ultimately, the capacity of the perturbed system as a whole to be tapped
to perform work at the level above that of molecular collision is a
consequence of the distributional features of the incessant micro work,
not the energy of the component collisions, which as a whole can increase,
decrease, or remain unchanged. In other words, in thermodynamics the macro
doesn’t simply reduce to the micro, even though it is dependent upon it.
The macroscopic form of the distribution is the critical factor.” Deacon,
Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W.
Norton. P. 336.
“This allows us to propose an even more general definition of work: it is
simply the production of contragrade change.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete
Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 337.
“That is, we can begin to discern a basis for a form of causal openness in
the universe. To frame these insights in somewhat more enigmatic and
cosmic terms, we might speculate that whereas the conservation laws of
science tell us that the universe is closed to the creation or destruction
of the amount of possible ‘difference’ (the ultimate determinate of what
constitutes mass-energy) available in the world, they do not restrict the
distributional possibilities that these differences can assume, and it is
distributional relationships which determine the forms that change can
take.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter.
2012. W.W. Norton. P. 342.
“So to restate the closure or conservation laws a bit more carefully: the
universe is closed to gain or loss of mass-energy and the most basic level
of formal causality is unchanging, but it is open to organizational
constraints on formal cause and the introduction of novel forms of
efficient cause. Thus we have causal openness even in a universe that is
the equivalent of a completely isolated system. New forms of work can and
are constantly emerging.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind
Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 368.
“The vast power of evolvability thus is a consequence of the fact that
natural selection is a process that regularly transforms incidental
physical properties into functional attributes. An adaptation is the
realization of a set of constraints on candidate mechanisms, and so long
as those constraints are maintained, other features are arbitrary. But
this means that with every adaptation, there are innumerable other
arbitrary properties potentially brought into play.” Deacon, Terrence.
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp.
423-4.
“Evolution is not imposed design, but progressive constraint.” Deacon,
Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W.
Norton. P. 426.
“... natural selection assumes the existence of processes of persistent
non-equilibrium thermodynamics, self-maintenance, reproduction, and
adaptation. It cannot therefore be the complete explanation for their
origins, particularly for the origins of their teleodynamic character.”
Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012.
W.W. Norton. P. 429.
“I define symbionomics as the study of the emergence of complex systems
through self-organization, self-selection, coevolution, and symbiosis.” De
Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the Organization
of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 31.
“An evolutionary convergence is occurring: technology is invading the
biological world, and biology is invading the world of machines.” De
Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the Organization
of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 39.
“The coevolution of a society and its environment, with each determining
the other, adds a new dimension in space and time.” De Rosnay, Joel. The
Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the Organization of Life and a
Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 39.
“A similar phenomenon exists in the birth, growth, and development of a
city; the city is both a means of support and a consequence of the
activity of the collective organism that lives in it, builds, it, and
maintains its structure.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New
Understanding of the Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future.
2000. McGraw Hill. P. 39.
“The digitization and circulation of information in networks is analogous
to the introduction of currency into the networks of the economy. Before
the introduction of currency, goods or services were bought and sold by
barter, which made exchanges slow and limited them considerably. By
creating additional space for expansion and by shrinking time and space,
the introduction of currency led to explosive growth in the world
economy.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the
Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 51.
“The Internet is not a new technology; it is an integrated
resource-sharing system, an informational ecosystem made up of numerous
interdependent elements ...” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New
Understanding of the Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future.
2000. McGraw Hill. Pp. 54-5.
“From the point of view of macrobiology, the symbiosis between humans and
cars is particularly illuminating. Humanity maintains a fleet of 500
million vehicles, extracts the energy that feeds them, and builds roads
for their circulation, garages for their repair, and factories for their
‘reproduction.’ In return for the maintenance and reproduction of the
automobile species, cars allow humans to travel at greater speeds, to act
more effectively, to conquer distance, and they provide pleasure and
social status. They are also, as we saw in the previous chapter, a source
of disease for the social organism and of danger and pollution for the
planetary organism. Like symbiotic partners that turn into parasites, they
are endangering the future of the ecosphere.” De Rosnay, Joel. The
Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the Organization of Life and a
Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 76.
“... our environment is filled with biomechanical communications systems:
door and drawer handles, keys, faucets; the steering wheel, clutch, and
brake pedal of a car; the tiller of a boat; the control column and rudder
of an airplane.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding
of the Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill.
Pp. 78-9.
“The marriage of virtual reality and biotics will lead to the ultimate
interface between the human brain and that of the cybiont. Humans will
then have access to a new inner universe. To the relationship between the
real and the imaginary will be added the relationship between the real,
the imaginary, and the virtual–a shared inner universe, the embryo of a
planetary coconsciousness leading its own life, notwithstanding the
limited existence of the symbiotic consciousnesses of which it is made
up.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the
Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P.
107.
“The cybiont is to the social macroorganism what Gaia is to the planetary
ecosystem.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the
Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P.
113.
“... at the present time it [the cybiont] has no need to move, since its
life as a parasite of Gaia provides it with the energy needed for
survival.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the
Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P.
114.
“Like any living organism, the cybiont provides for its major basic
functions: self-preservation, self-regulation, and self-repair. Using
people and machines, it feeds itself, converts energy, digests, and
eliminates its waste.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New
Understanding of the Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future.
2000. McGraw Hill. P. 116.
“In an age of globalization, as the division of labor advances around the
world, many problems are arising that Durkheim warned against. In
particular the social function of religious practices is being confused
with religious beliefs. If persons, in an attempt to overcome the
increasing contingency and insecurity of modern life, turn to traditional
religious communities that exclude nonbelievers, increased fragmentation
will result. Practices, on the other hand, have the potential to be
inclusive. It was Durkheim’s position that an international cult would
have to be based on shared practices that do not discriminate between
beliefs.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The
Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P.
26.
“Durkheim also emphasizes the relationship between identical sounds and
movements and the development of reason. His argument in this regard is
essential to an understanding of his positions, because it places the
emphasis, in explaining the origin of the categories, on the experience of
enacting sounds and movements in common, not on learning words, or
mastering systems of belief.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice:
Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge
University Press. P. 37.
“For Durkheim, the possibility of shared knowledge and mutual
intelligibility depends entirely upon the collective enactment of those
shared practices which produce moral force and through the experience of
moral force the categories of the understanding. Without participation in
ritual assemblies, and the performance of ritual practices, the categories
would not be presented to experience, and all contact between minds would
be lost.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The
Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P.
39.
“Durkheim treats symbols as a surface phenomena beneath which lie concrete
social relations. It is not a referential relationship, but a causal one.
The concrete social relations, that is, the practices, cause the feelings
that are ‘called up’ by the totemic symbol.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology
and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004.
Cambridge University Press. P. 40.
“Rather, he [Durkheim] states the argument in a conditional form:
Societies cannot exist where sameness of thought does not exist to a
sufficient degree. Therefore, only groups that manage to develop religious
rites that are able to cause the ideas essential to this sameness and
unity of thought will become societies.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and
Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004.
Cambridge University Press. P. 47.
“The internal coercion of the moral force of the categories is different
from the experience of sense perception. In arguing that the categories
have a social origin, Durkheim points out that they impose themselves on
persons from the outside with an authority that sense perceptions do not
have: ‘This is none other than the authority of society passing into
certain ways of thinking that are the indispensable conditions of all
common action.’ Moral force is what participants feel when the authority
of the group is enacted by the practices and experienced directly. The
point of the contrast between sense perception and moral force is that
sensations do not impose themselves on us in this way. Sense perceptions
can be doubted, moral forces cannot” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and
Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004.
Cambridge University Press. Pp. 64-5. Quote is from Durkheim, Emile. 1912.
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Translated by Karen Fields.
The Free Press. P. 30.
“... Durkheim maintains that participation in the enactment of ritual
social practices transforms the individual into a rational human being.
However, the animal pre-rational nature of the individual remains intact.
It is the tension between these two, the rational social being and the
pre-rational individual, that constitutes dualism, according to Durkheim,
not an inherent tension between the body and the mind, or between
spiritual and material reality, as Kant and Descartes had argued.” Rawls,
Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of
Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 74.
“Society is a reality sui generis.” Durkheim, Emile. 1912. The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life. Translated by Karen Fields. The Free Press.
P. 29. Quoted in: Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The
Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P.
79.
“The sacred Durkheim identifies with the group, the social, and with moral
force. The profane he identifies with the individual (among other things).
Because collective concepts are shared and transcend the individual, they
are assigned by Durkheim to the realm of the sacred and not the profane.”
Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms
of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 100.
“Durkheim argues that ‘since the role of the social being in our single
selves will grow ever more important as history moves ahead ... all
evidence compels us to expect our effort in the struggle between the two
beings within us to increase with the growth of civilization.’” Rawls,
Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of
Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 101. Quote from:
Durkheim, Emile. 1914 [1960] Montesquieu and Rousseau. University of
Michigan Press. P. 339.
“Durkheim’s critique of religious anthropology parallels his critique of
epistemology. The animists and naturists generally attempt to explain the
sacred on the basis of sense perception and fail. They fall prey to Hume’s
dilemma; that general ideas cannot be derived from sense perception. The
Totemists, in an argument reminiscent of Kant, offer innate human
tendencies as the origin of the sacred. In both cases, Durkheim argues, in
a manner parallel to his criticisms of Kant and Hume, they have failed to
explain the origin of the idea of sacredness. The animists, in particular
Taylor, and the naturists, in particular Muller, must fail, Durkheim says,
because sense perception cannot explain the origin of an idea, like the
sacred, that has no counterpart in nature. Durkheim’s point here is
similar to Hume’s argument that the idea of causality could not be
empirically valid because no counterpart could be found for it in sense
experience. Sacredness, not being a natural phenomena, cannot present
itself to perception. The Totemists, and in this regard Durkheim, cite
Frazier, because they are innatists, assume the existence of the
phenomenon and therefore, like Kant, fail to provide any explanation at
all for its origin.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press.
P. 110.
“Finally, in order to have an idea of a supernatural order of things,
Durkheim argues that a society must first have an idea of a natural order
of things. The idea of a supernatural order requires the explanation of a
disjuncture between two orders of things....
“Consequently, he argues the origin of the belief in the supernatural
cannot be reduced to being awestruck in the face of the unforeseen forces
of nature, because events cannot be unexpected, unless there are
background expectations against which they take place.” Rawls, Anne W.
Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious
Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 114.
“Durkheim then offers his final definition of religion: “A religion is a
unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is
to say, things set apart and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite
into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to
them.’ This means that religion is by definition collective. It also, by
definition, relates to the sacred.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and
Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004.
Cambridge University Press. P. 123.
“In other words, it is not the obligation that creates the collectivity,
but the collectivity that creates the obligation.” Rawls, Anne W.
Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious
Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 123.
“Totemic symbols are not considered by Durkheim to be ideas. On the
contrary, he treats them as physical objects, or marks. Their significance
is not that they represent ideas either. What they signify are feelings
that were once shared between members of a group, or more exactly,
feelings that, once shared, made persons feel like members of a group.
They call up collective moments. Such shared moments can be called up be a
picture, things, or a word, and in so doing, the feelings that were once
felt together are renewed.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice:
Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge
University Press. P. 149.
“He [Durkheim] argues that the sacred and profane occur in phases. Short
periods that are considered sacred are followed by longer periods which
are considered profane.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice:
Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge
University Press. P. 163.
“Viruses are by common definition neither organisms nor alive.” Brussow,
Harald. “The not so universal tree of life or the place of viruses in the
living world.” 2009. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.
364: 2263-2274. P. 2265.
“In the largest of the ocean studies, more than 91 per cent of the
sequences from the viral DNA fraction did not have a significant hit in
the sequence databases. From this observation, we have to conclude that
the viral DNA sequence sphere is very large. Microbial ecologists working
in the oceans provided data that independently support this conclusion.
The first big surprise was the discovery of large numbers of viruses in
coastal water. In eutrophic estuarine water, 107 viral particles were
counted per millilitre of water. This is 10 times the amount of bacteria
in this ecosystem. From the data of many ecological surveys, it was
calculated that viruses are by far the most abundant ‘biological entities’
in the world’s oceans yielding a global level of more than 1030 viruses.
Viruses are not only numerous, they are also a major cause of microbial
mortality in the sea, rivaled only by grazing from protists.” Brussow,
Harald. “The not so universal tree of life or the place of viruses in the
living world.” 2009. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.
364: 2263-2274. P. 2269.
“Viruses play an important role in the ocean ecosystem by maintaining the
genetic diversity of microbes according to the ‘killing the winning
fraction’ concept. In addition, viruses power the microbial loop that
maintains nutrients in the microbial world, preventing their flow into the
marine food chain. Therefore, viruses play a major role in
biogeochemistry.” Brussow, Harald. “The not so universal tree of life or
the place of viruses in the living world.” 2009. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B. 364: 2263-2274. P. 2269.
“If one combines the large number of ORFans in viral metagenome analyses
and the sheer number of viruses in the biosphere, it is possible that the
viral sequence space exceeds that of their prokaryotic hosts in size.
These data are simply not compatible with the older concept that the viral
genes escaped from cells.” Brussow, Harald. “The not so universal tree of
life or the place of viruses in the living world.” 2009. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B. 364: 2263-2274. P. 2270.
“Two central themes in Maynard Smith and Szathmary’s book develop this
idea of change in the conditions that make evolutionary change possible.
One concerns the expansion of mechanisms of hereditary–where richer and
more accurate systems of the intergenerational flow of information evolve.
The other focuses on the evolution of new levels of biological
individuality; an evolutionary change after which previously independent
entities now reproduce together, sharing their evolutionary fate. Both
mark out core features of the Darwinian process. One is a radical change
in the kind of individual from which evolving populations and lineages are
built. The other is a change in the processes relating these individuals
across generations. A third, less well-explored theme, concerns the
generation of variation, which they touch on in their final chapter on
language.... Thus, we see three core features of the Darwinian process of
change–the subject of change, how change is passed on, and ways in which
further change is generated–are all themselves subject to modification.”
Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In
Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. Pp. 4-5. Reference is to Smith, Maynard &
E. 1995. “The major evolutionary transitions.” Nature 374: 227-232. Also
their book The Major Transitions in Evolution. 1995. Oxford University
Press.
“... David Queller has pointed out that there seem to be two very
different transitions in individuality: ‘egalitarian’ and ‘fraternal’
transitions. Perhaps these should not be lumped together. Eukaryote
evolution is the paradigm of an egalitarian transition, for the
partnership that became the new Darwinian individual did not begin with an
association between closely related individuals. In contrast, the
evolution of multicelled organisms (and eusocial animals) is a fused
alliance between close relatives. Explaining these two types of transition
poses quite different challenges. In egalitarian transitions,
differentiation between the partners, and hence the potential profits of
specialization, come for free. But there is no automatic overlap of
evolutionary interest, and no possibility of a division of reproductive
labor. And so there are potentially unmanageable problems of conflict. In
fraternal transitions, there is an overlap of evolutionary interest (in
clones, identity), so the problem of conflict is less pressing. But the
profit of cooperation is more elusive, as differentiation does not predate
partnership.” Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major
Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 10. Reference is to
Queller, David. 2000. “Relatedness and the fraternal major transitions.”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 355: 1647-1656.
“Multicelled organisms have evolved many times, but only in a few cases
have these lineages generated impressive disparity and diversity. The
evolution of complex multicellularity requires the evolution of a
higher-level unit with its own fitness values. But it requires more–the
evolution of a developmental cycle–and that in turn requires a major
advance in mechanisms of inheritance. Protist genes never have to
contribute to building afresh the critical inner cellular structures of
protists. The reproduction of these crucial intercellular structures can
largely be reduced to growth and fission. In contrast, organs and tissues
do not exist in miniature in fertilized ova. Complex multicelled organisms
exist only because there are developmental cycles in which key structures
of adult organisms are rebuilt from scratch in the new generation.”
Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In
Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 11.
“A number of factors stabilize cooperation: relatedness, iterated
interactions and reciprocity, mutualisms, and punishment or conflict
mediation.” Calcott, Brett. “Alternative Patterns of Explanation for Major
Transitions.” Pp. 35-51. From Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The
Major Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 38.
“Michod’s model explains the transition in V. carteri by showing that a
split between germ and somatic line prevents the accumulation of defectors
in the population. Without such a split, the defectors are more likely to
build up and displace any cooperators.” Calcott, Brett. “Alternative
Patterns of Explanation for Major Transitions.” Pp. 35-51. From Calcott,
Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution
Revisited. MIT Press. P. 40.
“Most critically, though, in multicell systems, development routinely
builds from scratch new structures in each generation. Tissues, organ
systems, support structures, and circulatory systems all have to be built
anew. That is not true when a prokaryote splits into two daughter cells.
Its cell walls and many intercellular structures are continuously present
and available through the process of gene replication and cell fission.”
Sterelny, Kim. “Evolvability Reconsidered.” Pp. 83-100. From Calcott,
Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution
Revisited. MIT Press. P. 91.
“Hence, the idea of a transition to a Darwinian world. Woese and his
allies think such protocell evolution precedes a Darwinian transition, for
the phenotype of a pretransition protocell depends more on its neighbors
and those neighbors’ immediate ancestors than on the protocell’s own
distant ancestors.” Sterelny, Kim. “Evolvability Reconsidered.” Pp.
83-100. From Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major
Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 93. Reference is to
Woese, C. 2008. “The domains of life and their evolutionary implications.”
From Dunn, M, L. Jorde, P. Little & S. Subramaniam (Eds.). Encyclopedia of
Genetics, Genomics, Proteomics and Bioinformatics. John Wiley & Sons.
“Explaining the evolution of evolvability turns into the project of
explaining the origin and distribution of special developmental
mechanisms, themselves novelties on which other novelties depend.”
Sterelny, Kim. “Evolvability Reconsidered.” Pp. 83-100. From Calcott,
Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution
Revisited. MIT Press. P. 95.
“The various hypotheses of the origin of life and the major transitions of
evolution currently on offer, henceforward referred to as origins and
transitions narratives–whether replicator-first, metabolism-first, RNA
world, lipid world, peptide world, virus world, communal, gene-swapping
progenotes, biological big bang, or panspermia–all share the assumption,
usually tacit, that somehow selfishness entered the world. Put another
way, they assume the emergence of the sort of self-preserving,
self-organized complexity that provides a minimal basis for attributing
selfishness to a system.” Lyon, Pamela. “To Be or Not To Be: Where is
Self-Preservation in Evolutionary Theory?” Pp. 105-125. From Calcott,
Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution
Revisited. MIT Press. P. 105.
“The evolution of traits adaptive at a given level of biological
organization requires the existence–at that level–of the necessary
prerequisites for Darwinian individuality. When the trait whose origin we
wish to explain is reproduction, we face a dilemma: Appeals to natural
selection would seem to presuppose the existence of collective
reproduction–the very trait whose evolution requires explanation.” Rainey,
Paul & BH. Kerr. “Conflicts among Levels of Selection as Fuel for the
Evolution of Individuality.” Pp. 141-167. From Calcott, Brett & K.
Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT
Press. P. 144.
“The absence of a means of collective reproduction does not mean that
selection cannot act on collectives, but its capacity to do so is limited
to selection at the level of collective viability.” Rainey, Paul & BH.
Kerr. “Conflicts among Levels of Selection as Fuel for the Evolution of
Individuality.” Pp. 141-167. From Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011.
The Major Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 145.
“Three phases can be identified in transitions in individuality. The
aggregate phase is the least individuated, the group phase intermediately
individuated, and the individual phase is the most. Each phase is
characterized by a dominant fitness component. Differential expansion is
the component associated with aggregates, differential persistence is
associated with groups, and differential reproduction is characteristic of
paradigm individuals. Evolutionary transitions to more individuated phases
require the accumulation of additional fitness components, but new levels
are attained once the expansive component of fitness is attained. This
allows us to know that organisms in each of the three phases of
individuality are at the same level if they share a common ancestor.”
Simpson, Carl. “How Many Levels Are There?” Pp. 199-225. From Calcott,
Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution
Revisited. MIT Press. Pp. 200-1.
“The obvious implication is that reduced material has been introduced to
the three surface zones at a rate that is closely related to the oxygen
and oxidised chemical increase in the environment.” Williams, R.J.P. &
J.J.R. Frausto da Silva. The Chemistry of Evolution: The Development of
our Ecosystem. 2006. Elsevier. P. 32.
“... we know today that about 2% of the retained energy on the Earth is
used by life and it has increased continuously from the abiotic start,
...” Williams, R.J.P. & J.J.R. Frausto da Silva. The Chemistry of
Evolution: The Development of our Ecosystem. 2006. Elsevier. P. 100.
“We must recognise, as stated above, that the only way we can account for
evolution is if the chemicals produced became involved in a flow system
that did not produce an all inclusive cycle, which is a terminal condition
like that in the cyclic ozone layer.” Williams, R.J.P. & J.J.R. Frausto da
Silva. The Chemistry of Evolution: The Development of our Ecosystem. 2006.
Elsevier. P. 100.
“We wish to consider how the simple original resultant cell could lead,
3.5 billion years later, to an animal as complex as man. I shall explain
why I do not consider it was due to pure chance alteration of a code. I
shall claim that it is a direct consequence of a system of chemical
reactions in coordinated flow and as such was inevitable as it was
dependent on the inevitable original environment and its change, no matter
how much the central line of progression of organisms is confused by the
multitudes of varieties, so-called species, that arise at any one time.
There is a main logical chemical progression of the whole of life.”
Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical advances in evolution by and changes in
use of space during time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159.
P. 151.
“The evolutionary sequence was anaerobic, then aerobic prokaryotes,
unicellular then multicellular eukaryotes, the last three dependent on a
micro- then a macro-aerobic environment, with more and more compartments.
This is the main line of change to 0.4 Ga independent of species. Moreover
the last three coexist as the complex cells, alone, have not sufficient
separate survival strength due to their complexity. In fact the majority
of unicellular organisms supports the minority of multicelular organisms.
This symbiosis is just an extra way of utilising space efficiently as in
modern industrial practice where different locations provide different
components.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical advances in evolution by and
changes in use of space during time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268:
146-159. P. 152.
“The Cambrian Explosion seen in fossils is due to the surge in oxidation
to give cross-linked external matrices around 0.75-0.55 Ga, enabling the
evolution of numerous shells and skeletons.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011.
“Chemical advances in evolution by and changes in use of space during
time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. P. 153.
“At this point in the article I insert a general view of our holistic
approach to chemical evolution which is based on observing the changes
largely in the metal inorganic elements in the environment and those of
organic chemicals based on them in cells. The reasons for using this
approach are that the metal elements are common to both the environment
and organisms in exactly the same form. Their concentrations in both can
therefore be followed and compared, showing the mutual interaction and
energisations of the different spaces, the environment and the cell
compartments, including the cytoplasm.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical
advances in evolution by and changes in use of space during time.” Journal
of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. P. 153.
“The remarkable fact appears to be that there is only one limiting set of
free ion values in the cytoplasm, in all of the four classes of aerobic
cells suggesting that this particular chemical condition is a unique
solution to the problem of cell cytoplasmic activity.” Williams, R.J.P.
2011. “Chemical advances in evolution by and changes in use of space
during time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. Pp. 154-5.
“It is important to realise that the major changes of the chemistry of
evolution were completed by 0.4 Ga. Thereafter evolution is largely
diversity, not novelty, of chemistry.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical
advances in evolution by and changes in use of space during time.” Journal
of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. P. 155.
“The increase in complexity of cells from prokaryotes to unicellular, then
multicellular, organisms required more and more management. Staying with
our wish to refer to metal ions, Fe2+ and Mg2+ remained as major controls
of metabolic pathways in the cytoplasm in all cells, of both anaerobic and
aerobic organisms. Control systems responsive to external changes became
necessary for the vulnerable eukaryote cells. They evolved, using the
available metal ion gradients, especially of calcium, and later of the
pair of ions Na+/K+, for external/internal cell messages. The controls
using all three ions arose from the need of the earliest prokaryotes for
protection which created gradients of these ions with high concentration
of Ca2+ and Na+ in the sea and later in extracellular fluids to low values
in the cytoplasm. The flows of the two govern many cellular mechanical and
chemical metabolic switches.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical advances in
evolution by and changes in use of space during time.” Journal of
Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. P. 155.
“Now complexity places great stress on the ability to organise. A
remarkable feature of evolution in the broadest sense is not survival of
the fittest, competition between individual organisms, but on survival of
the whole, cooperative, symbiotic system. The development of unicellular
eukaryotes is a major, little understood, symbiotic evolution. Utilising
symbiosis is a new use of space. It was greatly increased in multicellular
eukaryotes, plants and animals, as they come to rely on chemicals from
lower organisms living independently, attached outside or even inside
these eukaryotes. Plants depend on bacteria for nitrogen and on fungi for
minerals. Plants and animals depend on vitamins, including the many
essential coenzymes, and recent animals require additionally essential
amino acids and sugars from many sources. They are obtained by feeding.
The ensemble of organisms became a large cooperative network in an
environment/organism system in which the definition of species becomes
difficult. However, speciation is not important in main line chemical
evolution. Man is an extreme example. We do not know how many organisms
(species) man’s existence depends upon. The total complexity involves and
is relieved by ever increasing use of biological plus environmental
space.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical advances in evolution by and
changes in use of space during time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268:
146-159. P. 156.
“We have related symbiosis increases particularly to the difficulty of
carrying increasing complexity in single cells whenever chemistry in the
environment became more complicated and useful to cells but not directly
related to the original maintained chemistry of the basic cell cytoplasm.”
Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical advances in evolution by and changes in
use of space during time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159.
P. 156.
“Recall Hutchinson’s definition of the fundamental niche of a species: a
hypervolume of environmental variables, ‘every point of which corresponds
to a state of the environment which would permit the species to exist
indefinitely.’ Most differences in niche concepts depend on the
formulation and relative importance given to three interrelated points,
considered in turn later: (1) the meaning of ‘exist indefinitely,’ (2)
what kinds of variables constitute the hypervolume, and (3) the nature of
feedback loops between a species and the variables composing the
hypervolume.” Peterson, A. Townsend, J. Soberon, R. Pearson, R. Anderson,
E. Martinez-Meyer, M. Nakamura & M. B. Araujo. Ecological Niches and
Geographic Distributions. 2011. Princeton University Press. P. 9.
“Instead, we construct the multivariate environmental spaces for our
definitions based on variables that are not dynamically affected by the
species, like climate, topography, and perhaps some habitat features, in
contrast to variables that are dynamically modified (linked), such as
consumed resources or those that are subject to modification by niche
construction. We use the term ‘dynamically linked’ in the sense of terms
that appear as parameters in population equations versus appearing as
dynamic state variables ... We call nonlinked variables ‘scenopoetic.’”
Peterson, A. Townsend, J. Soberon, R. Pearson, R. Anderson, E.
Martinez-Meyer, M. Nakamura & M. B. Araujo. Ecological Niches and
Geographic Distributions. 2011. Princeton University Press. Pp. 11-2.
“The main meaning [of ‘niche’ underpinning this book] is explicitly
geographic in nature, and is based on E-spaces composed of scenopoetic
variables taken as conditions or requirements. These niches have been
called ‘Grinnellian’ or ‘environmental.’” Peterson, A. Townsend, J.
Soberon, R. Pearson, R. Anderson, E. Martinez-Meyer, M. Nakamura & M. B.
Araujo. Ecological Niches and Geographic Distributions. 2011. Princeton
University Press. P. 16.
“Of course, other extremes of niche meaning are possible and important; in
particular, as we saw, niche concepts exist that are oriented toward
community-ecology questions, defined at local scales, and including models
of resource consumption and impacts. We will refer to this scale and
meaning as ‘Eltonian niches.’” Peterson, A. Townsend, J. Soberon, R.
Pearson, R. Anderson, E. Martinez-Meyer, M. Nakamura & M. B. Araujo.
Ecological Niches and Geographic Distributions. 2011. Princeton University
Press. P. 17.
“Grinnellian niches, defined as subsets of scenopoetic environmental
spaces, are entirely different entities in this sense than Eltonian
niches, defined in terms of zero-growth isoclines, impact vectors, and
supply points.” Peterson, A. Townsend, J. Soberon, R. Pearson, R.
Anderson, E. Martinez-Meyer, M. Nakamura & M. B. Araujo. Ecological Niches
and Geographic Distributions. 2011. Princeton University Press. P. 17.
“In the classic niche literature, the only population interactions
considered are competitive and predator-prey interactions. The inclusion
of positive (mutualistic) interactors, however, represents an important
gap in niche theory. Although we acknowledge this gap, we restrict our
discussion to negative interactions, since available theory regarding
Eltonian niches has disregarded mutualism almost entirely.” Peterson, A.
Townsend, J. Soberon, R. Pearson, R. Anderson, E. Martinez-Meyer, M.
Nakamura & M. B. Araujo. Ecological Niches and Geographic Distributions.
2011. Princeton University Press. P. 27.
“Water plays an indirect but crucial role in the story of life on earth
through geophysical and astrophysical processes of which Henderson could
have had not inkling. One of these is plate tectonics. Astrobiologists
believe that a healthy planet must continually recycle material if equable
conditions are to be maintained. For example, on earth, carbon becomes
sequestered in carbonate rocks and is released again in the form of carbon
dioxide when the rocks are subducted. Similarly, oxygen is prevented from
building up to dangerous levels by tectonic activity, which continually
exposes fresh material to be oxidized. Part of the reason Mars seems to be
a dead planet is because its tectonic processes have ground to a halt.
Water is a crucial ingredient in this story. If the earth’s crust were not
hydrated, the basalt would be brittle. The water content gives the rock
high plasticity that allows the plates to slide smoothly and material to
flow steadily through the mantle.” Davies, Paul. “Fitness and the cosmic
environment.” Pp. 97-113. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland &
C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and
Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 106.
“The central theme is the recognition of so-called ecomorphs. This term
refers to unrelated species that evolve similar morphologies in response
to equivalent functional demands within a given environment. As with other
examples of convergence, the degrees of similarity are seldom precise, but
can still be striking.” Morris, Simon C. “Tuning in the frequencies of
life.” Pp. 197-224. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C.
Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and
Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 210.
“Let us consider the situation at two levels: the sequence level (which is
the genotype because it is a direct translation from the evolving DNA
molecules) and the structure level (which we can think of as the
phenotype). As pointed out by Maynard Smith, as the sequence undergoes
mutation, the mutated sequences must traverse a continuous network without
passing through any intermediaries that are non-functioning. Thus, one
seeks a connected network in sequence space for evolution by natural
selection to occur. Considerable evidence accumulated since the pioneering
suggestion of Kimura and King and Jukes shows that much of evolution is
neutral. The experimental data strongly support the view that the ‘random
fixation of selectively neutral or very slightly deleterious mutants
occurs far more frequently in evolution than selective substitution of
definitely advantageous mutants.’ Also ‘those mutant substitutions that
disrupt less the existing structure and function of a molecule
(conservative substitutions) occur more frequently in evolution than more
disruptive ones.’ Thus, although one has a ‘random walk’ in sequence space
that forms a connected network, there is no similar continuous variation
in structure space.” Banavar, Jayanth & A. Maritan. “Life on earth: the
role of proteins.” Pp. 225-255. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S.
Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry
and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 243. References:
Maynard Smith, J. “Natural selection and concept of a protein space.”
Nature. 225 (1970), 563; Kimura, M. “Evolutionary rate at the molecular
level.” Nature. 217 (1968), 624; King, J. & T. Jukes. “Non-Darwinian
evolution.” Science. 164 (1969), 788.
“There is increasing evidence that evolution along with natural selection
allows nature to use variations on the same theme facilitated by the rich
repertory of amino acids to create enzymes that are able to of catalyzing
a remarkable array of diverse and complex tasks in the living cell. The
key point, of course, is that a constant backdrop of folds not shaped by
sequence but determined by physical law is necessary for molecular
evolution to work in this manner. Were the folds not immutable and
themselves subject to Darwinian evolution, the possibility of creating
many subtle and wonderful variations on the same theme would not exist.
The pre-sculpted landscape is the crucial feature that leads to a
predetermined menu of immutable folds.” Banavar, Jayanth & A. Maritan.
“Life on earth: the role of proteins.” Pp. 225-255. From: Barrow, John,
S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for
Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P.
244.
“Proteins, the workhorse molecules of life, are wonderful molecular
machines that carry out a variety of functions and speed up chemical
reactions by orders of magnitude. A single protein may have a variety of
capabilities, but the work it does, although efficient, is monotonous. The
situation changes dramatically when one has a collection of proteins
organized in a network. These proteins interact with one another, catalyze
chemical reactions, turn the gene on or off, and lead to the robust and
coherent behavior that we associate with life.
The structure of the DNA molecule provides a beautiful explanation of how
it is able to encode information and the mechanism underlying its
replication. Proteins, on the other hand, are less well understood. One
could ask what kind of a phase of matter one would choose to house protein
structures in order to accommodate the important roles that these
molecules of life play. Our work suggests that a very special, previously
unstudied phase of matter is associated with the marginally compact phase
of short tubes with a thickness specially tuned to be comparable to the
range of attractive interactions promoting the compaction. This phase is a
finite-size effect and exists only for relatively short tubes; it is
poised near a phase transition of a new kind that lends itself to
flexibility in the structure; the structures that one finds in the
marginally compact phase are space-filling and modular in construction,
being made up of two principal building blocks – helices and sheets; the
total number of distinct folds is relatively small and only on the order
of a few thousand or so, and proteins are able to fold rapidly and
reproducibly into them. The price that nature pays for utilizing this
novel phase of matter is the relative ease with which aggregation of
multiple tubes can occur, leading to amyloid formation.
“In his insightful book, The Fitness of the Environment, Henderson
extended the notion of Darwinian fitness to argue that ‘the fitness of
[the] environment is quite as essential a component as the fitness which
arises in the process of organic evolution.’ Strikingly, the chemistry of
proteins ensures that they are self-tuned to occupy the marginally compact
phase of short tubes. One cannot but marvel at how several factors – the
steric interactions; hydrogen bonds, which provide the scaffolding for
protein structures; the constraints placed by quantum chemistry on the
relative lengths of the hydrogen and covalent bonds; the near planarity of
the peptide bonds; and the key role played by water – all reinforce and
conspire with one another to place proteins in this novel phase of matter.
“Proteins have proved to be difficult to understand because of (1) their
inherent complexity with twenty types of amino acids and the role played
by water; (2) their relatively short length compared with generic
human-made polymers, which means they are therefore likely to be
characterized by ‘non-universal’ behavior; and (3) the complexities
associated with the random process of evolution. Nevertheless, our work
suggests an underlying stunning simplicity. Although sequences and
functionalities of proteins evolve, the folds that they adopted, which in
turn determine function, seem to be determined by physical law and are not
subject to Darwinian evolution.” Banavar, Jayanth & A. Maritan. “Life on
earth: the role of proteins.” Pp. 225-255. From: Barrow, John, S.C.
Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life:
Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. Pp.
247-50. Reference is to: Henderson, L. 1913. The Fitness of the
Environment: An Inquiry into the Biological Significance of the Properties
of Matter. Macmillan.
“As well as being essentially invariant, it became apparent during the
1970s, as more structures were determined, that the structure of the folds
is also basically hierarchical, consisting of secondary structural
elements such as the α helix and β sheet combined into more complex motifs
and that the same motifs (helix-turn-helix, β hairpin, etc.) recur in many
different proteins. The hierarchic nature of fold structure and the
recurrence of the same submotifs suggested that physical law is playing a
major role in the ordering of global fold structure and further supported
the notion that the folds might be a set of natural and lawful structures
rather than contingent assemblages of matter.” Denton, Michael.
“Protein-based life and protein folds.” Pp. 256-279. From: Barrow, John,
S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for
Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P.
263.
“A picture has emerged of a limited number of ahistorical forms that have
been secondarily modified to perform a vast number of adaptive functions.
A remarkable feature of these secondary adaptive substitutions is how few
seem necessary to cause adaptive shifts in protein function.” Denton,
Michael. “Protein-based life and protein folds.” Pp. 256-279. From:
Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the
Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University
Press. P. 264.
“The fact that the total number of theoretically possible protein
structures that an individual amino acid chain of 150 residues might adopt
– assuming that each peptide group has only three conformations – is 3150
or 1068 whereas the total number of permissible folds is of the order of
1000 graphically illustrates just how restrictive the laws of protein-fold
form are. Whatever the actual figure, the total number of folds is bound
to represent a tiny stable fraction of all possible polypeptide
conformations, determined by the laws of physics. This further reinforces
the notion that the folds, like atoms, represent a finite set of allowable
physical structures that would recur throughout the cosmos wherever
carbon-based life that utilizes the same twenty amino acids exists.”
Denton, Michael. “Protein-based life and protein folds.” Pp. 256-279.
From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness
of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge
University Press. Pp. 267-8.
“The discovery that the protein universe consists of a finite set of
natural forms in a sense completes the molecular biological revolution,
revealing finally – five decades after the nature and biological purpose
of DNA and RNA were first elucidated – the essential nature of the second
great class of biopolymers. It reveals that the purpose of the genetic
system is to turn out endless adaptive variants of a set of invariant
natural forms. The great complexity of the folds (among the most complex
material structures known) indicates, perhaps more clearly than any other
previous discovery in the biological sciences, that very great biological
complexity may be lawful and need not necessarily be contingent.” Denton,
Michael. “Protein-based life and protein folds.” Pp. 256-279. From:
Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the
Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University
Press. P. 269.
“Because each fold has been subjected to billions of years of selective
fine-tuning for specific biochemical functions, efficient folding, and so
forth, it is somewhat difficult to judge precisely which properties are
universal, generic properties of the folds and which are secondarily
evolved features. Nonetheless, as James and Tawfik point out, ‘An evolved
function can only evolve if it is already present to some extent,’ and
this presumably applies to all characteristics of the folds. Thus, four
characteristics that contribute to their fitness are likely to be basic,
intrinsic characteristics of the folds themselves: their architectural
diversity, marginal stability, robustness, and possession of a hydrophobic
core.
“The underlying molecular architectures of the folds are, as we have seen
quite amazingly diverse. This architectural diversity is a major
contributor to their biological fitness, providing the basis for the vast
range of structural and functional molecular roles that they play within
the cell.
“The folds exhibit a combination of robustness and marginal stability,
both characteristics that confer important elements of fitness. In terms
of marginal stability, the folds are nothing like the rigid conformations
conveyed in textbook depictions. In fact, the energy difference between
the native conformation of a fold and its denatured state is
extraordinarily small – about 5-15 kcal/mol – not much more than the
energy level of a single hydrogen bond, which is of the order of 2-5
kcal/mol. Studies by various groups, including those of Martin Karpus and
Hans Frauenfelder indicate that a protein’s native structure consists of a
large number of conformational substates. Instead of inhabiting a deep
free-energy minimum, a ‘V-shaped’ bowl with steep sides ending in a unique
deep pit, the folds inhabit a complex energy landscape that is more a
‘shallow U-shaped bowl’ with multiple small depressions on its base. These
depressions are the substates, or alternative conformers, available to the
fold, each of near-equivalent stability. Marginal stability is critical
during folding, enabling the polypeptide chain to search conformational
space for increasingly stable conformations. Marginal stability and the
characteristic U-shaped energy landscape arise according to the ‘tube
model’ of Banavar and Maritan from a ‘novel phase of matter in the
vicinity of a phase transition’ in which the folds arise. The tube model
also implies that few other polymers may exist that will exhibit discrete,
stable, folded conformations associated with their characteristic marginal
stability.
“It is this marginal stability and its consequences, the ability of folds
to adopt many slightly different conformations, that have permitted the
evolution of allosteric control mechanisms that link logical control
circuits with catalysis in the same molecular fabric – a phenomenally
sophisticated mechanism that Monod saw as the ‘second secret of life.’”
Denton, Michael. “Protein-based life and protein folds.” Pp. 256-279.
From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness
of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge
University Press. Pp. 270-1. References: James, L. & D. Tawfik. 2003.
“Conformational diversity and protein evolution – a 60 year-old hypothesis
revisited.” Trends in Biochemical Science. 28, 361-8; Karpus, M. & G.
Petsko. 1990. “Molecular dynamics simulations in biology.” Nature. 347,
631-9; Frauenfelder, H., F. Parak & R. Young. 1988. “Conformational
substates in proteins.” Annual Review of Biophysics and Biophysical
Chemistry. 17, 451-79; Banavar, J. & A. Maritan. 2003. “Colloquium:
geometrical approach to protein folding: a tube picture.” Reviews of
Modern Physics. 75, 23-34; Banavar, J. & A. Maritan. 2003. “Comment on the
protein folds as platonic forms.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 223,
263-5.
“The rapid growth in understanding of biology, from structures to systems,
seems likely to expose many more sensitivities of life to details of
chemistry, physics, and history. The question has been posed as to whether
these advance Henderson’s interpretation of fine-tuning of the environment
or, more generally, what their anthropic significance is. In this chapter,
we examine features of intermediary metabolism, whose universality and
historical persistence suggest that they are not arbitrary products of
chance.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of fine-tuning for
intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S.
Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry
and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 384. Reference is
to: Henderson, L. 1913. The Fitness of the Environment: An Inquiry into
the Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter. Macmillan.
“We argue that much of biological order comes from arrangement and
augmentation of near order in the underlying chemical world and that the
uniqueness of life is often found in this augmenting relation, rather than
in particular biological structures. What seems familiar and lawful to us
about life is often the lawfulness of the underlying physical and chemical
world, with which we have broad experience, as that order is expressed
transparently through the living process. We are seeing the environment
through life; the meaningful category distinctions are defined not by
specific molecular structures, but by specific relations to the
opportunities for structure formation in chemical and energetic
relaxation.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of fine-tuning
for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C.
Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life:
Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 385.
“Living systems combine a strictness of regularity with a profusion of
innovation of structures, to a degree that seems unequaled in any other
single class of phenomenon we recognize. They are uniform in many ways,
but strikingly diverse in others. All organisms ever alive on earth, taken
together, account for a tiny fraction of the conceivable physicochemical
structures of comparable complexity, and their uniformity implies that, in
a statistical sense, the realized instances are drawn over and over from
that small subset of possibilities.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the
question of fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From:
Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the
Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University
Press. P. 386.
“Adaptation produces sensitive dependence in living forms quite generally
because it arises from growth with heritable variations. Differential
growth rates (including survival and fecundity effects) appear
exponentially with time in the population frequencies of inherited
features, leading to sensitive dependence of population samples of
phenotypes on small differences in their relations to environments. Under
situations of resource constraint, this can result in competitive
exclusion, through which not only the population mean, but all of its
instances, may be strongly biased by small differences in viability. The
relative growth rates themselves, which may not depend sensitively on
environment by any natural measure, are termed ‘fitness’ in Darwinian
population dynamics. Darwinian fitness is expressed through selection of
individuals – each one a relatively complex package of adaptations – in
response to the often complex characteristics of their environment.
Therefore, it frequently leads to sensitive dependence of complex wholes
on complex wholes.
“Henderson appears to have appealed to this latter aspect of fitness in
characterizing the laws of chemistry and physics, as well as the earth’s
environmental composition, as ‘fit for life.’ The observed physico-chemical
environment is sensitive to his criterion that it be able to support
life’s complexity and also its need for homeostasis, rather than being the
result of any dynamic process that produces exponential dependence on
initial conditions, and in that respect is unrelated to Darwinian fitness.
“Because of its variability, adaptability, and robustness, it seems likely
that life will admit relatively few easy category distinctions, such as
the carbaquist sensitivity to carbon abundance. Most of the ‘information’
in the structure of life, about either its necessary circumstances or its
generating processes, will likely come from more specific structures,
which typically emerge at higher levels of complexity. Thus, in addition
to understanding the logic of anthropic argument and the flexibility in
its use of empirical sensitivities, we must understand the different kinds
of surprise carried by sensitivity in complex and simple systems.” Smith,
Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of fine-tuning for intermediary
metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland &
C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and
Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 387-8. Reference is to:
Henderson, L. 1913. The Fitness of the Environment: An Inquiry into the
Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter. Macmillan.
“Resilience and robustness can come from the same ability to track the
environment that leads to convergence or from a quite different ability to
absorb its variations, leading to a kind of antisensitivity. Such
antisensitivity is not exclusive to life; the atmosphere generates many
negative feedbacks that confer stability against geological and biogenic
shocks. Indeed, the pH stability of blood arises from its positioning at a
stable region of carbon dioxide solution chemistry in water. The fitness
of the environment for life may depend on its richness in such stable
regions, but not necessarily on the ability of natural selection to
exploit those regions.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of
fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John,
S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for
Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P.
389.
“Heterotrophy is possible because all organisms are composed of roughly
the same 300 small molecules (molecular mass < 500 Dal), into which all
food is broken down before being used directly or being reassembled into
several thousand kinds of polymer inside the organism. All major classes
of these biomolecules are synthesized from the eleven carboxylic acids of
the rTCA or TCA cycle, although sugars can also be photosynthesized from
3-phosphoglycerate by an alternate pathway.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz.
“Framing the question of fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp.
384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.)
Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008.
Cambridge University Press. P. 390.
“We thus characterize life as a collection of physical and chemical
processes of environmental constituents, augmented by biomolecules that
are rare or absent in abiotic environments. Different levels of living
structures, depending on their complexity, can behave more or less like
the common reaction networks in the abiotic environment. In particular,
those involving many reactions of small molecules that are strongly
distinguished by free energies of formation or kinetics of functional
groups may thoroughly and redundantly sample all allowed reactions with
one another (a kinetic generalization of the notion of ergodic sampling in
equilibrium statistical mechanics), selecting by familiar statistical
means the favored species and pathways. More complex structures such as
macromolecules – with a flatter energy landscape, more kinetically
equivalent combinations, and lower turnover in reactions – are both more
susceptible to accident and, as a result, more eligible to record
information within the organism about the environment to which it must
respond.
“Genes, compartments, and catalysts are regulatory structures that must be
built from free energy and materials made available by metabolic
reactions. The metabolites are smaller and simpler than the regulators,
more of them are present in the ambient environment, and the possible
reaction networks among them are more densely sampled than the possible
networks producing complex structures. Thus, the reaction network of core
metabolism is expected to be more nearly a bulk chemical process than the
combinatorics of either nucleic acid or amino acid polymers.” Smith, Eric &
H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of fine-tuning for intermediary
metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland &
C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and
Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 394-5.
“Living processes contribute to thermochemical relaxation, but they are
not the only ones to do so. Many processes in convective weather,
chemistry, and engineered systems are examples of self-organized
production of conduits for the transport of energy and transport or
generation of entropy. Progression away from the unstable, unorganized
state is frequently exponential, giving rise to a physical form of
competitive exclusion similar to that seen in Darwinian population
dynamics at a higher level of complexity. (Indeed, it is natural from a
physical point of view to regard competition for bulk resources to build a
metabolic energy-transducing channel as the origin of directional
evolution in biology. Darwinian evolution is distinguished by the non-linearities
it injects into this bulk process, making the genome the unit of
inheritance and the individual the unit of selection.)
“As we expect many biological structures to achieve stability by
exploiting statistical stability in the underlying chemical networks, so
we expect biological organization to be most likely where it follows
dynamically stable thermochemical relaxation pathways. Their stability can
be driven by the free energy stress they relieve, by their use of
near-equilibrium chemicals and reaction networks, or by the redundancy of
random relaxation pathways leading to them. Thus, a continuation exists
from physical self-organization to the energetically predictable biases to
Darwinian fitness.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of
fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John,
S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for
Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P.
397.
“All of these observations combined lead us to believe that the
development of modern life as a steady-state relaxation process in fact
took place through the sequential emergence of two separate channels. The
first in time, and the simple, was the emergence of reductive metabolism
through autocatalytic networks either identical or similar to the rTCA
[reductive tricarboxylic acid] cycle. All its reagents are small molecules
that are selected by simple kinetic and physical properties from the
complete set of CHO molecules of comparable size, and the reaction
networks involving them are relatively densely sampled, either within the
cycle or in the side-reactions that generate biomass from it.
“The reductive metabolic core reactions are close enough to bulk physical
chemistry to be studied with the statistical mechanics of complete
reaction networks of small molecules, yet produce the biomass necessary to
support the full complement of compartments, catalysts, prosthetic groups,
and genes. The scenario requiring minimal happy accidents is one in which
most of the complexity of cellular life developed around this metabolism
over the first 0.5-2 Gy.
“Reductive metabolism captures free energy ultimately produced by the
fission of uranium, thorium, and potassium-40 in the earth’s mantle, but
makes no use of the richer free energy stress from solar fusion reactions,
other than exploiting liquid water as a solvent in the habitable zone.
Photosynthesis captures this independent fusion energy source, but appears
to have become accessible only with the molecular complexity of modern
cells. It therefore evolved to be self-supporting by artificially
generating reductant to synthesize critical components such as the
porphyrins from molecules provided by the rTCA cycle.
“It is a remarkable example of life’s robustness that the compounds in the
rTCA cycle survived the poisoning of the earth’s atmosphere by oxygenic
photosynthesis to remain the core of biosynthesis. Photosynthesis of
3-phosphoglycerate as well as reductant enabled the direction of the cycle
to be reversed, from self-generation to self-consumption, becoming the
oxidative Krebs cycle.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of
fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John,
S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for
Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. Pp.
402-3.
“We have argued that metabolic pathways are statistically favored
relaxation channels in energetically stressed environments and that their
universality and stability result at least partly from this function. Yet
the only places we see these pathways capture a significant fraction of
element abundances is within organisms. Once modern organisms exist, their
greater efficiency than abiotic processes can scavenge useful reagents
from the environment, lowering the residual energetic stress below the
threshold to spontaneously induce life, so the dominance by organisms of
these relaxation structures may not in itself be surprising. However, the
essentially regulatory superstructure, which emerges with the complexity
of cellular life to enhance efficiency, distinguishes living from all
non-living relaxation phenomena that interact with the same reservoirs by
means of the same active chemical bond types.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz.
“Framing the question of fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp.
384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.)
Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008.
Cambridge University Press. P. 404.
“All the regulatory structures we have discussed have at least a
qualitative category distinction from the reagents whose pathways we have
argued are most like those of abiotic chemical networks. To function, all
the regulators require polymerization of small molecules in the minimal
set of 300. Although cell membranes form spontaneously by surface energy
minimization, they are only stable with the addition of either amino-sugar
or cellulose cell walls or with the addition of membrane-dissolved
cholesterol and the cytoskeleton. Amino and nucleic acids are both
generated along short pathways from the TCA [tricarboxylic acid cycle]
core, but to be useful as catalysts and templates they must be polymerized
with particular sequences.
“A qualitative difference arises between the somewhat sparse but orderly
sampling of the reaction network among all small metabolites and the much
sparser and more clearly contingent sampling of the space of synthesized
polymers. The reactivity of biomass, a consequence of its reduction
stoichiometry as shown in Figure 18.2, also induces small free energy
differences among different sequences, making the energetic landscape of
sequence space flat compared with that of the metabolites themselves.
“Polymer sequences are therefore much more likely to be governed by
sampling bias in evolutionary history than are metabolites. One
consequence of this degeneracy under permutations of sequence is that
neutral models of population genetics can provide good first
approximations for the evolution of traits that depend on complex
syntheses, although this has also reduced most Darwinian arguments to
rationalizations and led to the complaint that Darwinian evolution is not
like other scientific theories. An important second point, however, is
that only such neutral molecules are eligible, by possessing a degenerate
configuration space with many states, to carry mutual information within
the cell about those characteristics of the environment that it needs to
anticipate. Although we have argued that it is an error to identify life
with polymer chemistry and sparse sampling, we agree that a qualitative
distinction of the informational and regulatory character of life emerges
with this class.
“The regulatory structures have a universal relation to core metabolism
that appears to be a distinguishing feature of life. First, they are of
low metabolic load and can therefore exist in greater diversity than the
metabolites they regulate. Thus, a typical cell contains as many as tens
of thousands of kinds of polymers, most in small numbers, but only several
dozen metabolic reagents, in amounts that scale with the mass of the
organism, and perhaps 50 building blocks, cofactors, and prosthetic groups
that are shared among the polymers.
“Second, whereas core metabolism generates net currents and an arrow of
time from non-equilibrium thermal boundary conditions, regulatory
structures inherit this arrow of time from metabolism, which generates
their building blocks as raw materials for combinatorics. Thus, the
plausible abstractions for metabolism are based on microscopically
reversible thermodynamics and chemistry, with non-equilibrium boundary
conditions. The more natural abstractions for regulatory structures are
cellular automata or the growth-and-culling models of Darwinian population
genetics. It is known that important prohibitions on the formation of
order, such as the absence of phase transitions in one-dimensional
systems, which apply to near-reversible processes, are not binding for
cellular automata because of their time-reversal asymmetry and
constructive dynamics. The opportunities for encoding stable information
are naturally larger in these driven structures for dynamical, as well as
sampling, reasons.
“Finally, because regulatory structures usually do not flow between the
organism and its environment, and because they act catalytically within
the organism, selection of these structures takes place only through their
impacts on the rate of core metabolism and their ability to efficiently
draw energy and material from it for self-reproduction. (It is implicit
here that the fit participation of the organism in its living environment
is almost always a leading factor impacting the net core metabolism of the
ecology as a whole.) Those structures enabling greater bulk free energy
transduction, more efficient synthesis, or reduced thresholds to
autocatalysis either survive in expanded environments or exclude less
efficient solutions in existing niches.
“We designate the reciprocal relation among components, having these three
properties, as ‘feed-down’ of regulation onto core metabolism. This is a
universal relational property of all living systems that provides an
energetic foundation for Darwinian fitness and governs the emergence of
complexity and innovation in evolution. Feed-down determines selection
bias on catalytic schemata competing intraspecifically to be the surviving
metabolic strategies of autotrophs and operates through material cycling,
as well as energy capture, at the level of ecologies. To us, these three
relational features of regulators to substrates – sparse sampling that
leads to history dependence, but also to the ability to carry information
about the environment; a limited gatekeeper role over the forms of
organisms; and selection through feed-down reciprocity that operates both
prior and subordinate to the gatekeeper role – are more fundamental to
life than any single chemical class or physical structure.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of fine-tuning for intermediary
metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland &
C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and
Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 406-8.
“... the really impressive aspect of an enzyme is not that it is a good
catalyst for a given reaction but that it is an extremely bad catalyst–no
catalyst at all, in fact–for virtually every other reaction... Specificity
is what enzymes abundantly provide, and it is their specificity that ought
to impress us, because it is specificity that allows all the reactions of
life to proceed in an orderly fashion under the mild conditions that exist
in a living cell.” Cornish-Bowden, Athel. The Pursuit of Perfection:
Aspects of Biochemical Evolution. 2004. Oxford University Press. P. 4.
“Like any other catalyst, an enzyme does not determine the direction in
which a reaction proceeds, nor even how far it will proceed given enough
time. These are questions that are decided by energetic considerations
that are independent of whether a catalyst is present or not; the catalyst
only determines how fast the reaction proceeds toward equilibrium.”
Cornish-Bowden, Athel. The Pursuit of Perfection: Aspects of Biochemical
Evolution. 2004. Oxford University Press. P. 31.
“... most metabolic systems spend a large amount of their time in steady
states, and we can go some way toward understanding how biochemical
systems behave by restricting the discussion to steady states. In doing
this, however, we should keep in mind that it is only a beginning, because
many of the most interesting moments in the life of a cell involve
transitions from one steady state to another.” Cornish-Bowden, Athel. The
Pursuit of Perfection: Aspects of Biochemical Evolution. 2004. Oxford
University Press. P. 87.
“... the appearance of metabolic steady states is a mathematical necessity
that does not require natural selection or any other special mechanism to
explain it ...” Cornish-Bowden, Athel. The Pursuit of Perfection: Aspects
of Biochemical Evolution. 2004. Oxford University Press. P. 90.
“... negative feedback is very common in metabolism, positive feedback
rare almost to the point of nonexistence.” Cornish-Bowden, Athel. The
Pursuit of Perfection: Aspects of Biochemical Evolution. 2004. Oxford
University Press. P. 131.
“Incidentally, in Rosen’s view evolution is secondary: one can imagine
life forms that did not evolve (e.g., fabricated ones), but evolution
without life is inconceivable.” Harold, Franklin. The Way of the Cell:
Molecules, Organisms and the Order of Life. 2001. Oxford University Press.
P. 223. Reference is to Rosen, R. Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry
into the Nature, Origin and Fabrication of Life. 1991. Columbia University
Press.
“More generally speaking, the essence of life as such does not only
concern the difference between a single living cell and its abiotic
surroundings, but also the self-regulating system-wide properties spanning
populations, ecosystems, or the entire biosphere. Thus, the emergence of
pre-macromolecular collective systems with life-like properties steps in
as the critical threshold for the origins of life.” Egel, Richard.
“Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of
Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A.
Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. P. 291.
“The semantics of life would be incomplete without mention of information,
which is closely related to memory in any form. Evolutionary
self-organization always depends on some kind of memory to evade
stochastic equilibration in the flow of time. In modern life, the
biochemical memory is primarily based on DNA ...” Egel, Richard.
“Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of
Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A.
Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. P. 294.
“Conceivably, self-organizing repositories of solely compositional and
structural information have preceded the emergence of genetic memory.”
Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework
for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D.
Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 295.
“Comparing rather diverse kinetic phenomena has uncovered far-reaching
similarities, as of tropical cyclonic depressions, orogenic island arcs,
continental drainage patterns, or living organisms. All of these dynamic
entities couple the dissipation of potential energy to collective flow and
concerted redistribution of matter. As such, they are part of superior
recycling systems at a global scale, which keep the entire Earth in a
gradually evolving state of quasi-equilibrium. At different levels, the
formation of stars and galaxies on the one hand, or socio-political
interactions on the other, can likewise be ascribed to energy-dissipating
aggregation.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a
Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel,
Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 299.
“... it is worth noting that living organisms have exaggerated the
roughness at the surface of the Earth enormously – starting at the
molecular scale of catalytic sites at micelles or membranes, and
culminating in the macroscopic appearance of forest communities or coral
reefs.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent
Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard,
D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 301.
“Certain macroscopic features of flow, energetics, and evolution in
cascading pond and drainage systems formally resemble other processes,
which at the molecular nanoscale have led to the organization of living
matter. Repeated retardation of flow at intermediate energy potentials, as
well as funneling of downward flow into conducting channels can be found
again at the biochemical level in diverse reaction pathways. The
retardation in reservoirs has an important buffer function, making energy
and matter available more evenly than following environmental fluctuations
directly.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a
Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel,
Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 302.
“Inasmuch as the prebiotic evolution towards life on Earth has likely been
governed by the structuring of catalytic surfaces in progressively greater
detail, the assumption of some kind of primordial surface metabolism is
quite valuable as a general evolutionary concept. Hence, this term as such
should not be solely associated with the particular kind of pyrite-driven
chemistry for which it was first proposed. In fact, the notion of
catalytic surface interactions has earlier roots in clay-driven models of
geochemical self-organization. Colloquially, the evolutionary potential of
surface metabolism models has been referred to as ‘primordial pizza’
dynamics – in contrast with earlier notions of some ‘primordial soup’....”
Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework
for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D.
Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 302.
“In other words, the patchy environment where life can have started may
best be conceived as biofilm-like molecular associations in some kind of
geochemical reactor with many internal surfaces.” Egel, Richard.
“Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of
Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A.
Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. P. 303.
“The cash flow of energetic coupling in endergonic metabolic reactions is
based on relatively few types of chemical bonds and compounds, as
characterized by quantized energy release on the one hand and mechanical
handles or anchor points on the other. The most readily convertable
currency of metabolic energy coupling is represented by ATP and other
pyrophosphate carriers. In the top-down ranking of universal metabolism, a
close second is the prototype coenzyme, CoA, where thioester linkage
activates carboxylic acid moieties for various transfer reactions.” Egel,
Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for
Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau &
A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. P. 311.
“By and large, however, it is not unreasonable to assume a certain
congruence between metabolic networks in modern life and a prebiotic
protometabolism. In particular, the shell-like organization of metabolism
can be rationalized in evolutionary terms, assuming that the inner shells
assembled first in prebiotic, geochemical evolution.” Egel, Richard.
“Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of
Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A.
Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. P. 313.
“Although modern biocatalysts are wonderful in many ways, they cannot
actually do miracles. Without proper substrates, all their marvelous
capabilities would have no effect. What really matters is which potential
substrates are present at a given moment in time, and which reactions can
possibly lead to other compounds. Primordial catalysts can increase the
rate of particular reactions over others and thereby influence the
availability of substrates for other catalysts nearby. Inasmuch as entire
ecosystems are capable of self-organization, it is the tenet of
metabolism-first scenarios that self-organizing molecular ecosystems
preceded the emergence and natural selection of cellular/genetic
organisms.
“In terms of network analysis, emerging biocatalysts are both substrates
and mediating agents. Acting collectively in a communicative system, this
ultimately channelizes a flow of matter, as coupled to the conversion of
environmental energy for metabolic work. The effective coupling of
energy-rich compounds to endergonic reactions by emerging organic
catalysts is arguably the most far-reaching accomplishment in prebiotic
evolution ...” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a
Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel,
Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 314.
“Under general growth conditions, providing that the overall rate of
covalent bond formation exceeds the rate of spontaneous degradation, the
variety of different multimers is rising. Formally, this entails a random
synthesizer function. Further feedback can then result from differential
breakdown; if unstructured, flexible, idling multimers are purged before
others that are tightly folded, substrate-bound, and stabilized.
Complementary systems properties have been proposed by Dyson and Kauffman,
assuming that, in a large set of different multimers, certain members will
catalyse the formation of others. In a process of autocatalytic network
closure, this provision will select for certain subsets where every member
is catalysed in its formation by one or more members of the same set.
Collectively, therefore, ‘selection at the chemical level can operate by
the preferential survival of useful molecules.’” Egel, Richard.
“Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of
Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A.
Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. P. 316. References are: Dyson, F. 1985. Origins of Life.
Cambridge University Press. Kauffman, S. 1993. The Origin of Order:
Self-organization and selection in evolution. Oxford University Press.
Subquote is from de Duve, C. 1987. “Selection by differential molecular
survival: a possible mechanism of early chemical evolution.” Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA. 84:8253-8256.
“As for activating free amino acids before their polymerization under
early-earth conditions by other means, a conceivable mechanism is by
reaction with isocyanic acid (HNCO), which supposedly entered the
primordial atmosphere from volcanic sources. In a bold and ingenious
revolving scheme, termed primary pump, this activation could have
facilitated the stepwise elongation of prebiotic peptides, while cycling
between tidal wetting at a flooded beach and intermittent desiccation.”
Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework
for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D.
Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 317.
“The thing primary pump and the SIPF [salt-induced peptide formation]
reaction have in common is that they rely on local energizing in a
generally anoxic atmosphere, as well as on the regular repetition of
wet/drying cycles. Also, they probably would not have worked if they only
had to rely on low average concentrations of amino acids in a primordial
soup scenario, comprising the bulk of the entire ocean. Yet, in a patchy
environment and in close association with a primordial geochemical reactor
that already was generating a local stock pile of carboxylic and amino
acids, the SIPF and/or primary pump reactions could have provided the
critical link to kick-start the tentative biogenic reactor to proceed to
the next level. Autonomous peptide formation should then take over, as
energized by a system-internal means of amino acid activation and
scaffold-guided polymerization of more and longer, yet still stochastic
peptides.
“Neither the SIPF reaction nor the primary pump, however, have left
directly traceable relics in modern metabolism. So their potential impact
in kick-starting prebiotic peptide formation remains a matter of informed
speculation.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a
Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel,
Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 317.
“Metal chelation, such as phosphate binding in cups or nests can constrain
relatively small peptides into rigid conformations, presenting quite
specific binding epitopes for secondary interactions. In this pregenetic
phase of uncoded peptide evolution, selective fitness had a quite literal
dimension, dependent on physically fitting together complementary
configurations and eliminating other peptides that did not fit in with any
binding partner.
“Together with phosphorylated metabolites and cofactors, this colloidal
community of peptides would further diversify by transpeptidation-like
splicing reactions and various kinds of cross-linking, resulting in
system-wide catalytic closure. To denote the relevance of this important
evolutionary stage, the guiding concepts of a peptide world and a cofactor
world can blend together in a tentative peptide-coenzyme world. At this
dreamtime stage of prebiosis, regular RNA as a replicative macromolecule
did not yet exist, and a prebiotic mode of ‘selection favored communities
of molecules that collectively were best able to catalyze synthesis of
their own constituents’. By this token, self-supportive – autotrophic –
molecular ecosystems developed before any proto-cellular organisms, no
matter whether the first of those would emerge as autotrophic or
heterotrophic entities later on.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative
Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on
Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian,
Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. Pp.
318-9.
“Unlike most other catalysts, the ribosome itself is not directly involved
in the chemical transpeptidation reaction as such; it does not form any
reactive intermediate with the substrate. To the contrary, for most of its
work cycle it actually forms a particularly unreactive intermediate, so as
to protect the energy-rich peptide-bearing ester bond from accidental
hydrolysis by ambient water molecules. Overall, the ribosome is
essentially a reciprocating ratchet feeder for repetitive transpeptidation,
from one ribonucleotide carrier to another. Assembled from many parts, it
forms an exquisitely refined and complicated molecular machine. The
processivity and quality controls that make it tick today must have gone
through many evolutionary steps.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative
Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on
Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian,
Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P.
320.
“Mineral surfaces appear suitable for the emergence of RNA polymerization,
and tidal cycling may have assisted in the periodic separation of template
and product in the primordial absence of efficient helicase activity.
Up-concentration in the pore space of freezing sea-ice is likewise
conducive of polymerization from activated monomers. With the emerging
ability to replicate a given parental sequence and producing self-similar
progeny molecules at higher frequencies than unrelated sequences, chemical
evolution has passed a pivotal threshold, so as to enter competition
between individual molecules for better reproducibility. Together with the
emergent tendency for self-similar replication, the prolific exploration
of sequence space to reach local or global optima should be greatly
accelerated by means of molecular recombination quite early on.” Egel,
Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for
Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau &
A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. Pp. 321-2.
“Except for the involvement of tRNAs and ribosomes in amino acid
activation and trasnspeptidation reactions, all other natural ribozymes
engage in splitting and joining of phosphodiester bonds during processing
and maturation of RNA substrates. Among all the natural ribozymes, which
generally are embedded in ribonucleo-protein (RNP) complexes, only RNase P
and ribosomes facilitate more than a single reaction cycle, whereas others
are used up in their first and only reaction. Besides, ribosomes act more
as a mechanical shuttle and funneling aid than a genuine catalyst.” Egel,
Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for
Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau &
A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. P. 326.
“The largest – and arguably most complicated – RNP machines are likewise
engaged in the processing of RNA. These are the spliceosomes of eukaryotic
cells, and there are two ancient kinds with only partly overlapping
composition. Since the overwhelming majority of eukaryotic proteins are
encoded by discontinuous bits and pieces in the genome, the corresponding
transcripts need to be spliced into functional mRNAs, prior to meaningful
translation by the ribosomes. It is the essential job of spliceosomes to
remove all those intervening sequences (introns) – forming a branched
byproduct (lariat) en route – and to join the adjacent coding parts (exons)
together.
“There is a growing suspicion that spliceosomes indeed are ribozymes at
heart. Yet, like ribosomes, they foremost are formidable RNP machines at
large. In contrast with most other ribozymes, which esoterically engage in
single-shot reactions, spliceosomes are rechargeable in an intricate cycle
of dissociation and reassembly steps. Why this elaborate mechanism only
prevails in eukaryotes, but is absent in bacteria and archaea, has
intriguing implications for how to interpret the rooting of the universal
Tree of Life. As tentative relics from an ancient RNA world are
disproportionately more frequent in eukaryotic cells than in both bacteria
and archaea, it is not entirely unreasonable to consider that the basic
blueprint for eukaryotic cell organization, too, might be of more ancient
vintage than commonly believed.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives:
In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp.
289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins
of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 327.
“The emergence of replicatable genes with particular metabolic functions
is one thing: their integration into genomes is yet another. There are
several modes of keeping functionally related genes together, all of which
are biologically relevant to various extent. Most directly, the nucleic
acid sequences of several genes can be connected into chromosomal
entities. Also, groups of genes or their concatenates can be anchored at
external scaffolds and/or be gathered in closed compartments. At the RNA
world stage already – with or without the help of uncoded peptides – the
RNA gene products had to be distinguished and separated from the
generative templates (the genes themselves), which likewise consisted of
RNA in the beginning. Furthermore, this principle had to cooperate with a
growing tendency to gather functionally related genes on a common plasmid
of chromosomal entity.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest
of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From
Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The
Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 328.
“The mutual entanglement of self-complication and self-simplification,
which characterizes Darwinian evolution, likely goes back to precellular
origins.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent
Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard,
D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 332. Clarifying reference is:
Conrad, M. 1990. “The geometry of evolution.” Biosystems 24:6181.
“As adaptive evolution gradually reduced the number of low-specificity
components and, in turn, increased the length of sequences, expressing
higher specificity and/or activity of system-supportive reactions,
complementary tendencies for simplification and complication went hand in
hand.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent
Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard,
D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 333.
“As redundancy is required for many components at various levels, a simple
genes-inside-vesicles model faces depletion by stochastic losses at each
division and would hardly be viable early on. Instead, before long multi-genic
plasmids and/or chromosomes had been established, together with effective
proof reading, damage repair systems and segregation mechanisms, extensive
masses of proto-cytoplasmic hydrogels had to remain connected in a state
of confluence, spanning volumes much larger than presently seen in
bacteria. Presumably, therefore, proto-cytoplasm and vesicular membranes
coevolved for a long period, irrespective whether most of the membranes
occurred inside or outside the proto-cytoplasm.” Egel, Richard.
“Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of
Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A.
Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. P. 333.
“... I am led by the notion that precellular systems were highly organized
internally, before they could ever become miniaturized as genuine cells in
the modern sense. In this scenario, precellular life is more concerned
with sessile growth and spatial organization, than with periodic division
at the earliest possible time. Such priorities are more related to the
molecular ecology of biofilms, than to free-living, suspended individuals
and populations.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a
Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel,
Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 334.
“Seen from the vantage point of a coherent precellular molecular
ecosystem, a direct path to eukaryotic cell organization poses no
mystifying conundrum at any step.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative
Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on
Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian,
Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P.
339.
“A particular trait of eukaryotic cells is no longer contested by any
party – that mitochondria are of bacterial descent. In fact, modern
eukaryotes have attained other endosymbionts repeatedly in various
lineages, as commonly mediated by engulfment – phagocytosis without
digestion.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a
Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel,
Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 340.
“Presumably, the long transition from geochemical origins to organismal
life has passed through several stages:
• Carboxylic acids, aldol phosphates, amino acids, heterocyclics, and
other organic compounds accumulated in the multi-connected pore space of
mineral-catalytic, and probably photon-activated, geochemical reactors.
• Self-stabilizing proto-metabolic networks coalesced as a
mineral-cofactor world scenario.
• Peptide-like amino acid polymers added catalytic potential to
water-hydrophobic interfaces, at proto-membranes of hydrogels in a
peptide-cofactor world scenario.
• From a dual role of ribose phosphates, acting both in amino acid
activation and in ribonucleotide polymerization, ribozymes and RNPd
(RNA-peptide) complexes took over in a cofactor-assisted RNPd world
scenario.
• By speeding up the generation of stochastic peptides, as followed by the
adoption of sequence-specifying coding rules, the ever more sophisticated
protoribosomes ushered in the currently prevailing regimen of RNA-encoded
protein synthesis.
• The initially self-sufficient RNP (RNA-protein) world regimen was subsequently backed
up by genomic DNA for higher genetic stability – the modern RNA- and
protein-assisted DNA world.
• Presumably up to the RNP world level, a pervasive communal precellular
system organized itself as a primarily photoautotrophic molecular
ecosystem, mostly subject to K-selection.
• With the generation of autonomously viable and propagative cell-like
systems (cellular escape), free-living populations of r-selected organisms
could enrich the evolutionary scene, which quickly differentiated into
multiple ecological niches, comprising both autotrophic producers and
heterotrophic recyclers of various kinds.
“As for the sluggish, sessile, and communal precellular systems of the
LUCAS era, we have no phylogenetic indication that any complex
(non-bacterial) descendents survived on the bacterial side of the primal
dichotomy. Only the planctobacterial superphylum may come closest to such
an evolutionary relic. On the archaeal side, however, complex remnants
were not necessarily wiped out altogether by the newly appearing
r-selected prokaryotic cells. Instead, a mutual adjustment process let
other precellular remnants specialize in recycling of particulate organic
matter, including the engulfment of free-living cells. Eventually, some
complex communal remnants organized themselves as more slowly evolving
proto-eukaryotic macro-cells. The prokaryotic micro-cells, in turn, became
smaller in size but more prolific and ubiquitous by sheer numbers. Mainly
relying on phagocytosis of prokaryotic cells for a living, the complex
macro-cells had no need to miniaturize. Instead, they could retain and
perfect much higher degrees of cytoskeletal infrastructure and
compartmentalization at subcellular levels. At least once in such
engulfing cells, bacterial cells were retained as perpetuating
proto-mitochondrial endosymbionts. These compound cells gave rise to all
the eukaryotes of the modern era.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative
Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on
Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian,
Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. Pp.
342-4.
“One of the consequences of the sharpening differentiation among domains
once suffused with the national, or the supranational, is that at the
limit this can enable a proliferation of temporal and spatial framings and
a proliferation of normative orders where once the dominant logic was
toward producing unitary spatial, temporal, and normative framings. Even
though this is a partial rather than all-encompassing development, its
character is strategic.” Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights:
From Medieval to Global Assemblages. 2006. Princeton University Press. P.
421.
“In earlier periods, including Bretton Woods, that [organizing] logic was
geared toward building national states; in today’s phase, it is geared
toward building global systems inside national states. One consequence of
that difference in the economic arena, perhaps still the most legible
domain, is the fact that in the earlier period the development of the
world scale and the growth of international rivalry were directly related
while today they are inversely related....
“The opposite dynamic was at work in the development of the earlier world
scale. Where today’s global systems seek to over-ride interstate military
conflict, those of the late 1800s and early 1900s fed such conflicts.
Further, as they grow stronger, today’s global systems succeed more and
more at diluting (or suppressing) rivalries among the major powers, while
in the earlier period interstate rivalries became sharper as each of the
major national powers grew stronger.” Sassen, Saskia. Territory,
Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. 2006. Princeton
University Press. P. 16.
“In turn, as the formation of the national state and capitalism proceeded
through the seventeenth century and onward through the twentieth century,
the practices and projects that constituted the world scale evolved and
reached considerable diversification of flows, institutionalization, and
development of formidable administrative capacities. However, the
organizing logics remained geared toward building national political
economies.” Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to
Global Assemblages. 2006. Princeton University Press. Pp. 20-1.
“... globalization is not simply growing interdependence–its typical
definition–but the actual production of spatial and temporal frames that
simultaneously inhabit national structures and are distinct from national
spatial and temporal frames as these have been historically constructed.”
Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global
Assemblages. 2006. Princeton University Press. P. 23.
“The crux of the argument is that, in hominins, the act of opposing
dominant individuals involves a form of cooperation. Thus, by tracking
evidence in favor of enhanced cooperation, we can indirectly find evidence
of hominins evolving the capacity to disrupt dominance hierarchies.”
Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The
State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. P. 6.
“I argue that the most significant turning point between nonstate and
state societies occurs when an individual is authorized to delegate to
others the power to sanction normative transgressions. This is the
beginning of political centralization and of the hierarchical integration
that characterize many state institutions: the military, juridical,
administrative, and (sometimes) religious systems.” Dubreuil, Benoit.
Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010.
Cambridge University Press. P. 8.
“Indeed, humans have the ability to share attention not only to physical
objects but also to actions or events. Consequently, parents can draw the
attention of children to stereotypical actions and attach a negative or
positive sanction to them. This is basically what socialization is about:
children learn through repetitive social sanctions that some actions are
forbidden, permitted, or obligatory.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution
and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge
University Press. P. 64.
“For instance, low-ranking male chimpanzees quickly learn that getting too
close to a female in estrus can make high-ranking males quite angry. They
quickly understand that it is advantageous to sneak into the bushes to
avoid punishment. Non-human primates also have all kinds of ritual
gestures to signal their good intentions. Many of these gestures are the
outcome of social learning. Nonhuman primates develop expectations about
social actions, and these expectations contribute to shaping their social
preferences.
“There is no question that similar learning process shapes human
expectations and social preferences. The difference, however, is that
humans also develop a subset of expectations about actions that are
sanctioned in the context of shared attention. This set of expectations
can be qualified as ‘normative.’ In everyday life, normative expectations
are frequently contrasted with other behavioral expectations. For
instance, women often expect their employers to be upset if they find out
that they are pregnant, but they generally do not expect to be blamed by
their employers for being pregnant.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and
The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge
University Press. P. 65.
“Philosopher John Searle has claimed that normative expectations in humans
are distinctive in that they are ‘socially constructed.’ In the framework
presented here, constructing normative expectations socially implies
sharing attention to the action while attaching a positive or negative
sanction to it. In the socialization process, basic norms take the form of
stereotypical actions and scenes to which sanction will be attached
overtly in the context of joint attention. In that sense, norms are
similar to other conventional concepts on which natural language is
based.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies:
The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 65-6.
“The mechanisms underlying normativity and sanction provide a solution to
the collective problem of dominance. However, because they are general
social mechanisms, they also secure cooperation in many other areas of
social life.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of
Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. P. 67.
“What emerges from Table 2.1 is a punctuate evolution with two major
behavioral transitions:
“1. Early Homo erectus sensu lato presents strong evidence of increased
cooperation for two of the points that we examined: he was ecologically
more flexible than his predecessors, probably because of his modern body,
and he shifted to a higher quality diet.
“2. Homo heidelbergensis presents strong evidence of increased
cooperation for all but one of the points discussed. There is no
unambiguous evidence of long-term support for incapacitated individuals
among these hominins, but this can easily be due to the scarcity of the
fossil record. Even the much better known Neanderthal record has provided
only a few indisputable specimens.”
[Four other points of evidence for cooperation: “Habitual use of fire,
cooking, and reliance on large-game hunting; Prolonged infancy compared to
apes; Secondary altriciality and modern birth mechanism; Reduced sexual
dimorphism and restricted mating access”]
Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The
State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 84-5.
“I have argued in this chapter that, with regard to cooperation and social
norms, the archaeological record suggests that at least two major
behavioral transitions occurred since our last common ancestor with
chimpanzees. The first took place in early Homo erectus and can be related
to a change in social motivations that made cooperative feeding more
advantageous. It provoked a shift to a more versatile, higher quality
diet, as well as the colonization of a new ecological niche. The second,
which occurred in Homo heidelbergensis or slightly earlier, can be
explained by enhanced cognitive control that facilitated investment in
long-term public goods games such as cooperative breeding.
“If my argument is correct and these changes really occurred, they must
have had a major impact on traditional dominance hierarchies. Had the
early Homo erectus been interested in sharing attention with its
conspecifics, it would have been more prone to engage in cooperative
resistance against aggressive and violent individuals. A few hundred
thousand years later, enhanced cognitive control could have given groups
of Homo heidelbergensis the capacity to turn down the aspirations of their
most aggressive members. We will never know exactly how our ancestors
lived or the specific tactics they used to resist dominance. Nevertheless,
the best guess as of now would be that a few hundred thousand years ago
hominins were living in nearly egalitarian foraging bands, successfully
resisting despotic individuals. Although dominance hierarchies were
eradicated, modern status hierarchies had not yet been created. Homo
erectus, Homo heidelbergensis, and Homo neanderthalensis had no more alpha
males, but not yet a chief, a priest, or a president.” Dubreuil, Benoit.
Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010.
Cambridge University Press. P. 90.
“The African evidence suggests that, tens of thousands of years ago,
populations of modern Homo sapiens began to formally organize their social
life in building tribal networks in which local bands were embedded. In a
species capable of building such institutions, hierarchies could reappear,
given the right circumstances.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The
Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University
Press. P. 93.
“If the categorization of an individual as a ‘mother’ or as a ‘child’ can
be based simply on behavioral cues, the successful construction of
concepts such as ‘president,’ ‘chief,’ or ‘priest’ depends on our capacity
to represent the point of view of other persons on the ascribed concept.
It makes no sense to say that someone is a priest or a president if she
has no idea what it means to be a priest or a president. At a minimum, I
need to consider the status from my point of view and from the point of
view of the other person. In sum, institution-making in humans builds on
our capacity to consider and coordinate alternative perspectives on
concepts. This capacity requires more than the faculty of language as it
is ordinarily understood.
“1. It implies that we have the right affects and that we are interested
in sharing attention with our conspecifics. I proposed in the previous
chapter some reasons to believe that this ability was in place early in
the human lineage.
“2. It implies executive functions such as inhibition and working memory,
located in large part in the prefrontal cortex. Given the relative stasis
of the frontal lobe during the last 500,000 years and the presence of
long-term cooperative ventures in Homo heidelbergensis, these abilities
were probably in place before the morphological and the behavioral
modernization of Homo sapiens.
“3. Finally, it entails sufficient attentional flexibility to look
simultaneously at a a person as a man or as a president, or at an object
as a tool and as a ritual object. Such tasks rely heavily on the
temporoparietal areas, and as these areas underwent significant
reorganization in line with the globularization of the cranium, I propose
that the cognitive modernization of Homo sapiens began there.”
Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The
State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. P. 136.
“Put briefly, my point is that the cognitive mechanisms underlying human
behavioral modernization also stand behind the reappearance of hierarchies
in our species. Hierarchies in modern humans are not of the same kind as
those found in our closer relatives, but build on our ability for
collective ascription of status. Humans can be bullies – there is no doubt
about that – but leaders or rulers cannot be equated with alpha males.
They can be violent and exploitative, but they do not need to be so.
“I think that evidence in favor of uniquely human social organization
appears quite early in the archaeological record. As noted, the presence
of raw materials from distant sources (>100 km) in MSA [Middle Stone Age]
sites as old as 130,000 BP suggests that modern humans were already
engaged in long-distance exchange networks at that time. Among modern
foragers long-distance exchanges take place within tribal networks, in
which corporate groups (clans, lineages, etc.) are institutionalized and
are represented by specific individuals. It is tempting to see in
Paleolithic personal ornaments instruments that were used to signal one’s
place within such social systems.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and
The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge
University Press. P. 137.
“When people struggle to monitor who is who, punishing defectors becomes
more risky and less effective. People can thus go unpunished and break
social norms with near impunity. The risk to the group of fission
increases....”
“My contention is that local groups that grow beyond the level of a few
dozen individuals have to find a cheaper strategy to monitor individual
behavior. One way to do this is to focus monitoring on salient individuals
and to take them as indicators of the trustworthiness of less salient
ones. It is not surprising that most functions of headmen in egalitarian
societies have to do with representing corporate groups (clans, lineages,
tribes, and other sodalities).” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The
Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University
Press. P. 164.
“Because normative violations have implications for collectives, certain
members of a corporate group are often made implicitly or explicitly
responsible for enforcing norms within the group. I term this second
relational mechanism the ‘social division of sanction.’ By that, I mean
that in such societies not everybody is equally responsible for
sanctioning normative violations. Rather, normative expectations are
created about who should sanction normative violations. In modern
societies, for instance, there are explicit rules that specify that the
right to sanction the burglar belongs to the judge and not to the victim.
“Philosopher of law Herbert L. Hart has aptly captured this point with his
distinction between primary and secondary rules. To put it briefly,
primary rules are rules of conduct. They prescribe how people should
behave. In prelegal systems, their content is culturally defined by the
disapprobation that attaches to specific actions. Rules of etiquette are
probably the best examples of primary rules, but one can also think of
rules prohibiting violence or prescribing help. In legal systems, primary
rules can also be fixed by secondary rules; that is, rules that are
defined with respect to other rules.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution
and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge
University Press. Pp. 166-7. Reference is to Hart, Herbert. The Concept of
Law. 1961. Clarendon Press.
“My contention is that, although the range of possible arrangements can
vary indefinitely, growing group size depends on the ability to find
institutions that relieve the burden on cognition by focusing social
monitoring on a few salient individuals. If these individuals are turned
into reliable indicators of the trustworthiness of larger groups, the
costs of sanction may be prevented from rising.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human
Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010.
Cambridge University Press. P. 169.
“... higher theory of mind and perspective taking are essential for
creating both corporate groups and secondary rules. Consequently, only a
species in which these abilities are well established would be able to
generate the institutional arrangements that make it possible for human
groups to grow beyond the size of the band. If higher theory of mind and
perspective taking are unique to behaviorally modern humans, as I have
argued, then archaic humans could not have created either local groups
significantly larger than a few dozen individuals or tribal systems based
on the aggregation of corporate groups.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution
and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge
University Press. P. 170.
“The objective of this chapter was nevertheless to save one core
assumption underlying neoevolutionary approaches. I am not referring to
the idea of linearity or directionality of evolution, but to the
assumption that there is some functional link between large societies and
the emergence of hierarchies. I argued that this link can be explained by
the cognitive and motivational mechanisms that make punishing strangers
more expensive than punishing familiars. Growing group size thus depends
on the existence of institutions that control the costs of sanction. These
institutions can be corporate groups, indicating the trustworthiness of
their members, or secondary rules, allowing for a social division of
sanction.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of
Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. P.
186.
“In bacteriology, autotrophy has become determined by the growth of a pure
culture in a strictly inorganic growth media, devoid of any organic
compounds other than carbon dioxide (or carbonate) that serve as the sole
source of carbon. Subsequent studies have uncovered other one carbon
autotrophs that use carbon monoxide, carbon disulfide, methane and formic
acid as the sole carbon source.” Srinivasan, V. & H. Morowitz. “What is an
autotroph?” Arch Microbiology 2012 194:135-140. P. 135.
“As several autotrophs seem to lie near the root of the phylogenetic tree,
the metabolist position suggests that the earliest organisms were
chemoautotrophs. The core anabolism shows great similarity among
chemoautotrophs indicating three possibilities: a single origin of
metabolism, a best solution to anabolism, an only solution to anabolism.”
Srinivasan, V. & H. Morowitz. “What is an autotroph?” Arch Microbiology
2012 194:135-140. P. 136.
“The last 60 years have witnessed chemists developing an understanding of
organocatalysis and ligand field theory, both of which give demonstrable
low-molecular-weight catalysts. We assume that transition-metal-ligand
complexes are likely to have occurred in the deep ocean trenches by the
combination of naturally occurring oceanic metals and ligands synthesized
from the emergent CO2, H2, NH3, H2S, and H3PO4.” Morowitz, H., V.
Srinivasan & E. Smith. “Ligand Field Theory and the Origin of Life as an
Emergent Feature of the Periodic Table of Elements.” Biological Bulletin.
219:1-6. August 2010. P. 1.
“They [transition elements] are characterized as having atoms or ions with
incomplete or complete shells of ‘d’ orbitals; the ones we are most
interested in are groups 5 to 12 in the fourth period and molybdenum and
tungsten in the next periods. They are part of a cluster of the periodic
table called the ‘d’ block elements/chemicals. In present day biology they
form a very small part of the mass of functioning cells, usually less than
1%, yet they play a central role as cofactors as well as essential
components in perhaps half of all proteins. The best studied for their
biological roles are vanadium, manganese, iron, cobalt, zinc, molybdenum,
copper, and nickel.”
“As we noted, transition-metal complexes, or ‘d’ block complexes, consist
of a central transition-metal atom or ion surrounded by molecules and
ions, usually nonmetallic. When these surrounding structures are bonded or
otherwise attached to the metal, they are called ligands. This is a
restricted use of the word ligand used in ligand-field theory, which deals
with molecular orbitals and bonding of the metals and ligands. Ligand in
present-day biochemistry often refers to any molecular grouping that
attaches to a protein.” Morowitz, H., V. Srinivasan & E. Smith. “Ligand
Field Theory and the Origin of Life as an Emergent Feature of the Periodic
Table of Elements.” Biological Bulletin. 219:1-6. August 2010. P. 2.
“In ligand field theory, orbitals are associated with the entire complex,
thus allowing for more chemical subtlety. The orbitals are still weighted
sums of atomic orbitals, but the s,p,d overlap renders the probability
functions more global over the entire complex.” Morowitz, H., V.
Srinivasan & E. Smith. “Ligand Field Theory and the Origin of Life as an
Emergent Feature of the Periodic Table of Elements.” Biological Bulletin.
219:1-6. August 2010. P. 3.
“In a recent computational work, we sought to develop a broadly applicable
set of algorithms to ask whether and under what environmental condition
any two given species may be expected to display metabolic symbiosis....
Surprisingly, we found that for most organism pairs, it is possible to
find a large number of putative environments that induce cross-feeding,
i.e. that support growth of the joint model, but not of individual
species. Hence, metabolism-based symbiotic interactions may be highly
abundant in communities, and highly dependent on environmental composition
and dynamics.” Klitgord, N. & D. Segre. “Ecosystems biology of microbial
metabolism.” Current Opinion in Biotechnology. 2011. 22:541-546. P. 542.
“Genome-scale networks and algorithms are promising approaches toward
studying small natural or engineered microbial ecosystems. An outstanding
question is whether these approaches can be applied to the much larger
number of interacting species present in most ecosystems, and whether
large modular stoichiometric models are going to be useful and necessary.
One potential answer to this question comes from metagenomic sequencing
data, suggesting that while organism lineages fluctuate extensively
through time and conditions, the functional (and more specifically
metabolic) content of microbial communities displays dynamic stability and
correlations with environmental parameters. On the one hand, it does not
seem too surprising that the chemical make up of an environment (e.g. the
available redox couples) should, at evolutionary time scales, determine
what metabolic functions will be present in the microbial community.
However, if this ‘metabolic determinism’ has truly been shaping the
microbial world, this would have profound consequences on our
understanding of life and its evolutionary history on our planet. Given
this prospective of potential ecosystem-level principles of metabolic
organization, it may be useful to explore stoichiometric models that
consider a whole microbial community as a single ‘soup of enzymes’,
disregarding the boundaries of individual species.” Klitgord, N. & D.
Segre. “Ecosystems biology of microbial metabolism.” Current Opinion in
Biotechnology. 2011. 22:541-546. P. 543.
“Indeed, in small-scale foraging social worlds, the cognitive problem of
effective coordination is more demanding than that of detecting
defection.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made
Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 10.
“Fruits are designed to be eaten. But plants do not welcome herbivore
consumption of their storage organs, and hence they are protected both
mechanically and chemically. It takes a well-informed mind to find these
organs, extract them, and make them edible by soaking, cooking, and the
like.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans
Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. Pp. 13-4.
“The idea, then, is that positive feedback links social foraging and
intergenerational social learning. Intergenerational learning provides
much of the informational fuel that makes social foraging successful, and
the rewards of social foraging support the life spans and expensive
metabolisms that make extensive intergenerational learning possible.”
Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique.
2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 14.
“If specialists are more likely to successfully innovate in their field of
specialization, as seems likely, positive connections will develop between
elaborating social foraging, increased group size, and the rate of
innovation.
“In sum, feedback loops form between individual cognitive capacity, social
organization, and the pace of environmental change.” Sterelny, Kim. The
Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book,
MIT Press. P. 18.
“The apprentice learning model has four important virtues. First, it
identifies a form of learning that can be assembled incrementally. The
reliable transmission of skill can begin as a side effect of adult
activity, without adult teaching and without adaptations for social
learning in the young. Once established, it then brings with it selection
for cognitive and social changes that increase the reliability or reduce
the cost of learning. Rudimentary but reliable skill transmission,
however, does not presuppose the presence of such adaptations. Second,
apprentice learning is known to support high-fidelity, high-bandwidth
knowledge flow. Until recently, much technical competence in industrial
society depended on apprentice learning. Virtually all technical
competence in preindustrial societies depended on it. Third, the model
fits ethnographic data quite well. Formal educational institutions and
explicit teaching are not prominent parts of traditional society. But many
forager societies organize and enhance children’s participation in
economic activity, and this approach supports the transmission of
traditional craft skills. Finally, the model can be shown to illuminate
the archaeological record, ...” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How
Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. Pp. 35-6.
“For those who think of culture in this way, the emergence of decoration,
public art, and ‘style’ is the archaeological signature of the transition
from mere group membership to consciousness of membership. According to
this view, the evolution of behavioral modernity is a cultural revolution,
a transition from mere coexistence with others to identifying oneself with
others. This transition is relatively recent; it took place (in this
picture) somewhere between 120,000 and 50,000 years ago.” Sterelny, Kim.
The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford
Book, MIT Press. P. 49.
“However, symbols that serve as insignia of social place and identify are
neither arbitrary nor displaced.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice:
How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 51.
“In summary, then, the cultural learning characteristic of the Upper
Paleolithic transition and later periods of human culture–social
transmission with both a large bandwidth and sufficient accuracy for
incremental improvement–requires individual cognitive adaptations for
cultural learning, highly structured learning environments, and population
structures that both buffer existing resources effectively and support
enough specialization to generate a supply of innovation.” Sterelny, Kim.
The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford
Book, MIT Press. P. 61.
“Ecological cooperation selects for information sharing, and information
sharing makes cooperative foraging more profitable and less risky. The
critical premise of my argument was that cooperative foraging (of the
hominin variety) depends on technology and expertise and hence selects for
information sharing at and across generations.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved
Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT
Press. P. 76.
“We are obligate, habitual, inveterate, and adapted social information
pumps, sucking information and expertise from our social partners.”
Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique.
2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 76.
“But an alloparenting world selects for more than cuteness. It will select
for (a) infant monitoring of mothers and others, (b) infant awareness of
the differences among the others, and (c) infant awareness of others’
responses to its own action; awareness of joint attention and action. Once
care is a negotiable quantity, babies are under selection for social
skills, and that might help explain the recent results in developmental
psychology suggesting that infants have a surprisingly rich theory of
mind.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans
Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. Pp. 87-8.
“But according to Marlowe, between perhaps 30,000 and 20,000 years ago,
humans added spear throwers, the bow and arrow, and poison darts to their
arsenal.
“All of this matters because the ability to kill at a distance changes the
environment of cooperation. It became possible for individuals or small
groups to kill large animals in relative safety. Large groups that hunt
and kill together can share on the spot. The profit of joint activity is
accrued together and in full view of all, so no informational problems
arise in policing cooperation. Identifying and agreeing to a fair division
of a joint resource is much less problematic if everyone is a roughly
equal partner in a joint activity. Division becomes more problematic once
individual success becomes highly variable (as individuals hunt alone or
with favored partners), once the range of resources expands (making
commensurability an issue), once role specialization becomes important,
once reciprocation extends over time, and once individuals spend much of
their time, and enjoy much of their success and failure, away from the
eyes of the many. Cooperation is most stable in small, homogeneous
groups.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans
Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 91. Reference is to Marlow, F.W.
2005. “Hunter-gatherers and human evolution.” Evolutionary Anthropology.
14:54-67.
“Kaplan, Hooper, and Gurven argue that egalitarian, cooperative social
organization depends on four factors: (i) key resources cannot be
monopolized by one or a few agents; (ii) all adult economic activity is
highly skilled; (iii) female and male roles are complementary; and both
are important; and (iv) communities are small, so that bottom-up
mechanisms of norm enforcement, coordination, and decision work.” Sterelny,
Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012.
Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 92. Reference is to Kaplan, H., P. Hooper &
M. Gurven. 2009. “The evolutionary and ecological roots of human social
organization.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London,
Series B: Biological Sciences. 364:3289-3299.
“We are intelligent because cooperation is at once risky and too
profitable to abandon.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How
Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 101.
“In short: if agents can commit–if commitment devices are available–agents
can enhance fitness by constraining future choice. Constraining future
choice enhances an agent’s capacity to deter. Credible threats secure
resources that enhance fitness. Constraining future choice also enhances
trustworthiness. Trustworthy agents can enter extended, profitable
partnerships that cannot be stabilized by mutual surveillance.” Sterelny,
Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012.
Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 105.
“Internal mechanisms [those dependent on the “agent’s own psychology” and
not on institutional support], in this view, were foundational to the
solution of commitment dilemmas and hence to the evolution of human
ultrasociality. In particular, Frank argues that our distinctive social
and moral emotions are commitment devices....”
“As it happens, in hominin social worlds, the economic rewards of being
trustworthy are important. Agents who care about keeping commitments tend
to optimize their long-run economic welfare. As increasing resource take
tends to increase fitness, there is selection for being trustworthy.
Agents are trusted only if they can credibly commit; agents who can
credibly commit gain an advantage thereby, and that explains the evolution
of the commitment emotion complex. Commitment dilemmas were important to
hominin social life. And so we evolved emotions that are motivationally
powerful, emotions that are triggered by perceived violations of trust and
fairness, emotions whose motivational saliences are relatively insensitive
to utilitarian calculation, emotions whose occurrence are easily
recognized and difficult to fake.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice:
How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 107.
Reference is to Frank, R. 1988. Pp. 57-77. “Cooperation through emotional
commitment.” Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment. Editor, Nesse, R.
Russell Sage Foundation.
“... commitment mechanisms do depend on costs, in three ways.”
“First, costs amplify effects of arousal. Some commitment signals are
motivation bending rather than information carrying; they are
Krebs-Dawkins signals. Their function is to change the motivational
psychology of both sender and receiver rather than to reveal antecedently
existing characteristics of the sender. Singing, for example, is a signal.
But it has an affective impact on both sender and audience. Signal costs,
I suggest, up-regulate the effects of such mood- and emotion-altering
signals....
“By amplifying the salience of both reward and punishment, reinforcement
is more effective in highly aroused situations. So joint action in
emotionally amplified situations reinforces mutual bonds more powerfully
than collective action in calmer emotional waters....
“Second costs are investments. We commit through niche alteration. But
changing the world is not free.... Tattoos and facial scars are not (just)
signals but interventions. They make cooperation within the group the
right option in almost all circumstances, for the tattoos make shifting
social networks much more difficult. In advertising your origins and
affiliations, you inherit your allies’ enemies, whether or not you keep
your allies’ support....
“Third, honesty has a by-product advantage. Honest signals can take
advantage of by-products that increase their credibility for free. A
dishonest signaler has to manufacture the evidence that makes a signal
credible as well as produce the signal itself.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved
Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT
Press. Pp. 110-1.
“Investment in building and maintaining relationships is a commitment
device, because such relationships change the payoffs in triggering
situations. If a triggering temptation arises, the costs of defection have
been driven up. Defection will risk fracturing trust and hence forfeiting
the profit from the investment necessary to build trust.” Sterelny, Kim.
The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford
Book, MIT Press. P. 117.
“But manipulation was a threat even in the small-scale, intimate social
worlds of most human evolutionary history. But though real, this threat is
not uniform. Other factors contribute to the robustness of honest
signaling. The kind of information that flows, the nature of the channel,
and the shape of the sender-receiver network are all relevant to honesty
and deception. In sections 6.2 and 6.3, I argue that some forms of
informational cooperation are much less prone to deceptive exploitation.
In particular, I argue that the transmission of expertise is relatively
immune to the problem of deception. That fact is important. It shows that
some forms of informational cooperation can evolve and elaborate without
requiring the prior or simultaneous evolution of complex cognitive tools.”
Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique.
2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. Pp. 128-9.
“The Condorcet Jury Theorem makes the value of information-pooling in the
face of uncertainty vivid. If each juror votes independently and has a
better than 0.5 chance of being right, as the size of the jury goes up,
the probability of a majority vote being right rises rapidly to near
certainty. So agents gain access to reliable information about their
environment if they have mutual knowledge of each agent’s assessment of
noisy signals, together with trust in consensus. Imagine a foraging party
trying to decide whether a swollen river is too dangerous to ford, which
animal in a pack to target, how to interpret the ambiguous behavior of a
neighboring group. There is no temptation to defect here. By voting
honestly and accepting consensus, each agent trades an unreliable
assessment of a relevant feature of the world for a much more reliable
assessment. Information pooling protects not just against deception but
against noise.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made
Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 137.
“This shows that in some respects, information sharing is less subject to
defection problems than some forms of ecological and reproductive
cooperation. When cooperation has a physical product, conflict and
defection can arise over fair division of the product. A jointly produced
informational product–for example, a more reliable assessment of the risks
of a river crossing–is automatically available to all who have pooled
their individual estimates. In this respect, it is more like successful
collective defense than successful collective hunting.” Sterelny, Kim. The
Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book,
MIT Press. P. 137.
“It follows that in a heterogeneous and changing environment, no one
individual is personally exposed to all he or she needs to know about
resources and dangers, threats and opportunities. Unless early hominins
foraged together in a single convoy, differing individuals and teams
experienced differing spatiotemporal patches of their home range. Together
with a fission-fusion social organization, heterogeneity creates an
informational gradient and thus a potentially advantageous division of
epistemic labor.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution
Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 138.
“Many-to-many networks combined with sharing information in advance of
action impose a veil of ignorance between a potentially Machiavellian
agent and potential targets.... The upshot, then, is that in public
signaling contexts, the chance that an attempted manipulation will be
detected is quite high. Its rewards will rarely be both high and certain.
Since the individual and collective benefits of local knowledge pooling
are significant, we can expect a default for honest signaling.” Sterelny,
Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012.
Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 139.
“They [plausible candidate early evolving forms of information sharing]
are low-risk forms of information sharing. Skill transmission, fast-fading
ecological information, and long-shelf-life ecological information are all
likely candidates for being early evolvers. The establishment of these
early evolving forms of informational cooperation in hominin social worlds
changed the nature of those social worlds, leading to selection for
individual cognitive adaptations. Those extended the range of cultural
learning, improved its fidelity and bandwidth, and managed the risks of
deception. Moreover, the interaction of informational and ecological
cooperation increased information gradients in hominin social groups and
thus increased the potential profits of information sharing and
communication. As forager skill levels increased, so did life expectancy,
intensifying an intergenerational information gradient. Specialization and
the division of labor likewise contribute to informational gradients, for
specialization results in agents exploring different aspects and areas of
their common range. These steeper gradients amplify the potential profits
of communication, thus contributing to the positive feedback between
cooperation, communication, and technical intelligence.” Sterelny, Kim.
The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford
Book, MIT Press. Pp. 148-9.
“One group can be fitter than another if it pumps more individual hominins
into the next generation (multilevel selection 1). Or it can be fitter
because it is more apt to produce descendant groups (multilevel selection
2). Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans
Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 178.
“Conventionally, Darwinian fitness is thing-based, measured in terms of
replication of discrete things. In ‘traditional’ Darwinism, for example,
the replicate is the offspring, while to a Neo-Darwinist, it is the atom
of heredity, the gene. One can take a more physiological view of fitness
as process, however, and here is where the future begins to creep back
into our thinking about evolution. Processes have a dimension of
timeliness that objects lack: they are properly quantified as rates.
Processes are traditionally the purview of physiology, but they take on
evolutionary import if they come to embody heritable memory. There is no
real reason why they could not. Replicable genes qualify as heritable
memory largely because they bias the future toward a particular state. The
fitter gene is the one whose bias reaches further into the future. A
physiological process can also bias the future, and by this criterion
could also qualify as heritable memory. In this instance, the forward
reach in time is embodied in persistence of the process: how likely it is
that the orderly stream of matter and energy that embodies the process
will persist in the face of whatever perturbations are thrown at it? A fit
process is therefore a persistent process: if a particular catalytic
milieu, or a particular embodied physiology, can more persistently
commandeer a stream of energy and matter than can another, the more
persistent stream will be the fitter. Homeostasis, therefore, is the rough
physiological equivalent of genetic fitness: a more robust homeostasis
will ensure a system’s persistence over a wider range of perturbations and
further into the future than will a less robustly regulated system.
“A truly comprehensive theory of evolution, it seems, should be able to
accommodate both thing-based and process-based fitness. One way to meld
the two might be to define a new class of process-based heritable memory.
Allow me to put forward a candidate: persistent environments created and
managed by systems of Bernard machines. To differentiate these from
thing-based replicators, I shall designate these persistent living
environments as persistors. We place persistors and replicators at
opposite ends of a spectrum of forms of heritable memory: object-oriented
memory at one end and process oriented memory at the other.” Turner, J.
Scott. The Tinkerer’s Accomplice: How Design Emerges from Life Itself.
2007. Harvard University Press. Pp. 218-9.
“Variation without persistence would mean that changes could not be
maintained and built upon during evolution. And persistence without
variation would bring evolution to a standstill.” Coen, Enrico. Cells to
civilizations: The Principles of Change that Shape Life. 2012. Princeton
University Press. P. 22.
“A vast range of arrangements can be produced simply by joining a few
elements in different ways. I call this the principle of combinatorial
richness.” Coen, Enrico. Cells to civilizations: The Principles of Change
that Shape Life. 2012. Princeton University Press. P. 41.
“Our seven principles–population variation, persistence, reinforcement,
competition, cooperation, combinatorial richness, and recurrence–and their
interactions provide the driving force for these journeys, leading to the
remarkable variety of organisms we see today. I have called this
collection of seven principles and how they work together life’s creative
recipe.” Coen, Enrico. Cells to civilizations: The Principles of Change
that Shape Life. 2012. Princeton University Press. P. 60.
“Plant behavior is defined as the response to signals, and a plethora of
external signals are sensed and acted upon by green plants. Resources
(light, minerals, and water) figure strongly in a signals list that also
includes numerous mecahanical influences such as wind, rain, and touch;
gases such as ethylene and nitric oxide; soil compaction and particle
structure; and numerous biotic features, such as identity of neighbors and
disturbance, among many others.” Trewavas, Anthony. “Aspects of Plant
Intelligence: Convergence and Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. From Morris, Simon
C. The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous
to Give a Directional Signal? 2008. Templeton Foundation Press. P. 69.
“Plants and animals differ fundamentally in the way they express behavior
in response to signals. In plants, it is phenotypic plasticity; in
animals, it is movement.” Trewavas, Anthony. “Aspects of Plant
Intelligence: Convergence and Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. From Morris, Simon
C. The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous
to Give a Directional Signal? 2008. Templeton Foundation Press. P. 69.
“... unlike many animals, plants grow and develop throughout their life
cycle. Embryogenesis continues throughout the life cycle, and the
embryogenic meristems eventually form flowers. Environmental history can,
thus, pass directly into reproduction. The Weismann proscription that the
environment does not directly affect animal inheritance, because sexual
cells are protected from environmental variation, is inapplicable to
plants, strengthening the likelihood of neo-Lamarckian inheritance in
plant evolution.” Trewavas, Anthony. “Aspects of Plant Intelligence:
Convergence and Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. From Morris, Simon C. The Deep
Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous to Give a
Directional Signal? 2008. Templeton Foundation Press. Pp. 75-6.
“Light reflected from vegetation is richer in far-red wavelengths compared
to red. Plants use that information along with its direction to predict
not actual shade but to foresee the likelihood of shading at some stage in
the future from a competitor. When a change in the balance of red to
far-red radiation is perceived, an integrated adaptive response in
phenotype structure results. New branches grow away from the putative
competitor, stem growth is increased; the rate of branching diminishes,
and such branches assume a more vertical direction; leaf area increases in
anticipation of reduced incident flux; and the number of layers of leaf
cells containing chlorophyll diminishes.” Trewavas, Anthony. “Aspects of
Plant Intelligence: Convergence and Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. From Morris,
Simon C. The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently
Ubiquitous to Give a Directional Signal? 2008. Templeton Foundation Press.
P. 89.
“There are a number of organizational similarities between plants (trees,
in particular) and social insect colonies.
• “Both trees and colonies contain large numbers of replaceable foragers:
in the hive, for example, individual bees, in the tree leaf or branch
root, meristems.
• “In both cases, reproductive and other functions are differentiated from
the same uniform genetic line.
• “The hive colony is aggressive to invading outsiders, and entry points
are guarded. Trees use allelopathy to damage local competitive species and
possess induced defense reactions, such as natural pesticides, to kill
herbivores or invading fungi. These defense reactions can be complex,
involving chaotic pesticide production in different leaves so that the
herbivore is uncertain whether the next leaf is edible or whether
consumption kills.
• “A good source of food attracts more insect workers through positive
feedback mechanisms and communication. Tree branches and leaves grow to
exploit light patches, and roots proliferate in mineral-rich zones
involving positive feedback mechanisms and communication.
• “Just as entry guards to hives and other foraging individuals in hives
will altruistically sacrifice themselves to maintain the whole colony and,
in particular, the queen, trees will altruistically abscise their foraging
organs when parasitized by disease or damaged by herbivores. The
abscission zone, a layer of a few cells at the base of the petiole and
able to secrete cell wall weakening hydrolytic enzymes, will do so when
signals are received from elsewhere in the plant and the leaf blade to
commence abscission. The aim is maintenance of the whole individual for
later reproduction. Again, leaves and roots can altruistically abscise if
resources of minerals and water are short to ensure the future integrity
of the individual plant.
• “Hive and tree behaviors are dependent on complex communication,
assessment of external status, and behavioral (plasticity) change. If one
is regarded as intelligent, so must the other.”
Trewavas, Anthony. “Aspects of Plant Intelligence: Convergence and
Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. From Morris, Simon C. The Deep Structure of
Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous to Give a Directional
Signal? 2008. Templeton Foundation Press. P. 92.
“However, other organisms have developed intelligence in a very different
way from animals. Here, intelligence does not localize in a defined place
like a brain but is a property of the whole system. Animals learn by
exchanging dendritic connections between different cells, constructing new
neural pathways and changing information flow. Analogously, bacteria learn
by exchanging genes from other bacteria, altering information flow. Cells
learn by changing directions of information flow through signal
transduction pathways. Plants learn by changing information flow via
chemical communication much as social insects do.” Trewavas, Anthony.
“Aspects of Plant Intelligence: Convergence and Evolution.” Pp. 68-110.
From Morris, Simon C. The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence
Sufficiently Ubiquitous to Give a Directional Signal? 2008. Templeton
Foundation Press. P. 94.
“I argue that we do better to conceptualize functions as effects of
systemic components that contribute to more-general capacities of the
larger system. Emphasis falls upon the structure and organization of
natural systems and the work accomplished by components of such systems.
The function of the mammalian heart is to pump blood because pumping
contributes in significant ways to certain capacities of the circulatory
system. Functions are essentially systemic; history is not essential.
Functions typically have a history, to be sure, including a selective
history, but pumping would have been the function of the heart even if
some other device had beaten it out early in the evolution of mammals.
Functions are contributions to systemic capacities and, while selection
can preserve or eliminate those functions, selection is not their source.”
Davies, Paul Sheldon. Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of
Functions. 2003. MIT Press. P. xiii.
“Thus, although systemic functions are not defined by reference to
historical success, they are defined in terms of capacities to contribute
to the exercise of some higher-level capacity. They are defined in terms
of the capacity for systemic success. Thus, when the capacity to
contribute is absent, so too is the systemic function.” Davies, Paul
Sheldon. Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of Functions. 2003.
MIT Press. P. 212.
“For a finite-size flow system to persist in time (to live), its
configuration must evolve in such a way that provides easier access to the
currents that flow through it.” Bejan, Adrian & J.P. Zane. Design in
Nature: How the Constructal Law Governs Evolution in Biology, Physics,
Technology, and Social Organization. 2012. Doubleday. P. 3.
“Flow systems have two basic features (properties). There is the current
that is flowing (for example, fluid, heat, mass, or information) and the
design through which it flows.” Bejan, Adrian & J.P. Zane. Design in
Nature: How the Constructal Law Governs Evolution in Biology, Physics,
Technology, and Social Organization. 2012. Doubleday. P. 3.
“Where the second law commands that things should flow from high to low,
the constructal law commands that they should flow in configurations that
flow more and more easily over time.” Bejan, Adrian & J.P. Zane. Design in
Nature: How the Constructal Law Governs Evolution in Biology, Physics,
Technology, and Social Organization. 2012. Doubleday. P. 19.
“Determinacy is a condition common to many (but not all) animals, in which
the body boundaries of ‘individuals’ are localized: these individuals
cannot be in two or more places at once and they inevitably die within a
fairly fixed span of time. Such individuals may be free to move about, but
they have little freedom to remodel their own body boundaries other than
by moulting or adding on extra segments as they get older. Although
animals which accomplish the latter, e.g. snakes and worms, are sometimes
described as indeterminate, they generally repeat rather than remodel
their previous boundary and so are better thought of as ‘modular.’
“Since determinate individuals have a more or less fixed life span, they
have to reproduce if their genes are to survive. This situation may,
fundamentally, be related to the abilities of animals to ingest food and
to locate further supplies using various means of locomotion. It contrasts
with the indeterminacy of many plants, fungi, actinomycetes and colonial
animals such as hydroids, which are not fully motile and which receive
and/or absorb energy sources. These indeterminate organisms have at least
the potential to grow indefinitely, until or unless they encounter some
external limit to their expansion. Reproduction therefore provides them
with the scope to disperse and reassort their genetic information in the
long term, rather than being an absolute necessity for individual
furtherance in the short term.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living
in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 69.
“A general property of relatively indeterminate systems is that they
branch, having first become ‘polarized’ by producing an elongating
structure that typically extends at its tips....”
“These important processes in indeterminate development, namely
polarization, branching, integration and degeneration correspond with
patterns that are common to all kinds of fluid-dynamical systems.” Rayner,
Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial
College Press. Pp. 78-9.
“The intuitive appeal of the idea that at least some human thought
processes are indeterminate is evident in such widely used phrases as
‘streams of consciousness’ and ‘lateral thinking.’ Most people, when asked
how it feels to think about a complex, unfamiliar problem might well
describe something akin to a foraging fungal mycelium. Thoughts radiate
out from some inner space, as though searching out easier passages and
circumventing obstacles, eventually cross-connecting with one another and
becoming focused along particular channels. This kind of thinking has
sometimes been described as ‘water logic,’ and often yields varied
solutions that depend sensitively on circumstances....
“There therefore seem to be two contrasting kinds [of] problem solving–the
one prescriptive and precise but inflexible, the other innovative and
versatile but prone to wander.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living
in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. Pp. 89-90.
“At the outset, I want to recall that there are two basic kinds of
approaches to explaining the existence of biological phenomena–adaptational
and organizational.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic
Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 94.
“One way of proliferating involves expanding in all directions (isotropic
expansion). Any system which continues to expand in this way retains its
original shape and symmetry; i.e, it just gets larger. However, the
surface area of its boundary relative to its volume is inevitably reduced
as the distance between the boundary and the core of the system increases.
This makes it harder and harder to keep the interior adequately supplied
with resources brought in from outside.
“These limitations on isotropic expansion are the compelling reasons
usually given for why living systems in general and cells in particular
cannot just get larger, and therefore have to divide. Further reasons lie
in the fact that without division it is impossible to produce specialized
components or to disperse to new locations.
“Where the products of division do not dissociate, prospects open up for
them to follow distinctive developmental paths–to differentiate–whilst
still being able to be interconnected and so divide labour efficiently.”
Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997.
Imperial College Press. P. 97.
“Depending on the degree of freedom of genetic transfer, the ultimate
consequence of gene flow may be envisaged to be either the formation of
gene pools or the formation of genetic networks. The concept of a gene
pool basically assumes that genes have complete freedom to move around
within a population boundary, so that their distribution amongst
individuals is random....”
“In genetic networks, genes are distributed locally amongst interbreeding
individuals. No individual is capable of containing all the genetic
information available in the population as a whole, and so each individual
can be regarded as a differentiated component of the system, capable of
occupying a distinctive niche.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living
in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 117.
“The three known mechanisms of genetic transfer between bacteria are
conjugation, transduction and transformation. Conjugation involves a
sex-like process in which one cell, often described as ‘male’ acts as a
donor, attaching by means of ‘sex pili’ to a ‘female’, recipient cell.
“Tranduction involves the intervention of a third party, a virus or ‘bacteriophage’,
as the agent of transfer....”
“Transformation involves the uptake of ‘foreign’ DNA by a bacterial cell
from its immediate environment rather than directly from another cell or
virus particle.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic
Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. Pp. 118-9.
“... it is debatable whether fungal mycelia should be regarded as
multicellular because although they can be compartmented by septa, the
latter allow considerable protoplasmic communication. In some sense,
therefore, mycelia represent the most extreme result of the
diversification and integration of a single cell,...” Rayner, Alan.
Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College
Press. P. 131.
“The way that this re-organisation [in developing embryos] occurs
contrasts markedly between most higher plants and animals, presumably
reflecting the relative indeterminacy and determinacy of these organisms.
“Basically, in higher plants, the embryo becomes polarized and new cells
are added at the apices of the resultant elongated structure either by
proliferation of a single apical cell, or of sets of dividing cells known
as ‘meristems’. The apical meristems occur at the tips of shoots and roots
and are responsible for the production of cells which give rise to all the
tissues of what is known as the ‘primary plant body’. In woody plants,
secondary lateral meristems known as ‘cambria’ then give rise to the
conductive tissues within bark (‘phloem’) and wood (‘xylem’), thickening
the roots and stems in the process. The localization of cell division
within apical meristems also occurs in colonial Cnidaria and Bryozoa and
is a basic feature of indeterminate multicellular structures, analogous to
the extending tips of hyphae and other cellular filaments.
“By contrast, in the majority of animal embryos the production of new
cells for the body as a whole occurs within all the developing organs and
tissues and so is not localized.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living
in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 133.
“For this programme [the “precise sequence” of development of an animal
embryo] to operate successfully, it is important for the developing embryo
to be buffered, as far as is possible, from the effects of a variable
external environment. With some important exceptions, and in marked
contrast to indeterminate forms, the programme is therefore followed
without reference to external conditions.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of
Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P.
135.
“Higher plants typically consist of two complementary, potentially
competitive, but ultimately interconnected and interdependent
systems–roots and shoots. Root systems consist both of highly branched,
short-lived, absorptive components (‘short roots’) and indefinitely
extending, explorative and conductive components (‘long roots’). The
absorptive roots gather and the conductive roots distribute soil solution.
Shoot systems likewise consist both of indefinitely extending axes which
explore the aerial environment and assimilative offshoots (typically,
leaves) which harvest sunlight by means of photosynthesis.” Rayner, Alan.
Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College
Press. P. 146.
“For there can be no doubt about it; drawing on the energy assimilated by
individual human beings, our infrastructures are evolving in the
characteristic patterns of indeterminate systems.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees
of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P.
152.
“In versatile systems, degeneracy provides means for recycling and renewal
rather than demise. Death, the abandonment of old contextual boundaries,
becomes a way of life.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in
Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 156.
“Determinate systems diversify from outside-in, i.e differentiation occurs
within an external boundary that ceases to expand with the passage of
time. Indeterminate systems diversify from inside-out, with the external
boundary continuing to expand and change its form.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees
of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press.
Pp. 159-60.
“Indeterminate organisms are versatile both in the variety of functionally
distinctive offshoots–leaves, flowers, polyps, fungal fruit bodies
etc–that they can produce, and in the form of the interconnections between
these offshoots.
“The offshoots are commonly composed of tissues, and are often referred to
as ‘organs’ equivalent to those of determinate organisms. However, they
are generally produced externally and at varied places and/or times–not
internally and once-and-for-all. They therefore correspond more with
alternative phenotypes than with organs, although the fact that they
remain interconnected makes it easy to view them as components of the same
system.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries.
1997. Imperial College Press. P. 168.
“... through the interplay of differentiation, integration and degeneracy,
all living systems undergo cyclic patterns of change. These patterns are
brought about by four fundamental processes that vary the flow of energy
within and across contextual boundaries in different but complementary
ways: conversion, regeneration, distribution and recycling.
“Conversion processes characteristically follow a phase during which
energy has been gathered in (‘assimilated’) from the external environment.
They both immobilize and seal the boundary of a system, or segment of a
system, so conserving energy and producing ‘dormant’ survival capsules.
Seeds, spores, cysts and storage organs of various kinds all result from
conversion processes....
“Distribution involves the sealing but not the immobilization of parts of
the boundary of a system which are connected, directly or indirectly, to
assimilative regions. Resources taken in through the assimilative regions
can then drive expansion of the sealed components which are thereby able
to negotiate restrictive environments that would not otherwise sustain
growth. Explorative structures of all kinds are driven in this way....
“Regeneration allows the resumption of energy-gathering processes, through
the production of open, mobile boundaries, when supplies of available
resources are either renewed outside a survival structure or encountered
by an explorative or dispersal structure....
“Recycling occurs when internal partitioning allows resources to be
redistributed from locations that no longer participate in
energy-gathering or exploration to sites where these processes are being
sustained. It is therefore associated with the degeneration of former
boundaries, such as occurs during metamorphosis, fairy ring-formation and
amnesia.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries.
1997. Imperial College Press. Pp. 181-2.
“They [“‘self-organization’ and ‘complexity’ theories”] do not recognize
the role played by dynamic boundaries both in the emergence and the
sustainment of ordered structures. Indeed, they imply that, due to
dissipation, life cannot persist for any length of time in
resource-restricted environments.
“However, processes of boundary-fusion, boundary-sealing and
boundary-redistribution all provide means for reducing dissipation,
allowing energy to be maintained within the system rather than lost to the
outside. Since they lead to more coherent, more persistent organizations
in which the discreteness of individual units is blurred, these processes
may be referred to as ‘self-integrational’.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of
Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P.
184.
“The thesis I will start off with is that a fallacy is a form of reasoning
that for some applications is bad and for others is good; roughly
speaking, it is bad for logic but, for instance, good for surviving.”
Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed
Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 1.
“From the perspective of classical logic, a fallacy is a pattern of poor
reasoning which appears to be a pattern of good reasoning.” Bardone,
Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed
Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 2.
“... practical agents operate in cognitive economies, where the agent
access to cognitive resources encounters limitations such as:
• bounded information
• lack of time
• limited computational capacity.”
Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed
Cognition. 2011. Springer. Pp. 4-5.
“Abduction is defined by Magnani as the process in which a hypothesis is
created/selected and then evaluated.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances:
From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 12.
Reference is to Magnani, L. Abduction, Reqason, and Science. Processes of
Discovery and Explanation. 2001. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
“Abduction – considered as the process of hypothesis generation and
evaluation – plays an important role in the evaluation of arguments
(whether a real shift has occurred or not): insofar as an alleged
ignoratio elenchi is evaluated and then accepted by the audience – in a
dialectical and rhetorical context – it becomes a good argument.
“In the three cases of ignoratio elenchi illustrated above, the abductive
skills involved concern the ability of turning information about people,
and the social characters they represent, into relevant knowledge
supporting one view rather than another. In the argumentum ad hominem this
ability is related to the formulation of those abductive inferences, which
successfully employ and evaluate the information discrediting your
opponent. In the argumentum ad verecundiam the abductive process involved
is connected to the selection of experts and authorities who may be
recognized as such by a certain audience. Finally, the case of the
argumentum ad populum involves the selection of the majority to be heeded,
taking its composition into account.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances:
From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 13.
“The three fallacies can be easily considered in the light of
group-serving behaviors as well. For instance, discrediting your opponent
– the argumentum ad hominem – can be considered as a means of controlling
ideas and behaviors, which do not fit within the group.” Bardone, Emanuele.
Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011.
Springer. P. 16.
“Fallacies are part of a kind of rationality that in the following I will
call biased rationality.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased
Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 21.
“In other terms, to use Simon’s own definition, ‘rationality is bounded
when it falls short of omniscience’.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances:
From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 23.
Reference is to Simon, H.A. 1979. “Rational decision making in business
organizations.” American Economic Review. 69, 493-513.
“The idea of homo heuristicus stems from the rejection of two main
assumptions about accuracy and effort. The first is that a heuristic
always involves a trade-off to be reached between accuracy and effort, as
they are basically conflicting concepts....
“The second assumption can be called the ‘principle of total evidence’.
The principle of total evidence – introduced by Carnap and explicitly
mentioned by Gigerenzer and colleagues – states that it is always better
to take into account the total evidence available in order to determine
whether or not a certain hypothesis or course of action is justified or
rational: that is, having more information is always better than having
less information. Or, to put it simply, more is always more, and less is
always less.
“Contrary to these two beliefs, Gigerenzer and colleagues argued, and
managed to provide empirical evidence to support the idea, that heuristics
are not always accuracy-effort trade-offs. On certain occasions, one can
attain higher accuracy with less effort.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking
Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer.
P. 31. Reference is to, among others: Gigerenzer, G. 2000. Adaptive
thinking: Rationality in the Real World. Oxford University Press.
“The availability bias means seizing the first impression one comes up
with about a person, an object or a situation....”
“The primacy bias consists in interpreting certain clues in light of those
presented earlier....”
“The halo effect is further specification of the availability bias and the
primacy bias. Basically, it occurs when a person judges a situation, an
object or another person relying only one good trait. An example is a
script presented in good handwriting.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances:
From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. Pp.
32-3.
“Ecological validity is the term introduced by Brunswik to refer to the
situation in which a given proximal stimulus acts as a valuable indicator
of a certain distal state or event; ecological validity is a normative
measure about how diagnostic certain proximal stimuli are with respect to
a given distal event.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased
Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 40. Reference is
to Brunswik, Egon. 1952. The Conceptual Framework of Psychology.
University of Chicago Press.
“As people follow the so-called ‘wisdom of the crowd’, the bandwagon has
the cognitive effect of diminishing the total level of information
available to the group. If at an individual level conformity allows people
to make a decision when lacking competence and knowledge, at a group level
this could be catastrophic especially when facing change and/or
difficulties.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality
to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 44.
“Conformity enhances the probability that a given behavior or trait will
become common in a group or population. In doing so, it reduces
eco-cognitive variation within a group and consequently makes learning by
imitation less profitable. In fact, as reported by Castro et al. imitators
‘do poorly when they are common and individual learners are rare’.”
Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed
Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 44. Reference is to Castro, L., M. Toro & F.
Ayala. 2004. “The evolution of culture: from primate social learning to
human culture.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America. 101(27), 10235-10240.
“... humans like other creatures do not simply live their environment, but
they actively shape and change it looking for suitable chances. In doing
so, they construct cognitive niches through which the offerings provided
by the environment in terms of cognitive possibilities are appropriately
selected and/or manufactured to enhance their fitness as chance seekers.”
Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed
Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 49.
“I call the entire cycle the ‘externalization process,’ and it can be
summarized as follows: human beings overcome their internal limitations by
(1) externalizing and disembodying thoughts, ideas, solutions, and then
(2) re-projecting internally that occurring outside in the external
invented structure to find new ways of thinking.” Bardone, Emanuele.
Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011.
Springer. P. 50.
“Basically, composite intentionality refers to situations in which the
intentionality resulting from an action we take is made up of our own in
coordination with that emerging from the interaction with an artefact. The
intentionality resulting from interaction in smart environments is indeed
highly composite,...” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased
Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 65.
“... I define behaviors such as altruism as group-projecting behaviors,
meaning that groups are projections of an higher unit of evolution. That
is, every time an individual behaves altruistically it acts as if the
group actually exists....”
“The relevance of group-projecting behavior introduces quite a speculative
issue, that is however useful in order to better understand the allegedly
evolutionary meaning of groups. According to Stearns we are ‘stalled part
way through a major evolutionary transition from individual to groups’.”
Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed
Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 72. Reference is to Stearns, S. 2007. “Are
we stalled part way through a major evolutionary transition from
individual to group?” Evolution 61(10), 2275-2280.
“... I may claim that affordances are chances that are ecologically
rooted. They are ecological[ly] rooted because they rely on the mutuality
between an agent (or a perceiver) and the environment.” Bardone, Emanuele.
Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011.
Springer. P. 79.
“They [Zhang and Patel] maintain that affordances can be also related to
the role of distributed representations extended across the environment
and the organism. These kinds of representation come about as the result
of a blending process between two different domains: on one hand the
internal representation space, that is the physical structure of an
organism (biological, perceptual, and cognitive faculties); on the other
the external representation of space, namely, the structure of the
environment and the information it provides. Both these two domains are
described by constraints so that the blend consists of the allowable
actions.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to
Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. Pp. 79-80. Reference is to Zhang, J
& V. Patel. 2006. “Distributed cognition, representation, and affordance.”
Cognition & Pragmatics. 14(2), 333-341.
“Patel and Zhang’s idea tries to clarify that affordances result from a
hybridizing process in which the environmental features and the agent’s
ones in terms of constraints are blended into a new domain which they call
affordance space. Taking a step further, Patel and Zhang define
affordances as allowable actions.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased
Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 80. Reference is
to Zhang, J & V. Patel. 2006. “Distributed cognition, representation, and affordance.” Cognition & Pragmatics. 14(2), 333-341.
“As argued by these authors, hidden affordances are those affordances
specified by the information not available at the time of the interaction,
but drawn from past experiences. The same event or place can have
different affordances to different organisms but also multiple affordances
to the same organism. Following D. Normal’s perspective, affordances
suggest a range of chances: ...” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality
to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 80. References are: Rader, N.
& L. Vaughn. 2000. “Infant reaching to a hidden affordance: evidence for
intentionality.” Infant Behavior and Development. 23, 531-541. Norman,
Donald. 1988. The Design of Everyday Things. Addison Wesley.
“Indeed, we may be afforded by the environment, if we can detect those
signs and cues from which we may abduce the presence of a given
affordance. [relating to semiotics]” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased
Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 89.
“My idea is that the human agent abductively regulates his relationship
with the environment. That is, the human agent is constantly engaged in
controlling his own behavior through continuous manipulative activity.
Such manipulative activity (which is eco-cognitive one) hangs on to
abductive anchors, namely, affordances that permit the human agent to take
some part of the environment as local representatives of some other. So,
the human agent operates in the presence of abductive anchors, namely,
affordances, that stabilize environmental uncertainties by directly
signaling some pre-associations between the human agent and the
environment (or part of it).” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to
Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 89.
“The idea that an affordance is not a resource but rather, something that
offers information about one, allows it to be seen as anything involving
some eco-cognitive dimension.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to
Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 89.
“From a theoretical perspective we may argue that human beings function as
a kind of adapting task-transforming representation. The term
‘task-transforming representation’ was introduced by Hutchins to refer to
the fact that external artifacts shape the structure of a task – its
representation – helping people solve the problem they are facing. A tool
may transform the structure of a task:
1. Redistributing the cognitive load;
2. Rearranging constraints and action possibilities;
3. Unearthing additional computational abilities;
4. Increasing the number of operations while reducing mental costs.
“In the case of adapting affordances the cognitive load is reduced by
means of a transformation, which adapts the structure/representation of
the task to allow a person to detect latent environmental chances.
Caregivers and the intentional gaze are fair examples, as they show how
people adaptively manipulate the representations their fellows have of the
environment to favor or facilitate the exploitation of latent
affordances.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed
Cognition. 2011. Springer. Pp. 92-3. Reference is to Hutchins, E. 1995.
Cognition in the Wild. MIT Press.
“Adapting affordances are those affordances that help the agent exploit
latent environmental possibilities providing additional clues.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking
Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer.
P. 93.
“... docility is thought to be the concept able to connect a pro-social
attitude like altruism to human cognition. Docility will be described as
the attitude or tendency underlying those learning processes, which
involve various forms of reliance on social channels.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances:
From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 101.
“Going beyond Simon, docility can be considered as a kind of adaptation
that facilitates the process of distributing cognitive functions to the
environment, and makes that a major basis for decision making. From our
birth we operate this kind of delegation, first to our parents, and then
to other people. After that we begin to select and distinguish between
people from whom to learn something important or insignificant,...”
Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011.
Springer. P. 106. Reference is to Simon, H. 1993. “Altruism and
economics.” The American Economic Review. 83(2), 156-161.
“As I put it, docility has both an active and passive side. Developing
this line of thought, the active side can be further articulated into
three main elements; thus, docility can be viewed also as the tendency
1. To share one’s own information;
2. To give a public and social dimension to one’s thought/work;
3. To render communication easier by creating, maintaining, and developing
standards, or standard-fidelity.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality
to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. Pp. 107-8.
“We would like to emphasize that formation and maintaining of increasingly
complex biopolymers could proceed only if supported by a constant flow of
utilizable energy. This consideration severely constrains otherwise
plausible hypotheses of origin of life under impact bombardment that tend
to treat emergence of life as a one-time event.” Mulkidjanian, Armen &
Michael Galperin. 2007. “Physico-Chemical and Evolutionary Constraints for
the Formation and Selection of First Biopolymers: Towards the Consensus
Paradigm of the Abiogenic Origin of Life.” Chemistry & Biodiversity. Vol.
4. Pp. 2003-2015. P. 2005.
“An important chemical constraint, which often remains unrecognized, is
the reversibility of most (bio)chemical reactions. Therefore, any scheme
that explains biopolymer formation under certain environmental conditions
should also be able to explain why the synthesis of the given biopolymers
would not be followed by their immediate hydrolysis. One cannot help
noting that, in virtually all papers describing origin of life, the
corresponding schemes contain unidirectional arrows, instead of
bidirectional ones. However, the mechanisms that underlie that
unidirectionality are almost never described.” Mulkidjanian, Armen &
Michael Galperin. 2007. “Physico-Chemical and Evolutionary Constraints for
the Formation and Selection of First Biopolymers: Towards the Consensus
Paradigm of the Abiogenic Origin of Life.” Chemistry & Biodiversity. Vol.
4. Pp. 2003-2015. P. 2005.
“The rule of chemical conservation implies that the chemical composition
of living beings is more conservative than the chemical composition of
their environment. Therefore, the conserved organismal chemistry can
retain information about the ancient environmental conditions. The most
popular manifestation of this principle is the similarity between the
chemical composition of sea water and the internal liquids of
multicellular animals. The latter are characterized by high sodium content
even if organisms live in fresh water or on the land. In this case, high
sodium content appears to reflect the emergence of the first multicellular
organisms in the sea waters. Less broadly acknowledged example of chemical
conservation is the highly reduced state of the cell interior even in
those organisms that inhabit oxygenated environments.” Mulkidjanian, Armen
& Michael Galperin. 2007. “Physico-Chemical and Evolutionary Constraints
for the Formation and Selection of First Biopolymers: Towards the
Consensus Paradigm of the Abiogenic Origin of Life.” Chemistry &
Biodiversity. Vol. 4. Pp. 2003-2015. P. 2006.
“Alternatively, we have argued that the UV irradiation might play a
positive role upon the very origin of life by serving both as energy
source and a principal selective factor in the formation of pre-biological
structures. Indeed, the above noted extremely efficient deactivation of
the UV quanta by nitrogenous bases allows them to protect the compounds to
which they are attached from the UV-induced breakage. In particular, the
UV-damage to the sugar-phosphate bond was shown to decrease in the
presence of adenine entity; due to this phenomenon, the backbone breaks in
RNA and DNA seem to happen 103 – 104 times less frequent than the
UV-damage to the nitrogen bases proper....
“It seems quite unlikely that the extremely effective UV-quenching by all
five major nucleobases is just incidental. Therefore, we suggested that
the nucleobases were initially recruited as UV protectors.” Mulkidjanian,
Armen & Michael Galperin. 2007. “Physico-Chemical and Evolutionary
Constraints for the Formation and Selection of First Biopolymers: Towards
the Consensus Paradigm of the Abiogenic Origin of Life.” Chemistry &
Biodiversity. Vol. 4. Pp. 2003-2015. P. 2008.
“In the UV-illuminated primordial world the probability of a UV-breakage
was more than real for any compound. Correspondingly, those that succeeded
to bind (trap) a UV-quencher got a selective advantage. Hence, the
primordial polymerization could be driven by a mechanism that resembled
natural selection with the most UV-resistant polymers living longer.”
Mulkidjanian, Armen & Michael Galperin. 2007. “Physico-Chemical and
Evolutionary Constraints for the Formation and Selection of First
Biopolymers: Towards the Consensus Paradigm of the Abiogenic Origin of
Life.” Chemistry & Biodiversity. Vol. 4. Pp. 2003-2015. P. 2012.
“In sum, only at continental geothermal springs, the formation of organic
nitrogen-, phosphor-, and sulfur-containing compounds could be supported
by two different fluxes of reducing equivalents resulting from the abiotic
photosynthesis and the hydrothermal alteration of the iron-containing
rocks. In addition, only continental environments could be characterized
by wet-dry cycles, favorable for condensation reactions.” Mulkidjanian,
Armen. “Energetics of the First Life.” Pp. 3-27. From Egel, Richard, D.
Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal
Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 11.
“In a previous work four rules of metabolic evolution were stated as
follows:...
“1. Any enzymatic reaction is also chemically possible without the enzyme,
although in that case it would occur much more slowly and without a
well-defined specificity.
“2. All the intermediates of a chain of reactions to be used ultimately in
a metabolic sequence must resist rapid decomposition. The strongest reason
for this assumption is evolutionary; at the beginning of the pathway
design every rudimentary enzymatic reaction occurred very slowly, so
unstable intermediates could not have been used.”
“3. Material availability (Opportunism): Any material to be used by the
new pathway must exist in another metabolic process which was originally
developed for a different purpose. Design of this new pathway must
preserve the function of the previous one whose material has been used. An
inverse chronological application of this rule would eventually lead to
the origin of metabolism; on the primordial Earth the first available
compounds had to have been made through spontaneous chemical processes.
“4. Kinetic and thermodynamic compatibility: The new pathway cannot have a
reaction involving any thermodynamic or kinetic incompatibility with a
previous one that is operating simultaneously in the same space.”
Melendez-Hevia, Enrique, N. Montero-Gomez & F. Montero. “From prebiotic
chemistry to cellular metabolism–The chemical evolution of metabolism
before Darwinian natural selection.” 2008. Journal of Theoretical Biology.
252(2008) 505-519. P. 506.
“Life evolved through Darwinian natural selection, and its earliest form
appeared when natural selection became possible. Thus, the appearance of
the minimal material necessary for natural selection to work could not be
produced by natural selection itself, but by a previous selection that we
shall call ‘chemical selection’. This consists of an increase and
enlargement of certain specific chemical processes based on specific
kinetic and thermodynamic features that can increase the reaction rate.
Yet without considering the existence of enzymes as catalysts specific for
particular reactions, there are a number of different mechanisms that can
enhance the reaction rates based only on the stoichiometry of the
pathways, i.e., without ‘external’ catalysts: (a) stoichiometric
catalysis, which occurs in all metabolic cycles, as the feeder (or
starter) does as a catalyst itself; (b) stoichiometric autocatalysis,
which occurs in some cycles when the global reaction yields more amount of
the feeder than its entrance, so promoting the enlargement of the
reaction; (c) thermodynamic cooperativity, which is a property of a
process in which physical or chemical positive interactions among the end
products enhance the stability of the final structure promoting their
production. This effect is typical in the construction of polymers, as
these processes imply an initiation step, which is usually difficult, as
it is delayed by a positive energy change, followed by another of
elongation that is much easier; and (d) thermodynamic push of certain
specific processes by products originated in others; e.g., ATP production
will promote biosynthetic reactions, and NADPH production will promote
reductive processes.” Melendez-Hevia, Enrique, N. Montero-Gomez & F.
Montero. “From prebiotic chemistry to cellular metabolism–The chemical
evolution of metabolism before Darwinian natural selection.” 2008. Journal
of Theoretical Biology. 252(2008) 505-519. Pp. 508-9.
“The formose reaction and the structure of the metabolic map can explain
that metabolism could start from glucose, but it was obviously necessary
to develop a pathway capable of producing it from mineral material (CO2
and H2O), as a necessary step to divorcing metabolism from prebiotic
chemistry.” Melendez-Hevia, Enrique, N. Montero-Gomez & F. Montero. “From
prebiotic chemistry to cellular metabolism–The chemical evolution of
metabolism before Darwinian natural selection.” 2008. Journal of
Theoretical Biology. 252(2008) 505-519. P. 514.
“The materials necessary for natural selection had to be achieved
beforehand, by ‘chemical selection’. As this process operates through
selecting the reagents and reactions independent of their Darwinian
selective value, it can only be driven by increasing the rate of the
reactions as a consequence of their own chemical features. Thus, in this
process, catalytic, autocatalytic and cooperative effects, as well as
thermodynamic driving by available substrates or forces, such as energy
currency and reductive power that can favour certain reactions, could have
played a critical role, enhancing their probability.” Melendez-Hevia,
Enrique, N. Montero-Gomez & F. Montero. “From prebiotic chemistry to
cellular metabolism–The chemical evolution of metabolism before Darwinian
natural selection.” 2008. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 252(2008)
505-519. P. 516.
“Chemolithotrophic microbes are faced with the problem of extracting
energy from narrow redox zones in marine environments. The free-living
species typically occur in biofilms on sulfidic rocks or in filamentous
mats like Beggiatoa spp., absorbing reduced gases from the substrate below
and oxygen from the ambient water above. Symbiotic microbes, however, can
span broader oxic-anoxic boundaries by exploiting the behavior, physiology
and morphology of their animal hosts....
“The sessile vestimentiferan tubeworm, Riftia pachyptila, grows up to 1.5
m in length. It absorbs dissolved sulfide and oxygen from the ambient
bottom water with a feathery plume (the obturaculum) and delivers the
gases through its circulatory system to the trophosome, a specialized
organ housing thiotrophic endosymbionts. Riftia has a leathery tube that
allows it to flex and relocate its plume among water masses that are
variably sulfidic or oxygenated. Other species have rigid tubes that
penetrate deeply into anoxic sediments, allowing absorption of sulfides
through the worm’s posterior end.” Vrijenhoek, Robert. “Genetics and
Evolution of Deep-Sea Chemosynthetic Bacteria and Their Invertebrate
Hosts.” Pp. 15-49. From The Vent and Seep Biota: Aspects from Microbes to
Ecosystems. 2010. Edited by Kiel, Steffen. Springer Verlag. P. 16.
“The global average of human density for ice-free land is not a very
meaningful measure. Cultivated area is the proper denominator: it now
supplies about 85% of all food, and the global anthropomass now amounts to
almost 200 kg/ha of arable land and permanent plantations; China’s mean is
almost 500 kg/ha, and the country’s most intensively cultivated provinces
support 600-700 kg of humanity per hectare of arable land. This means that
in densely populated regions, human biomass is now more abundant than that
of all soil invertebrates. In contrast, the average densities of the two
large African primates, chimpanzees and gorillas, are mostly less than 1
kg/ha of their now so limited habitats.” Smil, Vaclav. The Earth’s
Biosphere: Evolution, Dynamics, and Change. 2002. MIT Press. Pp. 186-7.
“Completely transformed surfaces include all arable land and areas under
permanent crops, whose total the Food and Agriculture Organization puts at
15 million km2, and the surface claimed by settlements, industries,
transportation links, and water reservoirs. Urbanized areas, so vividly
outlined by nighttime satellite sensing of lights, now amount to about 5
million km2, and water reservoirs cover about 500,000 km2. Human
activities have thus entirely refashioned at least 20 million km2, or 15%
of all ice-free land surface....
“Permanent pastures, totaling about 34 million km2, are thus the largest
area that has been modified to different degrees by human actions. Tree
plantations and forests actively managed for goods and services total
about 6.5 million km2. Road building, logging, and fires have degraded
large areas of remaining forests....
“Adding up these impacts reveals that the total area strongly or partially
imprinted by human activities is about 70 million km2, or no less than 55%
of all nonglaciated land.” Smil, Vaclav. The Earth’s Biosphere: Evolution,
Dynamics, and Change. 2002. MIT Press. Pp. 239-40.
“Yet another way to look at the extent and the intensity of the recent
transformation of the biosphere is to estimate the share of GPP consumed
or otherwise processed, managed, or destroyed by human actions. Vitousek
et al. put this ‘appropriation’ of the global terrestrial NPP at as much
as 40%, but even their lower-bound estimate of about 25% illustrates the
intensity of the biosphere’s transformation.” Smil, Vaclav. The Earth’s
Biosphere: Evolution, Dynamics, and Change. 2002. MIT Press. P. 240.
“The aggregate mass of machines already greatly exceeds that of humans.
The dry-matter anthropomass is about 100 Mt, whereas the mass of motor
vehicles (cars, buses, and trucks) alone is now an order of magnitude
larger, in excess of 1Gt. And machines now need more carbon every year
than humans do. The global food harvest now amounts to about 1.3 Gt C per
year, whereas almost 1 Gt of fossil carbon (mostly metallurgical coke and
hydrocarbon feedstocks) is used annually to produce metals and plastics
from which machines are assembled, and about 4 Gt C are used each year to
power them, either directly with coal, oil, and natural gas, or indirectly
with electricity generated in thermal stations.” Smil, Vaclav. The Earth’s
Biosphere: Evolution, Dynamics, and Change. 2002. MIT Press. P. 269.
“Isenhower and colleagues demonstrated that individuals are able to
distinguish the boundaries between an affordance for oneself and an
affordance for a dyad, ie the point at which an individual action must
become a joint action in order to accomplish the goal.” Davis, Tehran, M.
Riley, K. Shockley & S. Cummins-Sebree. 2010. “Perceiving affordances for
joint actions.” Perception. Vol. 39, Pp. 1624-44. P. 1625. Reference is
Isenhower, R.W., M. Richardson, C. Carello, R. Baron & K. Marsh. 2010.
“Affording cooperation: Embodied constraints, dynamics, and action-scaled
invariance in joint lifting.” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 17: 342-347.
“While being able to perceive what actions another person is capable of
performing may be useful when predicting what the other person is about to
do, perceiving affordances for another may also provide information
relative to the constraints on possible interactions and joint action. A
major issue when considering joint action is how the action planning of
two distinct individuals becomes integrated to guide shared behavior. One
possible explanation is that individuals’ perception of a shared
affordance may facilitate the ‘embodying’ of other agents. That is,
perception of the shared affordance acts as a medium through which
individuals gain information relative to social perception – action
processes involved in a joint action.” Davis, Tehran, M. Riley, K.
Shockley & S. Cummins-Sebree. 2010. “Perceiving affordances for joint
actions.” Perception. Vol. 39, Pp. 1624-44. P. 1642.
“From a computational viewpoint, shared representations help solving
interaction problems in that they afford an interactive strategy for
coordination that makes action selection and understanding easier.”
Pezzulo, G. & H. Dindo. 2011. “What should I do next? Using shared
representations to solve interaction problems.” Exp Brain Res. 211:
613-630. P. 616.
“Our analysis suggests that agents engaged in joint actions do not solve
their problems individually, but ‘distribute’ some of them externally; in
this sense, the agent-environment dynamics and the agent-agent dynamics
are part of the problem-solving strategy. Indeed, our graphical model
formulation emphasized that the two agents are coupled at the level of
cognitive variables as well as at the physical level of interaction.”
Pezzulo, G. & H. Dindo. 2011. “What should I do next? Using shared
representations to solve interaction problems.” Exp Brain Res. 211:
613-630. P. 626.
“Theories of common ground formation propose similar arguments as those
that we made regarding shared representations, in that common ground is a
facilitator of interactions. However, these theories typically assume that
both agents know what is shared, which is not essential in our model.
Despite so, theories of common ground can be considered as complementary
to our proposal, as they emphasize interactive dynamics and the
coordination of co-actors at the level of cognitive processing, not only
of overt behavior. Furthermore, these theories have provided illuminating
analyses of important elements for coordination that should be
incorporated in any model that aims to scale up to the complexity of human
interactions.” Pezzulo, G. & H. Dindo. 2011. “What should I do next? Using
shared representations to solve interaction problems.” Exp Brain Res. 211:
613-630. P. 626.
“It is noteworthy, however, that there has been little study of the
interaction between the chemistry of life and cognitive or adaptive
behavior. In general, models that focus on the self-organization of
chemical systems work with a set of fixed boundary conditions, making
adaptive behavior unnecessary for system survival. And conversely, models
that study behavior tend to abstract away everything except the sensory,
control, and motor mechanisms.
“This is, perhaps, starting to change. There has been a series of recent
models that explore the interaction between processes that determine how a
system is constituted (metabolism) and mechanisms through which the system
influences its interaction with its environment (behavior). These models
include computer simulations as well as real chemical systems, and they
have led to some interesting reconceptualizations: Metabolic processes can
be thought of as robust or even adaptive, able to intelligently modulate
behavioral strategies; remarkably simple chemical reactions can perform
chemotaxis; and in a range of bacteria, metabolism-based behavior appears
to be more common than previously thought.” Egbert, Matthew, X.
Barandiaran & E. Di Paolo. 2012. “Behavioral Metabolution: The Adaptive
and Evolutionary Potential of Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis.” Artificial
Life. 18: 1-25. P. 2.
“In parallel with the omission of behavior in the study of the origin of
life, studies of minimal adaptive behavior have almost completely ignored
the role of metabolism as sustaining or modulating behavioral patterns.
Adaptive behavior is generally understood and modeled as optimizing some
value function or as maintaining essential variables under viability
constraints. However, there is generally no reference to the dynamics of
the biological organization (e.g., metabolism) that serves as the basis of
these viability constraints ....” Egbert, Matthew, X. Barandiaran & E. Di
Paolo. 2012. “Behavioral Metabolution: The Adaptive and Evolutionary
Potential of Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis.” Artificial Life. 18: 1-25. P.
3.
“However, recent experimental data provides counterevidence for the
metabolism-independence assumption. Many bacteria display clear cases of
what is called metabolism-dependent chemotaxis, including E. coli,
Azospirillum brasilense, Rhodobacter sphaeroides, and Pseudomonas putida.
Such cases have attracted renewed attention to the interplay between
metabolism and behavior. Experiments have shown that nonmetabolizable
structural analogues of metabolizable attractants (i.e., molecules that
bind to chemoattractant receptors but are not metabolizable) do not
produce a positive behavioral response in bacteria. It has also been shown
that inhibition of the metabolism of a chemical attractant completely
abolishes chemotaxis to and only to this attractant. And, in a slightly
more complex scenario, when a sufficient quantity of a metabolizable
compound is present in the environment, bacteria cease to be attracted to
other attractants. The most-studied cases of metabolism-dependent
chemotaxis are those concerning energy-taxis, which involve the modulation
of behavior in a manner that is sensitive to the energetic needs of the
bacteria.” Egbert, Matthew, X. Barandiaran & E. Di Paolo. 2012.
“Behavioral Metabolution: The Adaptive and Evolutionary Potential of
Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis.” Artificial Life. 18: 1-25. P. 3.
“Figure 1 illustrates the three different types of relationship between
metabolism and chemotaxis that we have mentioned: metabolism-independent
chemotaxis (long thought to be the default case); metabolism-dependent
chemotaxis, where different aspects of metabolic dynamics (e.g., in the
electron transport system) modulate existing sensorimotor pathways; and
metabolism-based chemotaxis, where metabolites directly modulate motor
activity.” Egbert, Matthew, X. Barandiaran & E. Di Paolo. 2012.
“Behavioral Metabolution: The Adaptive and Evolutionary Potential of
Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis.” Artificial Life. 18: 1-25. P. 4.
“The type of interactions shown in the experiments above, between
behavior, metabolism, and evolution, we have termed behavioral
metabolution, which we define as the evolution of behavior and metabolism
in such a way that: (a) behavior drives the evolution of metabolism (by
exploring, selecting, and/or climbing chemical environments that are
beneficial to metabolism), and (b) changes in metabolism affect behavior
and the evolution of behavioral patterns (e.g., changes in metabolism
could lead to the improvement and fixation of the adaptive response).”
Egbert, Matthew, X. Barandiaran & E. Di Paolo. 2012. “Behavioral
Metabolution: The Adaptive and Evolutionary Potential of Metabolism-Based
Chemotaxis.” Artificial Life. 18: 1-25. P. 16.
“In the standard approach, variation is internal and selection is
considered as an environmental feature, but in behavioral metabolution it
is the environment that provides a variety of chemicals to be selected by
the behaving protocell and retained by its metabolism and/or recurrent
chemotactic patterns. If the environment is sufficiently stable in its
provision of a specific chemical species, the retention of a reactant
beneficial to the protocells’ metabolism can be inherited through
continued interaction with that environment. Metabolism-based chemotactic
protocells can therefore be considered to instantiate the evolutionary
principles in this nontraditional way: Variation can be both internal (the
result of behavioral encounters / collisions giving rise to new molecular
species) and external (the result of behavioral encounters in a rich
environment), and selective retention can also be internal (by
contribution to autocatalysis) or external (by repetitive gradient
climbing or behavioral selection of an environmental compound).” Egbert,
Matthew, X. Barandiaran & E. Di Paolo. 2012. “Behavioral Metabolution: The
Adaptive and Evolutionary Potential of Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis.”
Artificial Life. 18: 1-25. P. 19.
“The process of evolution has generated an enormous diversity of
behavioral and physiological interactions, far surpassing the diversity of
interactions possible in chemical and physical systems.” Camazine, S.,
J-L. Deneubourg, N. Franks, J. Sneyd, G. Theraulaz & E. Bonabeau.
Self-Organization in Biological Systems. 2001. Princeton University Press.
P. 3.
“Most self-organizing systems use positive feedback. This may be
surprising since most biologists probably are more familiar with negative
feedback, a mechanism commonly used to stabilize physiological processes
(homeostasis) and avoid undesirable fluctuations.” Camazine, S., J-L.
Deneubourg, N. Franks, J. Sneyd, G. Theraulaz & E. Bonabeau.
Self-Organization in Biological Systems. 2001. Princeton University Press.
P. 15.
“In other words, information from the local environment and work-in-progress
can guide further activity. As a structure such as a termite mound
develops, the state of the building process continually provide new
information for the builders.
“In the study of social insects, the term stigmergy has been used to
describe such recursive building activity. ‘In stigmergic labor it is the
product of work previously accomplished, rather than direct communication
among nestmates, that induces the insects to perform additional labor.’”
Camazine, S., J-L. Deneubourg, N. Franks, J. Sneyd, G. Theraulaz & E.
Bonabeau. Self-Organization in Biological Systems. 2001. Princeton
University Press. P. 23. Subquote is from Wilson, E. O. 1971. The Insect
Societies. Harvard University Press. P. 229.
“... self-organized pattern-formation relies on positive feedback,
negative feedback, and a dynamic system involving large numbers of actions
and interactions.
“With such self-organization, environmental randomness can act as the
‘imagination of the system,’ the raw material from which structures arise.
Fluctuations can act as seeds from which patterns and structures are
nucleated and grow.” Camazine, S., J-L. Deneubourg, N. Franks, J. Sneyd,
G. Theraulaz & E. Bonabeau. Self-Organization in Biological Systems. 2001.
Princeton University Press. P. 26.
“The one characteristic that rodents and other mammals do not share with
primates is heavy reliance on vision. The expansion and specialization of
this sense has resulted in the other changes that immediately identify
animals as primates, even for novices in natural history. A mammal is
readily recognizable as a primate if it has a relatively small snout, eyes
that face forward, and a fairly large head that encloses a fairly large
brain. The primate brain has become larger in part to accommodate the
expansion of the visual system, even to the extent of influencing parts of
the cerebral cortex that are not the main visual areas in the brain.”
Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So
Well. Harvard University Press. P. 10.
“Many hypotheses for the origin of primates have been proposed over the
years. Most have focused on reconstructing a lifestyle that included a
unique diet or a unique way that proto-primates moved about in their
environment. These include the Arboreal theory, the (Nocturnal) Visual
Predation hypothesis, the Angiosperm/Omnivore hypothesis, and the
Camouflage-Breaking hypothesis.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree,
and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. P. 36.
“According the the Arboreal theory, the sense of smell is not particularly
useful in the trees and so primates lost much of their olfactory ability.
It was replaced by expansion of the visual system, which, in the
three-dimension, complex environment of tropical forests, also required
coordination of hands with eyes to maneuver along the branches.” Isbell,
Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well.
Harvard University Press. P. 37.
“He pointed out that there are many arboreal mammals that survive and
reproduce quite well without grasping hands, nails, orbital convergence,
and forward-facing eyes. Tree squirrels are one familiar example. Cartmill
also pointed out that many arboreal mammals still retain excellent
olfactory capability, and so life in the trees cannot alone explain
primates’ weakened olfactory sense. Again using a comparative approach,
Cartmill proposed an alternative model he originally called the Visual
Predation hypothesis. Cartmill proposed that stalking and grabbing insects
at close range while on small-diameter branches at lower levels of
tropical forests favored the entire suite of primate characteristics.”
Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So
Well. Harvard University Press. P. 38. Reference is to Cartmill, M. 1974.
“Rethinking primate origins.” Science 184: 436-443.
“... Sussman suggested that the first primates were not committed
insectivores but were omnivores, primarily eating fruits and other plant
foods while taking insects more opportunistically. Sussman hypothesized
that the first primates were able to take advantage of the appearance of
angiosperms (flowering plants), which had begun to spread throughout the
world. Angiosperms today include grasses, herbs, small shrubs, and
enormous tropical trees, but he suggested that the first primates lived
and ate among early angiosperms, which were small shrubs with
small-diameter branches. The new foods offered by angiosperms included
fruits and flowers, many of which were small and located in the dim light
of forest understories.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the
Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. Pp. 39-40.
Reference is to Sussman, R. 1991. “Primate origins and the evolution of
angiosperms. American Journal Primatology. 23:209-223.
“Crompton argued that orbital convergence would be useful for
discriminating between any number of small targets. For arboreal animals,
such targets would also include branches used during locomotion. He thus
offered what I call here the Camouflage-Breaking hypothesis. He argued
that orbital convergence and grasping hands would have been useful not
only for capturing insects and finding and eating small fruits but also
for aiming for and leaping to small branches in the complex
three-dimensional environments that are typical of tropical forests.”
Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So
Well. Harvard University Press. P. 41. Reference is to Crompton, R. 1995.
“‘Visual predation,’ habitat structure, and the ancestral primate niche.”
Pp. 11-30. In Alterman, L., G. Doyle, & M. Izard. Eds. Creatures of the
Dark: The Nocturnal Prosimians.” Plenum Press.
“I use visual system to refer to all the parts of the brain that give us
the ability to see. It is the broadest term of all, but it can be
separated into the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) visual system and the
superior colliculus-pulvinar (SC-pulvinar) visual system. I use pathway to
describe a distinct set of neural connections going from the eye to
various other parts of the brain. There are three of them: the
magnocellular (M) pathway, the parvocellular (P) pathway, and the
koniocellular (K) pathway. Finally, I use stream to describe the
conceptual idea that several functions related to vision in the primate
brain, e.g., object recognition/assessment and spatial
localization/self-movement, can be separated to some degree.” Isbell,
Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well.
Harvard University Press. P. 46.
“Although all mammals have a retina in each eye, the primate retina is a
bit different. Only primates (but not all prosimians) have a retinal
fovea. This is a pit, or depression, in the retina that allows clear
central vision for distinguishing between exceedingly small objects,...”
Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So
Well. Harvard University Press. P. 47.
“Visual processing streams appear to be unique to primates because of the
great increase in number of areas in the primate brain that are involved
in vision.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why
We See So Well. Harvard University Press. P. 49.
“These differences in the complexity of the LGN reveal that the P pathway
has not only expanded more in primates than in other mammals but also has
expanded more in anthropoid primates than in prosimians, and more in
catarrhines than platyrrhines [New World primates]. The P pathway is
largely responsible for our own excellent central vision, fine visual
acuity, and our ability to see rich color, all of which help us to
perceive objects in our environment.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the
Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. P.
50.
“Compared with prosimians, the anthropoid LGN visual system is even more
expansive and orbital convergence is even closer. We know this because the
number of P layers varies within primates, and as Barton showed, the
degree of orbital convergence is positively correlated with the number of
neurons in the P layers in primates. This suggests that there was some
greater selective pressure on anthropoids that favored even more acute
vision for identifying objects and even better stereopsis for
distinguishing between relative depths of objects also in the lower visual
field and for cutting through camouflage of objects in the lower visual
field. The presence of a fovea in anthropoids but not in all prosimians is
also consistent with the idea that anthropoids uniquely benefited from
clearly seeing and identifying objects that were close by and in front of
them.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We
See So Well. Harvard University Press. P. 64.
“Visual systems simply cannot expand much in mammals that cannot afford to
weaken their reliance on olfaction (or echolocation).” Isbell, Lynne.
2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard
University Press. P. 112.
“When angiosperms evolved they did something that was different from the
gymnosperms. Instead of using abiotic forces such as fire, water, or the
wind to help them reproduce, they began to use animals. These angiosperms
evolved flowers, nectar, and fleshy fruits enclosing still-protected seeds
to entice some animals to pollinate other flowers and to disperse their
seeds. The plants gained because animals are more accurate and efficient
than abiotic forces such as wind in placing pollen among flowers, and more
predictable than abiotic forces such as fire in casting seeds away from
the parent tree.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the
Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. P. 115.
“Visual expansion became possible with both the evolution of pleasantly
scented, tasty fruits and flowers and the exploitation of these foods by
some vertebrates, including birds and mammals. Unlike animal and plant
predators, however, those non-flying mammals that took advantage of this
new food source could afford a weaker olfactory system without
jeopardizing their ability to find food. Since there was no foraging cost
associated with olfactory reduction, their visual systems were no longer
constrained. Today, the mammals with the best vision tend to be those with
diets heavily weighted toward fruits. These include primates, the most
frugivorous order of mammals in existence today, and bats, coming in at a
distant second.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the
Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. Pp. 115-6.
“The neuroprotectant property of glucose might help explain the permissive
influence of frugivory on visual and brain expansion. The hypothesis is
that as females began to eat fruits, and plants began to make fruits more
attractive, a diet richer in glucose could have initiated a positive
feedback loop in which greater consumption and more rapid metabolism of
sugars by mothers both allowed greater CO activity to occur during
development of fetal visual systems and other parts of the brain because
more glucose provides more energy, making it possible for metabolic and
glutamatergic activity to increase, and was required because glucose is a
neuroprotectant against increased glutamate exposure. Over evolutionary
time, this could have resulted in greater neural growth, resulting in more
complex visual systems and larger brains.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit,
the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press.
P. 119.
“To summarize, I am suggesting that frugivory made it possible for visual
systems (and brains) to expand in primates because the glucose in fruits
protected the K and P pathways from glutamate excitotoxicity as the
pathways expanded. The K pathway expanded under selection to better detect
snakes preconsciously while the P pathway expanded in concert, to evaluate
the K pathway’s initial response, to help fuel visual expansion, and to
protect it during expansion. The addition of trichromatic color vision to
the P pathway was a later contribution that enabled frugivorous primates
to find the more glucose-rich foods more efficiently.” Isbell, Lynne.
2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard
University Press. P. 121.
“‘it may well be necessary, as Professor Gregory has recommended, to
discontinue the use of the word symbiosis, substituting for it the more
appropriate term ‘functional field.’ ... If this were done, questions
could profitably be raised regarding the degree of integration of
symbiotic associations considered as a function of the intensity of the
field established and of the internal and external resistances surmounted
in its establishment.’” Sapp, Jan. 2010. “On the Origin of Symbiosis.” Pp.
5-18. From Seckbach, Joseph & M. Grube, Eds. Symbioses and Stress: Joint
Ventures in Biology. Springer Verlag. P. 16. Reference is to Gregory, F.,
F. Baker, P. Fildes, A. Felix, G. Bond, R. Synge & S. Elsden. 1952. “A
discusion on symbiosis involving micro-organisms, general discussion.”
Proc. Royal Society London B. 139: 202-207.
“While neo-Darwinian evolutionists continue to trivialize significance of
symbiosis as a mode of evolutionary innovation, others argue that the
concept of the organism needs to be enlarged to embrace the symbiotic
complex, or ‘symbiome.’” Sapp, Jan. 2010. “On the Origin of Symbiosis.”
Pp. 5-18. From Seckbach, Joseph & M. Grube, Eds. Symbioses and Stress:
Joint Ventures in Biology. Springer Verlag. P. 16.
“The concepts of function and semiosis are intertwined. Both are
teleological concepts in the sense of being determined with respect to an
end (or other than itself)–a specifically correlated absent content.
Although it is unclear whether these two properties of living processes
are exactly co-extensive, it is clear that although time-asymmetrical,
irreversible physical processes are found in the prebiotic
physical-chemical world, teleological processes that are specially
organized with respect to specific ends or referents are unique to living
processes.
“If we conceive of a function as a process organized around an implicitly
represented end, then these two classes of phenomena must be considered
entirely co-extensive.” Kull, Kalevi, T. Deacon, C. Emmeche, J. Hoffmeyer
& F. Stjernfelt. “Theses on Biosemiotics: Prolegomena to a Theoretical
Biology.” Pp. 25-41. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards a
Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College Press. P.
27.
“Another way to put this is to say that hemoglobin function is not
intrinsic to its molecular structure. Rather it is relational – hemoglobin
may be seen as a carrier of contstitutive absence, in the sense that the
molecule’s properties are constituted not only by intrinsic features, but
by extrinsic features of its historical and physical functional contexts.
In effect, the missing oxygen with respect to which hemoglobin structure
has evolved has become its defining characteristic. In this respect, one
can understand the structure of hemoglobin as a ‘representation’ of both
oxygen and its role in the cellular molecular processes of metabolism. The
function of hemoglobin is in this way also what affords the possibility of
it having representational character. This function relates to the ‘needs’
or self-maintenance conditions of some agent.” Kull, Kalevi, T. Deacon, C.
Emmeche, J. Hoffmeyer & F. Stjernfelt. “Theses on Biosemiotics:
Prolegomena to a Theoretical Biology.” Pp. 25-41. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull,
Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs.
Imperial College Press. Pp. 29-30.
“The difficulty of making predictions about biological phenomena is that
the functions are plurally realizable and thus subject to considerable
variation. As a result, the physical-chemical details necessarily provide
an incomplete account. Functional requirements do, however, constrain the
physical-chemical substrates that can be recruited.” Kull, Kalevi, T.
Deacon, C. Emmeche, J. Hoffmeyer & F. Stjernfelt. “Theses on Biosemiotics:
Prolegomena to a Theoretical Biology.” Pp. 25-41. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull,
Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs.
Imperial College Press. P. 31.
“A semiotic niche is defined as the totality of signs or cues in the
surroundings of an organism–signs that it must be able to meaningfully
interpret to ensure its balance and welfare. The semiotic niche includes
the traditional ecological niche factors, but now the semiotic dimension
of these factors is also emphasized.” Kull, Kalevi, T. Deacon, C. Emmeche,
J. Hoffmeyer & F. Stjernfelt. “Theses on Biosemiotics: Prolegomena to a
Theoretical Biology.” Pp. 25-41. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011.
Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College
Press. P. 38.
“Volumes have been produced to solve the problem of how to justify the
concept of function inside a non-teleological frame of understanding. And
this is where natural selection comes in, for natural selection will tend
to optimize the capacity of species to meet the functional challenges of
their ecological niche conditions. Functionality is exactly what natural
selection is supposed to produce.
“The term ‘function’ in biology is understood as the answer to a question
about why some object or process has evolved in a system. In other words,
what is it good for? A function thus refers forward in time from the
object or process, along some chain of causation to the goal or success.
This inversed arrow of time (future directedness) immediately sets
functions apart from other kinds of mechanisms that always refer backward
along some chain of causation explaining how the feature occurred.
Darwinists, however, are not worried about the teleological character of
functions because they believe that natural selection will ultimately
account for them through ordinary mechanistic causation. Thus, as often
noted by Darwinists, adaptive traits are not explained by the consequences
the will or can have but by the consequences they already have had in
ancestor populations. The consequences in other words precede the effect
they explain, and selection does not therefore challenge the mechanistic
paradigm of traditional biology. So, as the explanation goes, the
teleology implied by the concept of function is only an ‘as if’ teleology,
i.e., a teleonomy.” Hoffmeyer, Jesper. “Biology is Immature Biosemiotics.”
Pp. 43-65. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic
Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College Press. P. 44.
“... contrary to physically based interactions, semiotic interactions do
not depend on any direct causal connection between the sign vehicle and
the effect. Instead the two events are connected through the intervention
of an interpretative response. The point is that in semiotic interactions
the causal machinery of the receptive system is itself in charge of
producing the behavior, and it thus only needs to acquire a sensitivity
towards the sign as an inducing factor. The biochemical machinery
underlying the response is not, therefore, restricted by any bonds
deriving from the chemistry of the releasing sign.” Hoffmeyer, Jesper.
“Biology is Immature Biosemiotics.” Pp. 43-65. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull,
Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs.
Imperial College Press. Pp. 60-1.
“... open-ended evolution includes then two distinct properties. (1) An
immense number of potential forms, and (2) a basic unpredictability of the
paths evolution will take.” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull. “Between Physics and
Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards a
Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College Press. P.
214. Kull speaking.
“The physical basis of the immense number of forms is a consequence of the
immense number of linear sequences of material units that laws cannot
distinguish because of their similar energy or similar stability. This is
the genetic memory. Only some forms of ‘frozen accident’ or higher level
selection process affects which memory sequences survive over time. Not
only are the initial sequences unpredictable, but their physical structure
appears to be largely arbitrary. Natural selection is also unpredictable
because of its complexity and the indefinite time period over which
selection continues to work.” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull. “Between Physics
and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards
a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College Press.
P. 214. Pattee speaking.
“The inexorable character of physical law is often misunderstood to imply
determinism. This is not the case. There are innumerable structures in the
universe that physical laws do not determine. It is also important to
understand why lawfully indeterminate does not mean physically
indistinguishable.
“Since all the basic laws of physics are expressed in terms of energy,
systems with two or more states with the same energy are lawfully
indeterminate. However, in many cases we can distinguish these states by
measurements of their initial conditions. These law-equivalent states are
often called degeneracies or symmetries.
“A common example is chirality, or left and right handedness. Chemically,
amino acids and proteins can be left or right handed, and they cannot be
distinguished by the laws that they both obey.” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull.
“Between Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull,
Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs.
Imperial College Press. P. 215. Pattee speaking.
“The concept of absolute determinism as envisioned by Laplace and
philosophers like Dennett, has turned out in physics to be an
unsupportable and unproductive way of thinking. Determinism is an
untestable metaphysical concept. First of all, measurement processes are
irreversible and therefore dissipative and subject to error, so
determinism is not empirically verifiable. All the fundamental laws are
consistent only with a probabilistic universe. We have enough ‘freedom’
just because of the undeterminable or equivalent probabilities of many
structures, like polymer sequences.” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull. “Between
Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011.
Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College
Press. P. 217. Pattee speaking.
“In physics a constraint is a local structure that limits the motions of
otherwise ‘free’ particles that are governed only by the laws of motion.
However, the concept of constraint is also used to describe levels of
hierarchical organizations. Generally speaking, each higher level requires
a constraint that is described by fewer observables than the lower level
description. More precisely, a constraint is an alternative simplified
description of structures that are not usefully described by the behavior
at a more detailed lower level.
A simple example is a closed box that limits the detailed motions of the
gas molecules inside. The box itself is also made of molecules, but they
are constrained by chemical bonds to form a solid structure. So we
simplify the description of the box by describing only its geometric
boundaries, and we ignore the detailed molecular structure of the box
itself. Such constraints are also called ‘boundary conditions.’” Pattee,
Howard & K. Kull. “Between Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche,
Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action
of Signs. Imperial College Press. Pp. 217-8. Pattee speaking.
“To be more precise, you never have ‘freedom from laws’ but only freedom
from initial or boundary conditions. You have to make a clear distinction
between laws and constraints. Laws are universal and inexorable. Nothing
is free of laws. Constraints are local structures that obey laws but are
not determined or predictable by laws. Memory is a special type of
constraint that can alter or control the lawful course of local events.
Polanyi’s phrase ‘harnessing the laws’ is apt.” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull.
“Between Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull,
Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs.
Imperial College Press. P. 220. Pattee speaking. Reference is to Polanyi,
Michael. 1968. “Life’s irreducible structure.” Science 160:1308-1312.
“A thing in the physical world is just one, whereas in the semiotic world
it is always many, it just cannot be one until it has a meaning. Semiosis
makes the world plural. Like, for instance, a painting – physically, it is
a concrete pattern of pigments, but semiotically it is many things that
can be recognized (or to what it refers).” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull.
“Between Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull,
Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs.
Imperial College Press. P. 226. Kull speaking.
“Physics and semiotics have two very different cultures, and biochemistry
is a third culture. The problem is even worse because all these areas have
subcultures with their special foci and terminologies.
“I’m sure you are aware of this culture problem. The two of us are both
motivated to try to resolve our different language problem by discussions
like this one. Unfortunately this is not the common motivation of most
biochemists. When they are confronted with the biosemiotics perspective,
they often resist semiotic expression of the problems of life as nothing
but restatements of what they describe in their well-developed material
language, which they regard as a more scientific description of life.
“It is not clear to me what biosemiotics wants to be. All I can suggest is
that if its practitioners want it to be accepted as science rather than as
philosophy, they must focus more on empirically decidable models, rather
than emphasizing its linguistic and philosophical foundations. In other
words, if biosemiotics claims that symbolic control is the distinguishing
characteristic of life, and if it also claims to be a science, then it
must clearly define symbols and codes in empirical scientific terms that
are more familiar to physicists and molecular biologists.” Pattee, Howard
& K. Kull. “Between Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus &
K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of
Signs. Imperial College Press. P. 230. Pattee speaking.
“... in Costa Rica, the tropical biologist and conservationist Dan Janzen
had argued that the biggest fruits, those that now sit unmoved beneath
their shady mothers, evolved to be dispersed by the now-extinct megafauna,
species that disappeared along with the pronghorn’s predators. Janzen’s
idea arose from his observations in 1979 of the three-foot-long pods of
the Cassia grandis tree. Thirty years later, Janzen seems just as right
and those fruits remain just as unmoved. To paraphrase the paleontologist
Paul S. Martin, we live in a time of ghosts, their prehistoric presence
hinted at by the largest sweet-tasting fruits. Many of the fruits that
humans have come to favor seem to have evolved to be carried from one
place to another in the temporary vehicle of a giant mammal’s guts–papayas
make the list, as do avocados, guava, cherimoya, osage oranges, and the
foul-smelling but delicious durian.” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our
Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we are Today.
Harper Collins. P. 29.
“Let’s call it the pronghorn principle. The pronghorn principle has two
elements: First, all species have physical characteristics and genes that
relate to the ways in which they interact with other species. Second, when
those other species are removed, such features become anachronistic or
worse....
“Pick any organism on Earth and as much of its biology is defined by how
it interacts with other species as is influenced by the basics of living,
eating, breathing, and mating. Interactions among species are part of the
tangled bank to which Darwin referred. What the Byerses newly understood
in the context of the pronghorn was the consequences of removing the
species our bodies evolved to interact with, be they predators (as in the
case of the cheetah), mutualists like the animals that once dispersed the
giant American fruits, or even parasites and disease.” Dunn, Rob. 2011.
The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners that Shape
who we are Today. Harper Collins. P. 30. Reference is to Byers, John.
Built for Speed, A Year in the Life of Pronghorn. 2003. Harvard University
Press.
“They [microbes in our guts especially for early humans] provided vitamin
K where it was once scarce, but just as importantly, they allowed us to
extract extra calories from our food, up to 30 percent extra.” Dunn, Rob.
2011. The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners that
Shape who we are Today. Harper Collins. P. 81.
“For much of our primate history, we spent hours a week picking and
savoring wild fruits. The fruits benefited us. We also benefited their
seeds by ‘depositing them’ wherever we relieved ourselves. Some plant
species spread around the world in this way, using latrines as
stepping-stones. In this regard our ancestors were like toucans, emus,
monkeys, and the many other species that serve plants as seed dispersers.
We ate other things, of course. We searched out some insects–the queens of
ants, for example, or the grubs of large beetles–but, for most of our
story, the plants were the mainstay of our vessel. Today when we look out
at our evolutionary partners, the ones not in our bodies, we see a very
different scene. No less than half of all wild forests and grasslands have
been replaced by agricultural and other intensively managed land uses. On
these managed lands, we nurture a tiny minority of Earth’s species, our
domesticates, whether corn, rice, wheat, or more rarely, something else.
These species are still our mutualists, but in a very different way from
the papaya tree growing like a phoenix out of the outhouse. In making the
transition from gathering thousands of species to farming far fewer, we
caused both our favored species and our disfavored species to evolve, but
they were not the only ones. We evolved too.” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild
Life of Our Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we
are Today. Harper Collins. Pp. 111-2.
“The answer Tishkoff found in East Africa was that the ability of human
adults to digest lactase evolved more than once. It evolved once in
Europeans, around 9,000 to 10,000 years ago, at about the time that
archaeological evidence and cow genes point to the domestication of cows
in Europe. It then evolved again, at least three times, in Africa,
beginning around 7,000 years ago, again just about when evidence suggests
cows were domesticated for the second time. At least twice (and probably
more like four times) upon a time, aurochsen were domesticated.” Dunn,
Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners
that Shape who we are Today. Harper Collins. Pp. 126-7. Reference is to
Scheinfeldt, L., S. Soi & S. Tishkoff. 2010. “Working Toward a Synthesis
of Archaeological, Linguistic, and Genetic Data for Inferring African
Population History.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 107:
8931-8938.
“In fact, it seems possible that in each place that agriculture arose, our
bodies changed, independently and differently. Our great human variety
reflects, in no small part, the great variety of ways in which we came to
depend on individual species, a new less diverse set of species, to make
it through the toughest years.
“In the villages of our descent, we turned to these new species and
latched on, the way a baby first latches on to its mother. We had been
brave and independent, but in those moments, we gave in. We would live,
for each day after, where and how those species needed us to live in order
to benefit from what they offered. We made an evolutionary contract from
which we have never since been separated. It is far easier to divorce your
spouse than to divorce agriculture.” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our
Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we are Today.
Harper Collins. Pp. 127-8.
“Imagine a crab that proceeds through four acts in its performance–finding
a mollusk, picking it up, breaking in, and then actually killing and
eating it. At some tasks, it rarely fails. It finds prey without trouble.
It kills with deadly certainty once it has broken through the shell. What
it most often fails to do is to get through the shell. Breaking in is hard
to do, and so what mollusks have done over time is to change most in those
features that prevent the crabs from breaking in. This was Vermeij’s law:
prey respond to predators’ weaknesses, the ways they fail rather than the
ways they succeed. The main caveat is that the prey must vary genetically
in traits related to the predators’ weakness, but in most cases they do.
Now that crabs are everywhere, almost all shells in the ocean are thick
and hard ....” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators,
Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we are Today. Harper Collins. Pp.
172-3.
“Each year we have farmed more sugarcane and sugar beets. Now they are
joined by corn farms. On such farms, a useful food is farmed to produce
nutritionally useless sweet high-fructose corn syrup. In 2010, more than
400,000 square kilometers of Earth were dedicated to the farming of sugar
beets and sugar-cane, an area the size of California. A similar quantity
of land is dedicated to the corn used to produce corn syrup.
“When millions of humans continue to starve each year, the fact that we
have allotted an area this large to a substance for which none of us has
any real need is a sign of just how beholden we are to our taste buds....
“Back in East Africa, no one follows the honeyguide anymore. It has
stopped coming to villages. The children who once chased it pursue
lollypops instead.” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our Bodies:
Predators, Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we are Today. Harper
Collins. Pp. 187-8.
“Our senses, coupled with our power, changed the world so quickly and
universally that it is easy to forget what the world used to be like.
Today, roughly 60 percent of the earth’s surface is managed by humans for
production, and most of that land is devoted to one or another kind of
grass. Nearly all humans on Earth live by water. Many of us tend to live
by water because we need it, but also because we tend to prefer it. It
pulls at us like gravity and makes us feel good. Once upon a time, though,
before modern humans, there were more forests and larger animals. Rats
were rare, as were mice and roaches. Even grasslands were not nearly so
common, and the flowering plants that have arisen around us had not yet
called to our senses. In many places, the coastlines along which we now so
easily walk were hidden beyond dunes tens of feet high, dunes that while
useful to us in protecting our shores, obscured our views. The views won,
and so in general the dunes are gone, reduced to a minor row of hills that
does little ....” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators,
Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we are Today. Harper Collins. Pp.
197-8.
“Preutz and Bertolani reported the first habitual use of tools by
chimpanzees to secure vertebrate prey. The apes of Fongoli, Senegal, used
sharpened sticks as skewers to hunt lesser bushbabies from their nests in
tree cavities. Making these instruments involved a hierarchically
organized sequence of up to five steps, flexible enough to allow some
steps to be omitted and others repeated. Some of the observed episodes
involved more than one tool being used to probe a single cavity.” Wynn,
Thomas, R. Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. McGrew. 2011. “‘An
Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary Anthropology.
20:181-197. P. 182. Reference is to Preutz J. & P. Bertolani. 2007.
“Savanna chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes verus, hunt with tools.” Current
Biology 17:412-417.
“Hernandez-Aguilar, Moore, and Pickering reported for the first time that
chimpanzees use tools to excavate the underground storage organs (USOs) of
plants.” Wynn, Thomas, R. Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W.
McGrew. 2011. “‘An Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary
Anthropology. 20:181-197. P. 183. Reference is to Hernandez-Aguilar, RA,
J. Moore & TR Pickering. 2007. “Savanna chimpanzees use tools to harvest
the underground storage organs of plants. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA.
104:19210-19213.
“A tool set is ‘two or more tools [used] in an obligate sequence to
achieve a single goal. Brewer and McGrew first described a tool set. In
that case, a female chimpanzee used four types of tools in series to
extract honey. Since then, tool sets have been seen in wild communities
for obtaining honey, sap, and social insects. The largest known tool set
comprises five tools used to get honey. A specific order in the use of
each tool of the set is needed to reach the goal.” Wynn, Thomas, R.
Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. McGrew. 2011. “‘An Ape’s View
of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary Anthropology. 20:181-197. P. 183.
Reference is to Brewer, S. & W. McGrew. 1990. “Chimpanzees use of a
tool-set to get honey.” Folia Primatology. 54:100-104.
“Based on long-term studies, these white-faced capuchins show notable
parallels with chimpanzees, such as social hunting, meat-sharing, and
interpopulational behavioral variation. However, in the last 10 years, it
is C. libidinosus (bearded capuchin) that has leapt to prominence...
“Overall, the tool kits of capuchin monkeys rival or even exceed those of
chimpanzee populations in scope and complexity, if not yet in size.” Wynn,
Thomas, R. Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. McGrew. 2011. “‘An
Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary Anthropology.
20:181-197. P. 187.
“Since 1989, the picture of non-human primate technology-based adaptations
has broadened dramatically. From termite fishing at Gombe and nut cracking
at Tai, which formed the core of the 1989 analysis, the known tool-based
activities of chimpanzees have expanded to encompass a much greater
variety of tools, including tool sets, composite tools, and compound
tools, and a greater variety of foods accessed and processed. Moreover, it
is clear that much of this activity depends on sequentially and
hierarchically organized actions that allow flexibility in task
completion. Chimpanzees represent the high end of a range of reliance on
tool-assisted activities now documented for other apes, and also monkeys.”
Wynn, Thomas, R. Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. McGrew. 2011.
“‘An Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary Anthropology.
20:181-197. P. 187.
“In nut cracking, Carvalho and colleagues reported that a large flake
detached from an anvil was then reused as a hammer. They stressed that
although such fracturing may have been accidental, the result was a tool
produced by another tool. Unintentional products of chimpanzee percussion
activities were also identified in the excavated archeological assemblages
at Tai. Although accidental stone tool-making by apes is not the same as
intentional knapping of stones by hominins, it is an important occurrence
and allows for the hypothesis that the unintentional fracture of anvil
margins was the first step in the evolution of stone knapping.” Wynn,
Thomas, R. Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. McGrew. 2011. “‘An
Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary Anthropology.
20:181-197. P. 192. Reference is to Carvalho, S, E. Cunha, C. Sousa & T.
Matsuzawa. 2008. “Chaines operatoires and resource exploitation strategies
in chimpanzee nut-cracking (Pan troglodytes).” Journal of Human Evolution.
55:148-163.
“These authors found that normal participants were better able to report a
target when it was presented in interaction with a partner object but only
under conditions in which the stimuli could be perceptually integrated
(e.g., with a short interval between the objects). Green and Hummel
proposed that objects placed in co-locations for action could be grouped
together and attended as a single ‘unit.’” Yoon, EY, G. Humphreys & MJ
Riddoch. “The Paired-Object Affordance Effect.” 2010. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 36, 4:812-824.
P. 813. Reference is to Green, C., & J. Hummel. 2006. “Familiar
interacting objects are perceptually grouped.” Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 32, 1107-1119.
“In order for a structure to evolve there must be a reasonable probability
that genetic variation carries it from one adaptive peak to another; at
the same time the structure should not be overly unstable to phenotypic
perturbations, as this is incompatible with occupying a peak.
Organizations that are complex in terms of numbers of components and
interactions are more likely to meet the peak-climbing condition, but less
likely to meet the stability condition. Biological structures that are
characterized by a high degree of component redundancy and multiple weak
interactions satisfy these conflicting pressures.” Conrad, Michael. “The
geometry of evolution.” 1990. BioSystems, 24:61-81. P. 61.
“The picture is that a very special class of structures is particularly
amenable to evolution, and that these are themselves selected through the
Darwinian mechanism of variation and selection. The chief characteristic
of this special class of structures is that it must satisfy at one and the
same time two conflicting conditions. The first is that the organism be
stable, that it sit in a developmental basin of attraction. This is more
likely as the number of components in the organism and the number of
interactions among them decreases, on the simple grounds that the chance
of a valley occurring in the phase space of a system decreases with its
dimensionality. The second condition is that the adaptive peaks
corresponding to these basins of attraction should be close enough
together to be connected by single genetic changes. But this is more
likely as the number of components and interactions increases, since
pathways between peaks in the adaptive peak space correspond to pathways
between valleys in the basin space. The only way for a system to satisfy
both conditions is to have many redundant components with multiple weak
interactions. In this case the developmental system can have many
genetically related homomorphic images. The extra components and weak
interactions that allow for this special situation are costs to the
individual organism; the structure that is more amenable to evolution will
be functionally less effective from the thermodynamic point of view.
Nevertheless the amenability-increasing structural features inevitably
hitchhike along with the advantageous traits whose evolution they
facilitate.” Conrad, Michael. “The geometry of evolution.” 1990.
BioSystems, 24:61-81. P. 62.
“Clearly we have arrived at a contradiction. A genetic-developmental
organization must be slightly unstable to allow for evolution, but this is
incompatible with the stability required for fitness. The resolution is
not too difficult. It is only necessary to organize the phenotypic
dynamics to be unstable to mutation and other genetic perturbation, but
stable to the physiological class of perturbations.” Conrad, Michael. “The
geometry of evolution.” 1990. BioSystems, 24:61-81. P. 69.
“At the level of the gene and organism the principle [of
self-complication] may be stated thus: the complexity of biological
organization increases because (buffered) dynamic instability in response
to genetic variations is advantageous to evolutionary
self-organization....
“The principle of self-complication contrasts with what has been termed
the principle of self-simplification. Some authors have argued that
complex systems, because they are unstable, will self-simplify. This is a
reasonable assumption, except for those special cases in which the
structure of complexity confers extra stability. Our analysis suggests
that complication in terms of redundant components and weak interactions
will in general facilitate the achievement of stability and that
biological organization is a consequence of self-complicating as well as
self-simplifying processes.” Conrad, Michael. “The geometry of evolution.”
1990. BioSystems, 24:61-81. Pp. 78-9.
“Actually our whole discussion has used a rather naive definition of
complexity Many other definitions exist. According to the algorithmic
definition of Chaiten and Kolmogoroff, the complexity of a pattern can be
represented by the length of the shortest computer program that can
generate the pattern. A truly random (not pseudorandom) pattern is thus
the most complex. Redundancy means that some of the features of the
pattern are related to each other by a rule. Thus our principle of
self-complication has a self-simplifying aspect when looked at from the
point of view of the Chaiten-Kolmogoroff definition. The
Chaiten-Kolmogoroff complexity of an evolutionary system would increase
less in the course of evolution than would the complexity as measured by
the number of components and interactions. Evolutionary systems would move
toward some situation intermediate between order and randomness. From the
point of view of constructing scientific theories this is of course the
most complex (difficult) region. Pure randomness, no matter how complex
from the standpoint of Chaiten-Kolmogoroff, lends itself to probabilistic
models; while highly ordered situations lend themselves to group theory.
The organizations that are best suited to evolution are precisely those
that are most ill suited to the classical standards of scientific
description.” Conrad, Michael. “The geometry of evolution.” 1990.
BioSystems, 24:61-81. P. 79.
“... a different and completely valid scenario is that the entities that
gave rise to the lineages of the three different domains of life were
actually the result of independent cellularisation events in an evolving
population of precells. However, the concept of a distinct LUCA becomes
ambiguous in this case, and as a consequence it is more appropriate to
speak of the Last Universal Common Ancestral State (LUCAS).” Guzman,
Marcelo. “Abiotic Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry to Metabolism.”
Pp. 85-105. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds.
Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 86.
“While metabolism supplies the monomers from which the replicators (i.e.,
genes) are made, replicators alter the kinds of chemical reactions
occurring in metabolism. Only then can natural selection, acting on
replicators, power the evolution of metabolism.” Guzman, Marcelo. “Abiotic
Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry to Metabolism.” Pp. 85-105. From
Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The
Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 87.
“Here are only three such models [to explain the origin of life]: (1) the
RNA-first world, (2) the compartmentalistic approach, and (3) the proposal
of nonenzymatic metabolism.... Among the many other models to explain the
origin of life is the thioester world and the glyoxylate scenario.”
Guzman, Marcelo. “Abiotic Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry to
Metabolism.” Pp. 85-105. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian,
Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 90.
“Universal metabolism rationalizes that all the possible metabolic cycles
are partially common and converge in the r-TCA cycle through at least one
of the intermediates. In consequence, this cycle is proposed to be
fundamental to the origin of life. Enzymes, specialized proteins able to
catalyze all these metabolic reactions, appeared later in metabolism,
speeding up the reactions, and eventually took over the complete control
of these networks. The deep consequence is that metabolic networks arose
before the origin of macromolecules with highly specialized catalytic
properties or enzymes.
“The model is not absolutely accepted, least so by supporters of the
RNA-first world scenario, whose main concern relates to the catalytic
properties of the minerals involved in the organization of the chemical
system.” Guzman, Marcelo. “Abiotic Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic
Chemistry to Metabolism.” Pp. 85-105. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A.
Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. P. 92.
“Nonenzymatic metabolism requires overcoming the high activation energies
(Ea) for the chemical reactions involved. Enzymes have the ability of
catalyzing those reactions by decreasing Ea and making possible many
energetically unfavorable reactions. In addition, the active sites where
the reactions take place in enzymes have a tridimensional geometry of high
order where the actual concentration of reactants is considerably larger
than in the surroundings. Cairns-Smith explored an idea first suggested by
Bernal. Cairns-Smith showed that clay mineral surfaces, in an aqueous
environment, can adsorb organic molecules, enhancing their concentration.
Clay surfaces also behave as a mold for polymerization reactions to take
place.” Guzman, Marcelo. “Abiotic Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry
to Metabolism.” Pp. 85-105. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A.
Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011.
Springer. P. 93.
“To date, there are six known carbon fixation pathways used by living
organisms. One of them, the r-TCA cycle is often proposed as the leading
candidate to be the first carbon fixation mechanism because it operates in
ancient green sulfur bacteria. Additionally, all six mechanisms share at
least a common intermediate ....” Guzman, Marcelo. “Abiotic
Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry to Metabolism.” Pp. 85-105. From
Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The
Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 96.
“The photocatalytic principle consists in the absorption of a photon in
the wave-length band of absorption of the mineral. The most extensively
studied mineral for this application is sphalerite, the cubic form of zinc
sulfide.... The novelty of this mechanism is to provide complementary
oxidation and reduction reactions that occur at the same time in the tiny
nano- to micro-meter diameter scale colloidal particles.” Guzman, Marcelo.
“Abiotic Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry to Metabolism.” Pp.
85-105. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of
Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. Pp. 98-9.
“In the early terrestrial environment, the genetic information that was
embedded in the RNA sequences could lead to self replication and to
phenotypes with catalytic properties. In the case of the proto-ribosome,
it is likely that the more efficient and more stable RNA dimers that
functioned as proto-ribosomes by positioning the substrates in a spatial
arrangement similar to the modern one, could have autoreplicated. Thus,
the surviving ancient pockets became the templates for the ancient
ribosomes. In a later stage these molecular entities underwent
optimization from non-genetic peptide bond formation towards performing
genetically driven translation.” Davidovich, Chen, M. Belousoff, A. Bashan
& A. Yonath. “The evolving ribosome: from non-coded peptide bond formation
to sophisticated translation machinery.” Resarch in Microbiology. 2009.
160: 487-492. P. 489.
“The emergence of Life required an apparatus for synthesizing polypeptides
capable of performing catalytic or other life supporting tasks, i.e. the
ribosome. The proto-ribosome, which served as the precursor for the modern
translation machinery by its capacity to autonomously catalyze peptide
bonds forming non-coded amino acid oligo- or polymers, is suggested to
have appeared by spontaneous dimeric assembly of two self-folding RNA
chains. These pocket-like dimers offered a catalytic site for favorable
positioning of the substrates involved in peptide bond formation and
simple elongation. Our studies show that it is likely that the
proto-ribosome is still embedded in the core of the modern ribosome, and
that the tendency for dimerization of the proto-ribosome, a prerequisite
for obtaining the catalytic center, is intrinsically linked to the
sequences and the folds of its two components, thus indicating functional
selection at the molecular level in the prebiotic era.” Davidovich, Chen,
M. Belousoff, A. Bashan & A. Yonath. “The evolving ribosome: from
non-coded peptide bond formation to sophisticated translation machinery.”
Resarch in Microbiology. 2009. 160: 487-492. P. 491.
“An important consequence of this view is that the agent and the
environment constitute a single system, i.e. the two aspects are so
intimately connected that a description of each of them in isolation does
not make much sense.” Nolfi, Stefano. “Behaviour as a Complex Adaptive
System: On the Role of Self-Organization in the Development of Individual
and Collective Behaviour.” ComPlexUs. 2005. 2:195-203. P. 196.
“The various forms of learning have traditionally been treated as separate
creations, much as species were treated by pre-Darwinian biologists. This
long-standing position is indefensible, however. Just as systematists,
comparative zoologists, biochemists, and ethologists have reconstructed
evolutionary hierarchies showing the origins of species, structures,
proteins, and instincts, so also comparative psychologists (or others)
should in principle be able to find hierarchical relationships linking
most or all known forms of learning. The present work addresses this
question, and offers a cladogram linking ninety-seven processes.” Moore,
Bruce. “The evolution of learning.” 2004. Biological Reviews. 79:301-335.
P. 302.
“Habituation has been defined as a response decrement ‘occurring as the
result of repeated [or prolonged] stimulation,’ and not attributable to
fatigue or sensory adaptation.” Moore, Bruce. “The evolution of learning.”
2004. Biological Reviews. 79:301-335. P. 303. Quote is from Harris, J.
1943. “Habituatory response decrement in the intact organism.”
Psychological Bulletin. 40:385-422.
“Dishabituation, in which abrupt stimuli reduce habituation, is rather
like sensitization. But it brings habituated reactions back to normal, or
near-normal, whereas sensitization enhances normal reflexes.” Moore,
Bruce. “The evolution of learning.” 2004. Biological Reviews. 79:301-335.
P. 305. Quote is from Harris, J. 1943. “Habituatory response decrement in
the intact organism.” Psychological Bulletin. 40:385-422.
“Sensitization is ordinarily an after-effect of negative reinforcement. It
occurs when mere presentation of a reinforcing stimulus, typically an
aversive one, potentiates reactions from the species-typical repertoire.”
Moore, Bruce. “The evolution of learning.” 2004. Biological Reviews.
79:301-335. P. 305. Quote is from Harris, J. 1943. “Habituatory response
decrement in the intact organism.” Psychological Bulletin. 40:385-422.
“While conditioning and sensitization are similar, they differ in at least
two ways. Conditioning is associative, while sensitization is not, and it
is a long-term (semi-permanent) effect, unlike simple sensitization.”
Moore, Bruce. “The evolution of learning.” 2004. Biological Reviews.
79:301-335. P. 305. Quote is from Harris, J. 1943. “Habituatory response
decrement in the intact organism.” Psychological Bulletin. 40:385-422.
“Here we present evidence from a diversity of sources supporting the
hypothesis that a fuller answer [to how hominin evolution could compete
with a guild of specialist carnivores] lies in the evolution of a new
socio-cognitive niche, the principal components of which include forms of
cooperation, egalitarianism, mindreading (also known as ‘theory of mind’),
language and cultural transmission, that go far beyond the most comparable
phenomena in other primates.” Whiten, Andrew & D. Erdal. “The human
socio-cognitive niche and its evolutionary origins.” 2012. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 367: 2119-2129. P. 2119.
“Under thermodynamic criteria, any biological system is no more ordered
than a piece of rock of equivalent weight. The difference between them is
in the kinetics and ability to remember favorable structurization
scenarios.” Ivanitskii, G.R. “21st century: what is life from the
perspective of physics?” 2010. Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 180 (4) 337-369.
P. 334.
“In other words, biological evolution proceeds in two distinct modes: as
the existence of short-living organisms, and via mutations in the
long-lived genetic code.” Ivanitskii, G.R. “21st century: what is life
from the perspective of physics?” 2010. Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 180 (4)
337-369. P. 342.
“It can be concluded that the greatest event in the course of natural
evolution was the appearance of primitive memory for at least one cycle of
environmental changes.” Ivanitskii, G.R. “21st century: what is life from
the perspective of physics?” 2010. Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 180 (4)
337-369. P. 344.
“The main point is that variations in the random process of environmental
changes enabled living organisms to develop a memory strategy for the
selection of advantageous mutations and modifications at different
hierarchical levels from macromolecules to the biospshere as a whole;
simultaneously, they learned how to survive in the course of evolution. In
other words, the mechanism of selection consists in a gradual alteration
of living matter responsiveness in time and space using memory of
preceding results. This mechanism was realized in different modes at
different stages of evolution by changing the pitch and the length of the
genetic code, a set of biochemical reactions, inner links, exchange
operation of learning for reproduction rate, etc. Selection gave
advantages to the best forms of living matter and enabled them to build up
new hierarchical levels of regulation by combining simultaneously arising
elements, which promoted the transformation of both chaotic and
deterministic environmental processes into the symbiotic
deterministic-chaotic process inside the living organism.” Ivanitskii, G.R.
“21st century: what is life from the perspective of physics?” 2010.
Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 180 (4) 337-369. P. 352.
“It is worth noting that the mass of living matter on our planet is still
rather small (2.4 - 3.6 x 1012 metric tons, dry weight), or
less than 10-6 of Earth’s mass. But the load it exerts on the
planet is determined by kinetics, not mass, of living matter, i.e., by the
energy being exhausted as it is consumed. According to different but close
estimates, a few billion species have disappeared from Earth during the
4.5 billion years of organic evolution. All these organisms had to let the
entire matter contained in the envelope of Earth (the atmosphere,
hydrosphere, lithosphere) pass many times through their organs, tissues,
and cells. Thereby, they not only reproduced themselves, but also
transformed atmospheric air, oceanic waters, and a huge mass of mineral
substance into the products of their vital functions.” Ivanitskii, G.R.
“21st century: what is life from the perspective of physics?” 2010.
Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 180 (4) 337-369. P. 353
“Much of evolution is coevolution—the process of reciprocal evolutionary
change between interacting species driven by natural selection. Most
species survive and reproduce only by using a combination of their own
genome and that of at least one other species either directly or
indirectly. Species evolve to a large degree by co-opting and manipulating
other free-living species or by acquiring the entire genomes of other
species through parasitic or mutualistic symbiotic relationships. The
evolution of biodiversity is therefore largely about the evolution of
interaction diversity.” Thompson, John. The Geographic Mosaic of
Coevolution. 2005. University of Chicago Press. Pp. 3-4.
“We are also beginning to understand better the profound effects of
coevolution on human societies. Human history is partly a history of
coevolution with the parasites and pathogens that have shaped the spread
of our species and our cultures worldwide. The story of human agriculture
is to a great degree the story of human-induced coevolution between crop
plants and rapidly evolving parasites and pathogens.” Thompson, John. The
Geographic Mosaic of Coevolution. 2005. University of Chicago Press. Pp.
4-5.
“In the past, discussions of the relevance of science for the
interpretation of reality, including human existence, were based on the
simplifications of physics. However, the close relationship of alternative
interpretations of living matter (in terms of either simplifying
generality or complex specificity and its extensive network of conceptual
continuity) suggests that the understanding of living, rather than
inanimate systems, would be of greater use in reconciling the simplifying
and complex qualities of reality. With its emphasis on specificity,
biology becomes a focal point in the discussion of the simple/complex
relationship, a pivotal area in bridging the gap between the abstract
realities of mechanistic physics and the concrete realities of human
society. It legitimizes biological systems as models for establishing
conceptual continuity as a way of understanding complexity.” Hermann,
Heinz. From Biology to Sociopolitics: Conceptual Continuity in Complex
Systems. 1998. Yale University Press. Pp. 7-8.
“Inherent in the scientific thought of past centuries has been the resolve
to create a representation of reality that is free of complexity.
Examination and discussion of complexity as a noteworthy concept in its
own right was to be avoided. Phenomena that could not be reduced to the
simplicity of ideal systems were to be disregarded. Ignoring complexity
seemed quite plausible, as long as some mathematical formalization could
be regarded as the only necessary and sufficient requirement for
understanding of nonideal systems. This tendency became particularly
frequent in dealing with biological systems. Physiology texts published at
the turn of the century could boast that their mathematical correlations
of physiological parameters gave physiology a status comparable to that of
physics.” Hermann, Heinz. From Biology to Sociopolitics: Conceptual
Continuity in Complex Systems. 1998. Yale University Press. Pp. 125-6.
“This hope for relieving the burdensome and frustrating complexity of
human existence through a simplified representation of reality, to be able
to make complexity tolerable by subsuming it under a unifying system of
thought, has been a pervasive goal of Western culture since the days of
ancient Greece to the present....
“These developments [demonstrations of necessary complexity in “nonideal
systems of physics, biology, or sociopolitics”] suggest that humanity may
have to abandon its dreams of simple realities and at last come to terms
with the overriding complexity of both individual and social existence.
The response to this change, the way we perceive reality, will very likely
become an initial determining condition and characteristic of our future.
“Three types of responses to complexity can be distinguished: resignation;
escape of denial; acceptance and attempted mastery.” Hermann, Heinz. From
Biology to Sociopolitics: Conceptual Continuity in Complex Systems. 1998.
Yale University Press. Pp. 204-6.
“I shall try to show that our major trouble, and the reason why it is
taking the Kuhnian revolution so long to complete itself, is that we have
no theory of the cell or organism that explains how either of these [the
environment or genes] manages to constrain or collapse an enormously
complex realm of possibility to a given adaptive reality. Until we do, if
Kuhn was right, we will have to go on repairing a defective genetic
paradigm that looks for answers in simplistic genetic programs of one sort
or another.” Strohman, Richard. “Epigenesis and Complexity: The coming
Kuhnian revolution in biology.” 1997. Nature Biotechnology. Volume 15:
194-200. Pp. 194-5.
“Normal science is an approach that reveals genetic maps related to
biological function, but the directions for reading the maps are not
included in the package. And the real secrets of life are obviously in
those missing directions–in the rules and constraints that organize
genetic agents into functional arrays. These rules and constraints are
more than likely embedded in the organization of life rather than in the
catalogue of the organization’s agents, and we have mistaken the former
for the latter.” Strohman, Richard. “Epigenesis and Complexity: The coming
Kuhnian revolution in biology.” 1997. Nature Biotechnology. Volume 15:
194-200. P. 197.
“The Kuhnian revolution in which we are now embedded is all about the
special qualities of living matter and of discoveries, now underway, and
still to come, of the very special boundary conditions that harness the
material forces to the purposeful pursuits of organisms. The evidence that
these boundary conditions must be present is everywhere. Their absence
from our current theories of life is at the root of confusion coming from
genetic determinism.” Strohman, Richard. “Epigenesis and Complexity: The
coming Kuhnian revolution in biology.” 1997. Nature Biotechnology. Volume
15: 194-200. P. 197.
“The entire landscape of theory in biology is changing before us. We are
trying to fit dynamic nonlinear change into a linear theory of the gene,
and it will not fit there. And this lack of fit has also been forecast for
years by organismal biologists and by population geneticists like Richard
Lewontin.” Strohman, Richard. “Epigenesis and Complexity: The coming
Kuhnian revolution in biology.” 1997. Nature Biotechnology. Volume 15:
194-200. P. 199.
“The biosphere is dominated, in terms of both physical abundance and
genetic diversity, by primitive life forms, prokaryotes and viruses. These
ubiquitous organisms evolve in ways unimaginable and unforeseen in
classical evolutionary biology.” Koonin, Eugene. 2009. “The Origin at 150:
is a new evolutionary synthesis in sight?” Trends in Genetics. V. 25. No.
11. Pp. 473-5. P. 473.
“We now think of the entire world of prokaryotes as a single, huge network
of interconnected gene pools, and the notion of the prokaryotic pangenome
is definitely here to stay.” Koonin, Eugene. 2009. “The Origin at 150: is
a new evolutionary synthesis in sight?” Trends in Genetics. V. 25. No. 11.
Pp. 473-5. P. 473.
“In general, the species concept does not apply to prokaryotes and is of
dubious validity for unicellular eukaryotes as well.” Koonin, Eugene.
2009. “The Origin at 150: is a new evolutionary synthesis in sight?”
Trends in Genetics. V. 25. No. 11. Pp. 473-5. P. 474.
“Equally outdated is the (neo-) Darwinian notion of the adaptive nature of
evolution; clearly, genomes show very little if any signs of optimal
design, and random drift constrained by purifying in all likelihood
contributes (much) more to genome evolution than Darwinian selection.”
Koonin, Eugene. 2009. “The Origin at 150: is a new evolutionary synthesis
in sight?” Trends in Genetics. V. 25. No. 11. Pp. 473-5. P. 474.
“Whereas emergence seems to be required to explain numerous biological
phenomena, fundamentalist reductionism flatly denies its existence: in all
cases the whole is no more than the sum of its parts. Thus, biology of the
20th century was in the strange position of having to contort itself to
conform to a world view (fundamentalist reductionism) that 20th century
physics was simultaneously in the process of rejecting.” Woese, Carl.
2004. “A New Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology and Molecular
Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. P. 174.
“Our task now is to resynthesize biology; put the organism back into its
environment; connect it again to its evolutionary past; and let us feel
that complex flow that is organism, evolution, and environment united. The
time has come for biology to enter the nonlinear world.” Woese, Carl.
2004. “A New Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology and Molecular
Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. Pp. 179-80.
“The genes in a genome thus fall into fairly discrete categories depending
upon these HGT [prevalence of horizontal gene transfer] characteristics.
One category could be called ‘cosmopolitan genes.’ These would be
specialty genes, genes that come and go as environmental circumstances
change. Cosmopolitan genes are special life style genes; they allow
adaptation to unusual environments....
“Then there are the genes whose functions are central to general cellular
metabolism and so are crucial for the cell’s existence under any (natural)
condition. For the majority of the main metabolic pathways, alternatives
appear to exist, i.e., different enzymes catalyzing the same reaction,
different pathways from one compound to another, etc....
“Finally there are the genes that define the organizational fabric of the
cell, those that give the cell its basic character. By and large genes of
this type are highly and idiosyncratically woven into the cellular
fabric.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New Biology for a New Century.”
Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. P. 181.
“In all likelihood primitive cells were loosely connected conglomerates,
in which the connections among the parts were relatively few in number and
imprecise in specification, and primitive cellular organization was likely
minimal and largely horizontal in nature.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New
Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews.
68(2):173-186. P. 181.
“The aboriginal processes of DNA replication and transcription could not
be as complex and, so, as precise as are their modern equivalents because
both of these mechanisms today are dependent upon large proteins.
Imprecise primitive genome replication implies that primitive genomes
could comprise relatively few (unique) genes. This in turn argues for
simplicity of primitive cell designs and a general looseness and
imprecision in those designs.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New Biology for a New
Century.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. P.
182.
“The world of primitive cells feels like a vast sea, or field, of
cosmopolitan genes flowing into and out of the evolving cellular (and
other) entities. Because of the high levels of HGT [horizontal gene
transfer], evolution at this stage would in essence be communal, not
individual.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New Biology for a New Century.”
Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. P. 182.
“... I assert that it was one such transition that took the cell out of
its initial primitive state in which HGT dominated the evolutionary
dynamic (and evolving cells had no stable genealogical records and
evolution was communal) to a more advanced (modern) form (where vertical
inheritance came to dominate and stable organismal lineages could exist).
The obvious choice of a name for this particular evolutionary juncture
would be Darwinian threshold or Darwinian transition, for it would be only
after such a saltation had occurred that we could meaningfully speak of
species and of lineages as we know them.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New
Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews.
68(2):173-186. P. 182.
“The order in which the three cell designs crossed their respective
Darwinian thresholds is, then, the bacterial first, the archaeal second,
and finally the eucaryotic.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New Biology for a New
Century.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. P.
184.
“[In the 19th and 20th centuries] Physics provided the ultimate
explanations. Biology, as no more than complicated chemistry, was at the
end of the line, merely providing baroque ornamentation on the great
edifice of understanding that was physics–the hierarchy
physics–>chemistry–>biology is burned into the thinking of all scientists,
a pecking order that has done much to foster in society the (mistaken)
notion that biology is only an applied science.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New
Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews.
68(2):173-186. P. 185.
“This article has touched on only some of the conflicts between the
Luhmannian and emergentist traditions. But these divisions are so
fundamental that we are justified in seeing these two systems of thought
as competing paradigms of social systems theory. First, they have
radically different understandings of the core concept of system; for
Luhmann, the fundamental units of social systems are communicative events,
whereas for emergentists, systems are entities and are composed of
entities, and events are produced by their causal interaction. Second,
while contemporary emergentism sees higher level properties as products of
mechanisms that depend on the properties of lower level parts and the
relations between them, a central element of Luhmann’s theory is
autopoiesis–a model of systems that denies the influence of lower level
properties on the behavior of the higher level system. Third, the two
traditions are primarily concerned with quite different core problems that
imply very different styles of theory: for emergentists, the resolution of
the core problem of reductionism provides resources for developing causal
theory, whereas for Luhmann, the resolution of the core problem of
self-reference entails the analysis of the meaning of communications.”
Elder-Vass, Dave. “Luhmann and Emergentism: Competing Paradigms for Social
Systems Theory.” 2007. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 37:408-432. Pp.
428-9.
“At the most basic level, the parameters describing human society are the
same as those for any other vertebrate group. The most obvious of these is
the tendency to be social itself, namely to live in groups made up of
known individuals. Other basic parameters that appear to be common across
humans and non-humans are more prolonged parental relationships, which
might be either sex or both, kin-based relationships among resident
adults, sex-based patterns of dispersal, more or less prolonged
relationships between adult males and females, with one or more partners,
some degree of tolerance of the presence of other members of the
‘society’, a lack of presence of equivalent tolerance for members of
another group (or at least a different pattern of behaviour) and some
degree of structured or repeated style of relationship between individuals
(e.g., dominance, submission, friendliness, aggression, etc.).” Foley,
Robert & C. Gamble. “The ecology of social transitions in human
evolution.” 2009. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. Pp.
3267-79. Pp. 3267-8.
“The ability to focus attention so single-mindedly on the making of an
object, and its constant repetition across three continents and many
millennia, is testament to a high level of attention in practical
operations....
“But this Acheulean gaze was not the only derived human trait that
appeared at this time [from 2 to 1 Mya]. Using the correlation between
brain and community size, Dunbar has proposed that hominins in this period
possessed a theory of mind and accompanying orders of intentionality.
Gamble has argued for the importance of behaviours that amplified the
strength and persistence of social bonds in such an advanced hominin
cognition. These would include social laughter and crying as well as other
mood enhancers such as collective dance and music.” Foley, Robert & C.
Gamble. “The ecology of social transitions in human evolution.” 2009.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. Pp. 3267-79. P. 3274.
“It is generally accepted that fission-fusion is an important element of
chimpanzee social organization and that it may have been enhanced among
the earlier hominins. However, among modern humans, fission-fusion occurs
at a different order of magnitude. Individuals, families, bands, etc. can
split up for very long periods of time, and disperse over large distances,
while still maintaining a common social network....
“A further indication of a significant change in ranging patterns comes
from the evidence that lithic raw materials were extracted and transported
over greater distances than before. [speaking of the time between 300ka
and 200ka ago]” Foley, Robert & C. Gamble. “The ecology of social
transitions in human evolution.” 2009. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society: B. Pp. 3267-79. P. 3275.
“At this point [200 to 10ka ago], a fundamental shift that goes beyond the
normal range of the socioecological model occurred. Technological
dependence, spatially restricted and controlled staples such as
domesticates, defended flocks, fields, and stores, opened the possibility
for greater male control over access to resources at local, regional and
inter-regional scales. If we take it as axiomatic to the model that female
reproduction is dependent upon access to resources, and males by access to
females, then the open-ended model becomes closed when males themselves
control the resources. Complex social structures that interweave marriage
patterns and resources, which characterize all human societies, represent
an entirely novel socioecology that is uniquely human.” Foley, Robert & C.
Gamble. “The ecology of social transitions in human evolution.” 2009.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. Pp. 3267-79. Pp.
3275-6.
“One such point is that if the ‘community’, in the sense used to describe
both chimpanzee groups and human social units, was present from the last
common ancestor to the emergence of modern humans, the key development is
the addition of social structures both below–families and descent
groups–and above–shared political systems, segmentary lineage systems and
trade networks. The community, however, remains the core and the basis for
elaboration....”
“Human society is essentially a chimpanzee community with exploded
fission-fusion; a society that has achieved release from the constraints
of proximity that dominate the negotiation and often daily affirmation of
social bonds and hierarchies among primates.” Foley, Robert & C. Gamble.
“The ecology of social transitions in human evolution.” 2009.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. Pp. 3267-79. Pp.
3276-7.
“Nevertheless, tradition, even post-Darwinian tradition, excludes our
doings from natural history. It may acknowledge our effects on the natural
world–at times (though less often in recent times) even celebrate them–but
these effects are treated as impingements, and never incorporated into our
conception of self-organization. Yet to put this exclusion so baldly is to
make its absurdity self-evident, and to invite us to challenge the entire
tradition on which it rests.” Fox Keller, Evelyn. 2005. “Ecosystems,
Organisms, and Machines.” BioScience. 55(12):1069-1074. P. 1073.
“Indeed, Gergely & Csibra have recently elaborated an account explaining
why the existence of relatively ‘opaque’ cultural conventions (there is no
causal structure or else it is difficult to see this structure) requires
both that human adults be specifically adapted for pedagogy toward
children and that human children be specifically adapted for recognizing
when adults are being pedagogical–which is typically indicated by the same
behavioural signs as cooperative communication in general, such things as
eye contact, special tones of voice and so forth (and indeed teaching may
be seen as one manifestation of human cooperative communication in
general). Gergely and Csibra emphasize that when children detect pedagogy,
they assume that they are supposed to be learning something otherwise
opaque to them that applies to the world in a general way.” Tennie,
Claudio, J. Call & M. Tomasello. 2009. “Ratcheting up the ratchet: on the
evolution of cumulative culture.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society: B. 364, 2405-2415. P. 2411. Reference is to Gergely, G. & G.
Csibra. “Sylvia’s recipe: the role of imitation and pedagogy in the
transmission of cultural knowledge.” From Roots of human sociality:
culture, cognition, and human interaction. 2006. Enfield, N. & S. Levenson,
Eds. Pp. 229-255. Berg Publishers.
“These three additional processes–teaching, social imitation and
normativity–represent the contribution of humans’ special forms of
cooperation to the process of cultural transmission across generations.”
Tennie, Claudio, J. Call & M. Tomasello. 2009. “Ratcheting up the ratchet:
on the evolution of cumulative culture.” Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society: B. 364, 2405-2415. P. 2412.
“When distributing two parts of a task between two actors, we found that
each actor represented not only his or her own part of the task but also
the other’s part of the task. Compared with performing the same part of
the task alone, acting together led to increased demands on executive
control, as actors needed to decide whether it was their turn or the
other’s turn to act. Finally, using fMRI, we found evidence that acting
together led to increased brain activity in areas involved in self-other
distinction. Thus, these findings suggest that humans have a strong
tendency to take others’ tasks (and the related intentions) into account,
while at the same time possessing mechanisms to keep them apart.” Knoblich,
Guenther & N. Sebanz. 2008. “Evolving intentions for social interaction:
from entrainment to joint action.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society: B. 363, 2021-31. P. 2025.
“Combining simultaneous affordance with joint intentionality allows one to
address the issue of how different actors perform non-identical actions
upon the same object to achieve a joint goal. For example, the way people
lift a two-handled basket depends on whether they lift it alone or
together. When alone, a person would normally grasp each handle with one
hand. When together, one person would normally grasp the left handle with
his/her right hand and the other person would grasp the right handle with
his/her left hand. Thus, embedded in joint intentionality, simultaneous
affordance changes into a joint affordance, inviting two different actions
from two co-actors.” Knoblich, Guenther & N. Sebanz. 2008. “Evolving
intentions for social interaction: from entrainment to joint action.”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 363, 2021-31. P. 2026.
“The creation of enduring artefacts opened up a whole new world of
affordances and ways of interacting with the world in a direct manner. The
resulting fact that artefacts embody socially transmitted knowledge about
ways of interacting with objects is hardly ever acknowledged in the
research on object perception.” Knoblich, Guenther & N. Sebanz. 2008.
“Evolving intentions for social interaction: from entrainment to joint
action.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 363, 2021-31.
P. 2027.
“We hypothesize that this new social world, created by rapid cultural
adaptation, led to the genetic evolution of new, derived social instincts.
Cultural evolution created cooperative groups. Such environments favoured
the evolution of a suite of new social instincts suited to life in such
groups including a psychology which ‘expects’ life to be structured by
moral norms, and that is designed to learn and internalize such norms. New
emotions evolved, like shame and guilt, which increase the chance the
norms are followed. Individuals lacking the new social instincts more
often violated prevailing norms and experienced adverse selection. They
might have suffered ostracism, been denied the benefits of public goods,
or lost points in the mating game. Cooperation and group identification in
inter-group conflict set up an arms race that drove social evolution to
ever-greater extremes of in-group cooperation. Eventually, human
populations came to resemble the hunter-gathering societies of the
ethnographic record.” Boyd, Robert & P. Richerson. 2009. “Culture and the
evolution of human cooperation.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society: B. 364, 3281-3288. P. 3286.
“Universal symbiogenesis is the process whereby new entities are
introduced because of the interactions between (different) previously
independently existing entities. These interactions encompass horizontal
mergings and the new entities that emerge because of this are called
symbionts. The process is irreversible and discontinuous.” Gontier,
Nathalie. 2007. “Universal symbiogenesis: An alternative to universal
selectionist accounts of evolution.” Symbiosis. 44, 167-81. Pp. 174-5.
“Green showed that complex systems are isomorphic to networks (nodes
linked to edges).” Paperin, Greg, D. Green & S. Sadedin. 2011. “Dual-phase
evolution in complex adaptive systems.” Journal of the Royal Society:
Interface. 8, 609-629. P. 610. Reference is to Green, David. 1993.
Emergent behavioiur in biological systems.” From Complex systems: from
biology to computation. Green, David & T. Bossomaier, Eds. IOS Press. Pp.
24-33.
“State spaces of dynamic systems form directed networks in which the
states are nodes and the transitions define edges. Thus, system dynamics
can be modelled in terms of state-transition networks, allowing the
application of graph-theoretical analysis techniques. Sparse connectivity
of state-transition networks often implies simple behaviour, while richly
connected state-transition networks are associated with chaotic behaviour.”
Paperin, Greg, D. Green & S. Sadedin. 2011. “Dual-phase evolution in
complex adaptive systems.” Journal of the Royal Society: Interface. 8,
609-629. P. 610.
“But it is perhaps owing to the work of Gould and Lewontin as well as
Goodwin that many contemporary biologists are now aware of the fallacy of
pure ‘selectionism’, according to which natural selection is the sole,
almighty sculptor of all phenotypic traits. Natural constraints in
organismal design, emanating from the inescapable laws of chemistry,
physics and even mathematics, as well as from history, present
prefabricated modules of high complexity for natural selection to choose
from. But the complexity itself is not the work of natural selection.”
Huang, Sui. 2011. “The molecular and mathematical basis of Waddington’s
epigenetic landscape: A framework for post-Darwinian biology?” Bioessays
34: 149-157. P. 150.
“Network dynamics is, then, the coordinated change of the expression
levels, x1(t), x2(t), x3(t)..., of all the genes in a GRN [gene regulatory
network] as a consequence of the entirety of the regulatory interactions
displayed as connections (wiring) in the fixed ‘wiring diagram’. In other
words: strictly speaking, when talking about GRNs, there are no ‘dynamic
networks’. Instead, ‘network dynamics’ is a legitimate term indicating the
characteristic dynamic behaviour exhibited by a given network.
“Thus, it is crucial to distinguish between two separate timescales:
network dynamics (the coordinated change of the expression levels xi(t) of
the genes of a given network) takes place within one organisms’ lifetime,
during which the wiring diagram of that network does not change. By
contrast, a change of the structure, or ‘rewiring’ of the network, is the
result of a genomic mutation (which may, for instance, affect how a
regulatory gene controls its target gene) and occurs at the evolutionary
time scale.” Huang, Sui. 2011. “The molecular and mathematical basis of
Waddington’s epigenetic landscape: A framework for post-Darwinian
biology?” Bioessays 34: 149-157. P. 153.
“Gene network dynamics readily accounts for Waddington’s genetic
assimilation, the related Baldwin effect, Neo-Lamarckism and other
epigenetic phenomena presented by critics of Neo-Darwinism.” Huang, Sui.
2011. “The molecular and mathematical basis of Waddington’s epigenetic
landscape: A framework for post-Darwinian biology?” Bioessays 34: 149-157.
P. 156.
“The heterogeneous field of systems biology can be described as the study
of the ‘dynamic interactions between components of a living system,
between living systems and their interaction with the environment.’” Drack,
Manfred & O. Wolkenhauer. 2011. “System approaches of Weiss and
Bertalanffy and their relevance for systems biology today.” Seminars in
cancer Biology. 21: 150-155. P. 153. Subquote is from Pastori, G., V.
Simons & M. Bogaert. 2008. “Systems biology in the European research
area.” ERASysBio Partners.
“Systems biology has its roots in new experimental and measurement
methods, and aims for a dynamic understanding of the behaviour of mostly
small systems. Broadly speaking Weiss and Bertalanffy started from the
whole and saw it as a system, while systems biology started from the parts
and works on ever more inclusive systems.
“O’Malley and Dupre distinguish two types of approaches. The first one is
referred to as ‘systems-theoretic biology,’ which strives for laws or
fundamental principles. The second is termed ‘pragmatic systems biology’
of the post-genomic era, where high-tech tools and sophisticated
computational models are utilised to study the interplay between the parts
(mostly molecules) of a living system.” Drack, Manfred & O. Wolkenhauer.
2011. “System approaches of Weiss and Bertalanffy and their relevance for
systems biology today.” Seminars in cancer Biology. 21: 150-155. P. 154.
“The system approach of Weiss and Bertalanffy must be reconciled with
approaches in systems biology: the former start with the whole, the latter
with the dynamically interacting parts.” Drack, Manfred & O. Wolkenhauer.
2011. “System approaches of Weiss and Bertalanffy and their relevance for
systems biology today.” Seminars in cancer Biology. 21: 150-155. P. 154.
“From this discussion, tentative agreement among many geographers seemed
to have emerged, at least temporarily, regarding several interrelated
ideas about the ontological nature of scale:
“1. Scales (at least those most obviously relevant to social theorists)
are socially produced and contested.
“2. Consequently, scales are not known a priori, but must instead be
understood according to the processes producing them.
“3. Because many causal processes operate across multiple scales,
comprehending most social phenomena will demand a poly-scalar approach.”
Chapura, Mitch. 2009. “Scale, causality, complexity and emergence:
rethinking scale’s ontological significance.” Transactions of the
Institute of British Geographers. 34: 462-474. P. 463.
“If causality can operate across multiple scales, agency can as well. As
with causality, we should expect our perception of agency to be
inextricably tied to the resolution at which we observe a panarchic
system.
“The immune system illustrates this point well. A variety of specialised
cells exist to find and destroy or neutralise pathogens that have entered
the body. Observed at the cellular scale, the behaviour of macrophages,
neutrophils, and eosinophils etc. appears quite purposeful. They
‘discriminate’ between different pathogens and ‘seek out’ those which they
may ‘attack’ and will even alter their ‘attack strategy’ so as to most
effectively neutralise the pathogen....
“Without the proper functioning of my immune system I could not exist. Yet
I am not consciously aware of its actions, nor do I control the billions
of cells constantly at work....
“Of course ‘I’ can influence my immune system, for better or for worse, by
eating a healthy diet, taking medications etc. Still, my ability to
causally influence my immune system, i.e. my agency, remains incomplete
and indirect. Acting to influence my immune system as a whole is not
equivalent to directing the complex operations of its components’
seemingly purposeful behaviours. Moreover, my actions cannot be understood
in isolation from my semiotic and material milieux. Let us imagine, for
example, that, experiencing symptons of illness, I consume an antibiotic.
The very possibility of this action results from my participation in
socio-material systems larger than ‘me’. Perhaps most saliently, without
the narratives, practices and technologies of contemporary biomedicine,
including the ‘germ theory of illness’ and the consequent creation of
ingestible antibacterial substances, the dissemination of knowledge
through medical educational institutions, and the production and sale of
my specific antibiotic by a pharmaceutical corporation, my actions would
be both unintelligible and impossible....
“Insofar as my immune system is both composite and component, the agency
in question is itself a poly-scalar phenomenon.” Chapura, Mitch. 2009.
“Scale, causality, complexity and emergence: rethinking scale’s
ontological significance.” Transactions of the Institute of British
Geographers. 34: 462-474. Pp. 467-8.
“Based on Hutchinson’s general concept, the niche describes the set of
abiotic and biotic conditions where a species can persist. Many ecologists
favour a concept of the niche based on resources and species interactions
at the local scale (i.e. an Eltonian niche concept). On the other hand,
more biogeographically oriented ecologists often prefer a concept focusing
on the environmental conditions determining the large-scale distribution
of species (i.e. a Grinnellian niche concept). I consider these to
represent equally valid conceptualizations of different aspects of the
general Hutchinsonian niche concept....” Wiens, John. 2011. “The niche,
biogeography and species interactions.” Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society: B. 366: 2336-2350. P. 2336.
“Species range limits are not simply set by unsuitable abiotic and biotic
conditions at their range margins, but also by the failure of individuals
to adapt to those unsuitable conditions....
“Therefore, to explain large-scale biogeographic patterns, we also need to
explain why species do not simply adapt to the ecological conditions at
the margins of their geographic ranges and continue expanding their
ranges. Without such limits, every species could be everywhere, and again
there would be few non-random biogeographic patterns. Niche conservatism
is simply the idea that species will retain similar ecological traits over
time.” Wiens, John. 2011. “The niche, biogeography and species
interactions.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366:
2336-2350. P. 2338.
“By contrast, there have been five origins of the long-tailed ecomorph [of
snakelike lizards], giving a somewhat clearer picture for this morph.
These origins exhibit a biogeographic pattern that is largely consistent
with the idea that the origin of one morph in a region restricts
subsequent origins of that same ecomorph in the same region....
“Thus, even if competition may constrain the same ecomorph from evolving
multiple times in the same region in most regions around the world,
competion does not prevent the build-up of many species of the same
ecomorph in sympatry within a region (at least at the broad scale)....
“Thus, species interactions seem to limit the rate of body-size evolution,
but they do not prevent co-occurrence of species with similar size.” Wiens,
John. 2011. “The niche, biogeography and species interactions.”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366: 2336-2350. P.
2344.
“Space and time are not static containers for material objects. They are
‘dynamic process manifolds’ that incorporate the interaction of
determinism and contingency. Scales and scaling are generated by the
behavior of the phenomena.” Stallins, J. Anthony. 2012. “Scale, causality,
and the new organism-environment interaction.” Geoforum. 3: 427-441. P.
430. Subquote is from Rhoads, B. 2006. “The dynamic basis of geomorphology
reenvisioned.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 96 (1):
1323-1340.
“In other words, epistemology and ontology recursively influence one
another. How the world is verified and observed – whether through the
senses or indirectly through technology – contributes to the ontologies
that become evident in it.” Stallins, J. Anthony. 2012. “Scale, causality,
and the new organism-environment interaction.” Geoforum. 3: 427-441. P.
431.
“Organisms may carry and even reinforce a particular set of omic
influences around with them. These dynamics exemplify how the causality of
molecular biology has aligned with geography. The landscapes of the cell
have a contingent, generative potential.” Stallins, J. Anthony. 2012.
“Scale, causality, and the new organism-environment interaction.” Geoforum.
3: 427-441. P. 432.
“Health scholars now speak of the ‘diseaseome’, the interacting networks
of genetic, cellular, and social interactions implicated in disease.”
Stallins, J. Anthony. 2012. “Scale, causality, and the new
organism-environment interaction.” Geoforum. 3: 427-441. P. 437.
“Scale, boundaries, and their ongoing negotiation could be considered a
defining feature of life. Organisms remake boundaries to promote and
inherit their own version of stability and predictability.” Stallins, J.
Anthony. 2012. “Scale, causality, and the new organism-environment
interaction.” Geoforum. 3: 427-441. P. 438.
“In this article, we argue that the considerable social differences that
exist among different cultures affect not only their beliefs about
specific aspects of the world but also (a) their naive metaphysical
systems at a deep level, (b) their tacit epistemologies, and (c) even the
nature of their cognitive processes–the ways by which they know the world.
More specifically, we put forward the following propositions, which we
develop in more detail later.
“1. Social organization directs attention to some aspects of the field at
the expense of others.
“2. What is attended to influences metaphysics, that is, beliefs about the
nature of the world and about causality.
“3. Metaphysics guides tacit epistemology, that is, beliefs about what it
is important to know and how knowledge can be obtained.
“4. Epistemology dictates the development and application of some
cognitive processes at the expense of others.
“5. Social organization and social practices can directly affect the
plausibility of metaphysical assumptions, such as whether causality should
be regarded as residing in the field versus the object.
“6. Social organization and social practices can influence directly the
development and use of cognitive processes such as dialectical versus
logical ones.”
Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and
Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological
Review. 108 (2): 291-310. Pp. 291-2.
“One of the most remarkable characteristics of the ancient Greeks was the
location of power in the individual. Ordinary people developed a sense of
personal agency that had no counterpart among the other ancient
civilizations....”
“The ancient Chinese provide a particularly valuable contrast to the
Greeks. The Chinese counterpart to the Greek sense of personal agency was
a sense of reciprocal social obligation or collective agency.” Nisbett,
Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of
Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108
(2): 291-310. P. 292.
“In Confucianism there was no thought of knowing that did not entail some
consequence for action.” Munro, D. 1969. The Concept of Man in Early
China. Stanford University Press. P. 55. Quoted in Nisbett, Richard, K.
Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought:
Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2):
291-310. P. 293.
“The cognitive differences between ancient Chinese and Greeks can be
loosely grouped under the heading of holistic versus analytic thought. We
define holistic thought as involving an orientation to the context or
field as a whole, including attention to relationships between a focal
object and the field, and a preference for explaining and predicting
events on the basis of such relationships. Holistic approaches rely on
experience-based knowledge rather than on abstract logic and are
dialectical, meaning that there is an emphasis on change, a recognition of
contradiction and of the need for multiple perspectives, and a search for
the ‘Middle Way’ between opposing propositions. We define analytic thought
as involving detachment of the object from its context, a tendency to
focus on attributes of the object to assign it to categories, and a
preference for using rules about the categories to explain and predict the
object’s behavior. Inferences rest in part on the practice of
decontextualizing structure from content, the use of formal logic, and
avoidance of contradiction.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A.
Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus
Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 293.
“A fundamental intellectual difference between the Chinese and the Greeks
was that the Chinese held the ‘view that the world is a collection of
overlapping and interpenetrating stuffs or substances... [This contrasts]
with the traditional Platonic philosophical picture of objects which are
understood as individuals or particulars which instantiate or ‘have’
properties’ that are themselves universals.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I.
Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic
Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P.
293. Subquote is from Hansen, C. 1983. Language and Logic in Ancient
China. University of Michigan Press. P. 30.
“The relationship view versus the rule stance is well illustrated by the
difference between the holistic approach to medicine characteristic of the
Chinese and the effort to find effective rules and treatment principles in
the West. Surgery was common in the West from a very early period because
the idea that some part of the body could be malfunctioning was a natural
one to the analytic mind. But the idea of surgery was ‘heretical to
ancient Chinese medical tradition, which taught that good health depended
on the balance and flow of natural forces throughout the body.’” Nisbett,
Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of
Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108
(2): 291-310. P. 294. Subquote is from Hadingham, E. 1994. “The mummies of
Xinjiang.” Discover. 15(4): 68-77. P. 77.
“In the Chinese intellectual tradition, there is no necessary
incompatibility between the belief that A and not A both have merit.
Indeed, in the spirit of the Tao or yin-yang principle, A can actually
imply that not A is also the case–the opposite of a state of affairs can
exist simultaneously with the state of affairs itself.” Nisbett, Richard,
K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought:
Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2):
291-310. P. 294.
“We believe that social organization affects cognitive processes in two
basic ways: indirectly by focusing attention on different parts of the
environment and directly by making some kinds of social communication
patterns more acceptable than others.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi
& A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus
Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 294.
“Thus the results of several studies indicate that East Asians rely less
on rules and categories and more on relationships and similarities in
organizing their worlds than do Americans. East Asians preferred to group
objects on the basis of relationships and similarity, whereas Americans
were more likely to group objects on the basis of categories and rules.”
Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and
Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological
Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 301.
“Examples of rules about contradiction that have played a central role in
the Western intellectual tradition include the following:
“1. The law of identity: A = A. A thing is identical to itself.
“2. The law of noncontradiction: A =/ [not equal] not-A. No statement can
be both true and false.
“3. The law of the excluded middle: Any statement is either true of
false....
“Peng and Nisbet characterized dialecticism in terms of three principles.
“1. The principle of change: Reality is a process that is not static but
rather is dynamic and changeable. A thing need not be identical to itself
at all because of the fluid nature of reality.
“2. The principle of contradiction: Partly because change is constant,
contradiction is constant. Thus old and new, good and bad, exist in the
same object or event and indeed depend on one another for their existence.
“3. The principle of relationship or holism: Because of constant change
and contradiction, nothing either in human life or in nature is isolated
and independent, but instead everything is related. It follows that
attempting to isolate elements of some larger whole can only be
misleading.”
Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and
Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological
Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 301. Reference is to Peng, K. & R. Nisbett.
1999. “Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction.” American
Psychologist. 54: 741-54.
“Chinese civilization was based on agriculture, which entailed that
substantial cooperation with neighbors was necessary to carry out economic
activities in an effective way.... Social scientists since Marx have
observed that economic and social arrangements such as these are generally
associated with ‘collectivist’ or ‘interdependent’ social orientations as
distinguished from ‘individualistic’ or ‘independent’ social orientations
that are characteristic of societies with economies based on hunting,
fishing, trading, or the modern market economy....
“The Greek ecology conspired against an agrarian base, consisting as it
does mostly of mountains descending to the sea. This sort of ecology was
more suited to herding and fishing than to large scale agriculture. The
sense of personal agency that characterized the Greeks could have been the
natural response to the genuine freedom that they experienced in their
less socially complex society.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A.
Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus
Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 303.
“Mere inertia would not result in contemporary differences in the way
people think. We propose that systems of thought exist in homeostasis with
the social practices that surround them.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I.
Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic
Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P.
304.
“Perhaps the most pervasive and important of all practices that operate to
sustain the cognitive differences are those having to do with language and
writing....”
“1. The basic writing system of Chinese and other East Asian languages has
been essentially pictographic. It can be maintained that the Western
alphabet is more atomistic and analytic by nature and ‘is a natural tool
for classifying and served as a paradigm for codified law, scientific
classification, and standardized weights and measures.’
“2. The actual grammar of Indo-European languages encourages thinking of
the world as being composed of atomistic building blocks, whereas East
Asian languages encourage thinking of the world as continuous and
interpenetrating. ‘[R]ather than one-many, the Chinese language motivates
a part-whole dichotomy.’
“3. East Asian languages are highly contextual in every sense. Because of
their multiple meanings, words must be understood in the context of
sentences. Because of the minimal nature of syntax in Sinitic languages,
context is important to understanding sentences. In contrast, Heath has
shown that language socialization for middle-class American children quite
deliberately decontextualizes language. Parents try to make words
understandable independent of verbal context and utterances understandable
independent of situational context.
“4. Although Western toddlers learn nouns at a much more rapid rate than
they learn verbs, the reverse appears to be true for Chinese. Moreover,
Western toddlers hear more noun phrases from their mothers, whereas East
Asian children hear more verbs.
“5. ‘Generic’ noun phrases–that is, those referring to categories and
kinds (e.g., ‘birds,’ ‘tools,’ as opposed to exemplars such as ‘sparrow,’
‘hammer’)–are more common for English speakers than for Chinese speakers,
perhaps because Western languages mark in a more explicit way whether a
generic interpretation of an utterance is the correct one.
“6. Consistent with the above findings about category usage, Ji and
Nisbett found that English-speaking Chinese used relationships more and
categories less when they grouped words in Chinese than when they did so
in English.
“Thus there are some good reasons to believe that social practices and
cognitive ones maintain each other in a state of equilibrium. Cognitive
practices may be highly stable because of their embeddedness in larger
systems of beliefs and social practices.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I.
Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic
Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. Pp.
304-5. First subquote is from Logan, R. 1986. The Alphabet Effect. Morrow.
P. 55. Second subquote is from Hansen, C. 1983. Language and Logic in
Ancient China. University of Michigan Press. P. vii. Reference on point 3
is to Heath, S. 1982. “What no bedtime story means: Narrative skills at
home and school. Language in Society. 11: 49-79. Reference on point 6 is
to Ji, L. & R. Nisbett. 2001. Culture, language and Categories. University
of Michigan unpublished manuscript.
“The assumption of universality of cognitive processes lies deep in the
psychological tradition. We believe that the results discussed here force
consideration of the possibility that an indefinitely large number of
presumably ‘basic’ cognitive processes may be highly malleable.” Nisbett,
Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of
Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108
(2): 291-310. P. 305.
“It is ironic that, just as our evidence indicates that some cognitive
processes are highly susceptible to cultural influence, other
investigators are providing evidence that some cognitive content may not
be very susceptible to cultural influence. Naive theories of mechanics and
physics, naive theories of biology and naive theory of mind appear so
early and are apparently so widespread that it seems quite likely that at
least some aspects of them are largely innate and resistant to social
modification.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001.
“Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.”
Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 305.
“Thus, it appears that the assumption that cognitive content is learned
and indefinitely malleable and the assumption that cognitive processes are
universally the same and biologically fixed may both be quite wrong.”
Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and
Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological
Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 306.
“We are urging the view that metaphysics, epistemology, and cognitive
processes exist in mutually dependent and reinforcing systems of thought,
such that a given stimulus situation often triggers quite different
processes in one culture than in another.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I.
Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic
Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P.
306.
“The basic premise of world-systems analysis is that historical social
systems have lives.” Lee, Richard. 2011. “The Modern World-System: Its
Structures, Its Geoculture, Its Crisis and Transformations.” Pp. 27-40.
Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins & N. Tanoukhi, Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein
and the Problem of the World. Duke University Press. P. 27.
“There was a third set of structures that were just as constitutive of the
modern world-system as those in the arenas of production and distribution
(the economic), and coercion and decision-making (the political).... The
third arena has come to be conceptualized as that of cognition and
intentionality, the structures of knowledge.” Lee, Richard. 2011. “The
Modern World-System: Its Structures, Its Geoculture, Its Crisis and
Transformations.” Pp. 27-40. Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins & N. Tanoukhi,
Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World. Duke University
Press. P. 29.
“From the beginning of the long sixteenth century, the practices of
knowledge production took the form of a complex of processes that produced
over time an intellectual and institutional hierarchy, a set of
structures, within which legitimate knowledge was progressively defined as
the ‘other’ of societal and moral values. Values, the foundations on which
the humanities have been built, could be based on ‘authorities,’ but in
the end were open and contestable, and thus relative, whereas the
universal truths produced by what eventually became the sciences were
presented as singular and not open to interpretation.” Lee, Richard. 2011.
“The Modern World-System: Its Structures, Its Geoculture, Its Crisis and
Transformations.” Pp. 27-40. Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins & N. Tanoukhi,
Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World. Duke University
Press. Pp. 29-30.
“The pursuit of objectivity, that is, the view from nowhere that canceled
agency and history, that in fact negated subjectivity however conceived,
took the form of the progressive privileging of formal rationality. This
formal rationality moved disinterested calculation to the fore as a
generalized means of instrumental action, to the detriment of substantive
rationality, the normative pursuit of specifically situated ends.” Lee,
Richard. 2011. “The Modern World-System: Its Structures, Its Geoculture,
Its Crisis and Transformations.” Pp. 27-40. Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins
& N. Tanoukhi, Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World.
Duke University Press. P. 30.
“These then are the three analytically distinct but functionally, and
existentially, inseparable structural arenas of the modern world-system:
the axial division of labor, the interstate system, and the structures of
knowledge. They define a singular ‘world.’ And that world is unique in
human history in that from the time of its emergence it has expanded to
incorporate the entire globe. It is this world, then, that constitutes the
unit of analysis of the world-systems perspective.” Lee, Richard. 2011.
“The Modern World-System: Its Structures, Its Geoculture, Its Crisis and
Transformations.” Pp. 27-40. Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins & N. Tanoukhi,
Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World. Duke University
Press. P. 32.
“‘Utopistics’ is the name Wallerstein gives to the mode of social analysis
appropriate for these times; it is a mode of analysis that privileges the
differentiation of possible from impossible alternatives for the future.
World-systems analysis, as Wallerstein himself has constantly and
consistently maintained, has always been an interpretative approach or
perspective, always taking into consideration of course that it is the
modern world-system that is the unit with which the analyst is concerned,
rather than a ‘theory’ to be proven or an explanatory or causal framework
grounding prediction.” Lee, Richard. 2011. “The Modern World-System: Its
Structures, Its Geoculture, Its Crisis and Transformations.” Pp. 27-40.
Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins & N. Tanoukhi, Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein
and the Problem of the World. Duke University Press. Pp. 38-9.
“To what extent is evolution ruled by the chance of contingency, versus
the necessity of convergence? For Gould all is contingent; for Conway
Morris, the question is, would an intelligent biped still have four
fingers and a thumb?” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria
and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 23.
“Dolphins and bats developed sonar navigation systems independently, and
we invented our own sonar system before we knew that dolphins and bats
took soundings in this way. All these systems are exquisitely complex and
beautifully adapted to needs, but the fact that each has evolved
independently on several occasions implies that the odds against their
evolution were not so very great.
“If so, then convergence outweighs contingency, or necessity overcomes
chance. As Richard Dawkins concluded, in The Ancestors Tale: ‘I am tempted
by Conway Morris’s belief that we should stop thinking of convergent
evolution as a coulourful rarity to be remarked and marvelled at when we
find it. Perhaps we should come to see it as the norm, exceptions to which
are occasions for surprise.’” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide:
Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 24.
Subquote is from Dawkins, Richard. 2004. The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage
to the Dawn of Life. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
“If you divide the luminosity of the sun by its mass, each gram of solar
mass yields about 0.0002 milliwatts of energy, which is 0.0000002 joules
of energy per gram per second. Now let’s assume that you weigh 70 kg, and
if you are anything like me you will eat about 12600 kilojoules (about
3000 calories) per day. Converting this amount of energy averages 2
millijoules per gram per second or about 2 milliwatts per gram–a factor of
10000 greater than the sun. Some energetic bacteria, such as Azotobacter,
generate as much as 10 joules per gram per second, outperforming the sun
by a factor of 50 million.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide:
Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 67.
“In an average person, ATP is produced at a rate of 9 X 1020 molecules per
second, which equates to a turnover rate (the rate at which it is produced
and consumed) of about 65 kg every day.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex,
Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P.
80.
“So the three great energy highways of life, respiration, fermentation,
and photosynthesis, all generate ATP, another profound example of the
fundamental unity of life.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide:
Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 80.
“In a broad sense, respiration generates energy using proton pumps. The
energy released by redox reactions is used to pump protons across a
membrane. The proton difference across the membrane corresponds to an
electric charge of about 150 mV. This is the proton-motive force, which
drives the ATPase motor to generate ATP, the universal energy currency of
life.
“Something very similar happens in photosynthesis. In this case, the sun’s
energy is used to pump protons across the chloroplast membrane in an
analogous fashion to respiration. Bacteria, too, function in the same way
as mitochondria, by generating a proton-motive force across their outer
cell membrane. For anyone who is not a microbiologist, there is no field
of biology more confusing than the astonishing versatility with which
bacteria generate energy. They seem to be able to glean energy from
virtually anything, from methane, to sulphur, to concrete. This
extraordinary diversity is related at a deeper level. In each case, the
principle is exactly the same: the electrons pass down a redox chain to a
terminal electron acceptor. In each case the energy derived from the redox
reactions is used to pump protons across a membrane.
“Such a deep unity is noteworthy not just for its universality, but
perhaps even more because it is such a peculiar and roundabout way of
generating energy....
“It seems that pumping protons across a membrane is as much a signature of
life on earth as DNA. It is fundamental.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex,
Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P.
91.
“Bacteria have dozens of membrane transporters, many of which use the
proton-motive force to pump nutrients into the cell, or waste products
out. Instead of using ATP to power active transport, bacteria use protons:
they hive off a little energy from the proton gradient to power active
transport....
“In short, bacteria are basically proton-powered. Even though the ATP is
said to be the universal energy currency, it isn’t used for all aspects of
the cell. Both bacterial homeostasis (the active transport of molecules in
and out of the cell) and locomotion (flagellar propulsion) depend on
proton power rather than ATP.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide:
Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. Pp. 92-3.
“To me, all this [the universality of harnessing proton gradients] hints
at the deep antiquity of proton pumping. It is the first and foremost need
of the bacterial cell, its life-support machine. It is a deeply unifying
mechanism, common to all three domains of life, and central to all forms
of respiration, to photosynthesis, and to other aspects of bacterial life,
including homeostasis and locomotion. It is in short a fundamental
property of life. And in line with this idea, there are good reasons to
think that the origin of life itself was tied to the natural energy of
proton gradients.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria and
the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 93.
“A single E. coli bacterium weighs about a trillionth of a gram.
Seventy-two cell divisions in a day corresponds to an amplification of
272, which is an increase in weight from 10-12 grams to 4000 metric tons.
In two days, the mass of exponentially doubling E. coli would be 2664
times larger than the mass of the Earth!
“Luckily this does not happen, and the reason is that bacteria are
normally half starved.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide:
Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 114.
“In other words, to thrive, bacteria must replicate their genome faster
than the competition, and to do so requires either a smaller genome or
more effective energy production.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide:
Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 115.
“Konstantinos Konstantinidis and James Tiedje, at Michigan State
University, examined all 115 fully sequenced bacterial genomes. They found
that the bacteria with the largest genomes (about 9 or 10 million letters,
encoding 9000 genes) dominate in environments where resources are scarce
but diverse, and where there is little penalty for slow growth, in
particular the soil.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria
and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 115. Reference is to
Konstandinidis, K. & J. Tiedje. “Trends between gene content and genome
size in prokaryotic species with larger genomes.” 2004. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences USA. 101: 3160-3165.
“Overall, then we see the dynamic balance of two different trends in
bacteria–the tendency to gene loss, which reduces the bacterial genome to
the smallest possible size in the prevailing conditions, and the
accumulation of new genes by means of lateral gene transfer, according to
need.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning
of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 120.
“The more we learn about bacteria, the harder it becomes to make valid
generalizations about them. In recent years, we have discovered bacteria
with straight chromosomes, with nuclei, cytoskeletons, and internal
membranes, all traits once considered to be unique prerogatives of the
eukaryotes. One of the few definitive differences that hasn’t evaporated
on closer inspection is gene number. Why is it that there are no bacteria
with more than 10 million DNA letters, when, as we noted in Chapter 1, the
single-celled eukaryote Amoeba dubia has managed to accumulate 670 billion
letters–67000 times more letters than the largest bacteria, and for that
matter 200 times more than humans? How did the eukaryotes manage to evade
the reproductive constraints imposed on bacteria? The answer that I think
gets to the heart of the matter was put forward by Tibor Vellai and Gabor
Vida in 1999, and is disarmingly simple. Bacteria are limited in their
physical size, genome content, and complexity, they say, because they are
forced to respire across their external cell membrane.” Lane, Nick. 2005.
Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford
University Press. P. 121. Reference is to Vellai, T. & G. Vida. 1999. “The
origin of eukaryotes: The difference between prokaryotic and eukaryotic
cells.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences.
266: 1571-1577.
“So bacteria are under a strong selection pressure for small size whereas
eukaryotes are not.... Whereas large size is penalized in bacteria, it
actually pays dividends in eukaryotes. For example, large size enables a
change in behaviour or lifestyle. A large energetic cell does not have to
spend all its time replicating its DNA, but can instead spend time and
energy developing an arsenal of protein weapons. It can behave like a
fungal cell, and squirt lethal enzymes onto neighbouring cells to digest
them before absorbing their juices. Or it can turn predator and live by
engulfing smaller cells whole, digesting them inside itself. Either way,
it doesn’t need to replicate quickly to stay ahead of the competition–it
can simply eat the competition.... A parallel with human society is the
larger communities made possible by farming: with more manpower, it was
possible to satisfy food production and still have enough people left over
to form an army, or invent lethal new weapons. The hunter-gathers [sic]
couldn’t sustain such a high population and were bound to lose out to the
numerous and specialized competition.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex,
Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P.
126.
“Among cells, it is interesting that predation and parasitism tend to pull
in opposite directions. As a rule of thumb, parasites are regressive in
character, and in this regard the eukaryotic parasites are no exception.”
Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of
Life. Oxford University Press. P. 126.
“So phagocytosis is made possible by three factors: the ability to change
shape (which requires losing the cell wall, then developing a far more
dynamic cytoskeleton); sufficiently large size to physically engulf prey;
and a plentiful supply of energy.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide:
Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 127.
“In the world of replicating systems, however, a system is stable (in the
sense of being persistent and maintaining a presence) if it does react–to
make more of itself, and those replicating entities that are more
reactive, in that they are better at making more of themselves, are more
stable (in the sense of being persistent) than those that aren’t. This is
almost a paradox–greater stability is associated with greater reactivity.
We therefore call the kind of stability associated with replicating
systems a dynamic kinetic stability.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How
Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 73.
“In 1989, Richard Dawkins alluded to a fundamental law of nature which
applies to both the biological as well as the broader physicochemical
world: the survival of the most stable.... Once it is evident that matter
is not immutable, that it is susceptible to chemical change, then it
necessarily follows that matter will tend to be transformed from less
persistent to more persistent forms, in other words, from less stable to
more stable.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes
Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 76. Reference is to Dawkins, Richard.
1989. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press.
“... Darwinism did bring about a sense of unity within biology, but the
troubling consequence of that unification, of enormous value in itself,
has been a growing isolation of the subject from the physical sciences to
which it must necessarily connect.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How
Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 117.
“But the chemistry-biology nexus runs much deeper. Ecology is an
established branch of biology and would seem to be quite unrelated to
chemistry. However, as Gerald Joyce, the remarkable Scripps biochemist,
reported in 2009, there is an intimate connection between the two. A key
ecological principle, termed the competitive exclusion principle, states:
‘Complete competitors cannot exist’ or, expressed in its positive form:
‘Ecological differentiation is the necessary condition for coexistence.’”
Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford
University Press. P. 128. Reference is to Joyce, Gerald & S. Voytek. 2009.
“Niche partitioning in the coevolution of two distinct RNA.” PNAS. 106:
7780-5.
“But here’s the important point. Manfred Eigen and Peter Schuster
discovered that the population of replicating RNAs that is generated by
this exploration of the fitness landscape does not consist of one single
sequence, but rather a population of RNAs of differing sequences, centred
around the most successful sequence (termed the wild type) within that
population. This population of varied sequences was termed a quasispecies....”
Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford
University Press. P. 143. Reference is to Eigen, M. & P. Schuster. 1979.
The Hypercycle: A Principle of Natural Self-Organization. Springer-Verlag.
“Thermodynamic stability is an intrinsic property of any system and is
measured in closed systems, in which energy and resources are continually
supplied. That makes comparisons of DKS [dynamic kinetic stability] highly
problematic....
“Despite the difficulties we’ve discussed in our ability to formally
quantify DKS, two crude measures of DKS are actually available. These are
the steady-state population number for a given replicating entity and the
length of time that the replicating population has managed to maintain
itself.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology.
Oxford University Press. Pp. 145-7.
“In the case of replicating systems and their clear tendency to become
transformed into more effective replicating systems, the driving force can
now be identified as the drive toward greater DKS. In other words, the
biological term ‘maximizing fitness’ is just the biological expression of
the more fundamental and more ‘physical concept–maximizing DKS.” Pross,
Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University
Press. P. 148.
“... DNA does not just catalyse its own formation. Through the processes
of transcription into messenger RNA and the subsequent translation of the
messenger RNA sequence into an amino acid sequence (proteins), it also
acts as a catalyst, a catalyst for the synthesis of other materials....
Change the DNA sequence and you end up with a different protein structure.
What that means therefore is that DNA is not just an autocatalyst, but
also a highly specific catalyst.... A moment’s thought suggests therefore
that the term ‘information in its biological context is just ‘specific
catalysis’ when considered in a chemical context.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What
is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. Pp.
151-2.
“We see then that the material world can in some sense be subdivided into
two parallel worlds–the ‘regular’ chemical world and the replicative
world.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology.
Oxford University Press. P. 155.
“In fact, the moment some non-metabolic (downhill) [he equates metabolic
here with energy-gathering] replicator acquired an energy-gathering
capability, could be thought of as the moment that life began. At that
moment the replicating system would be free to pursue its replicating
‘agenda’ despite associated energy costs, and significantly, through the
incorporation of that energy-gathering system the conflicting requirements
of DKS and the Second Law would be accommodated.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What
is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 158.
“... in regular chemistry matter is stable if it doesn’t react. But in the
world of replicating systems, matter is stable (in the sense of being
persistent) if it does react, to make more of itself.” Pross, Addy. 2012.
What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P.
163.
“Biology then is just a particularly complex kind of replicative chemistry
and the living state can be thought of as a new state of matter, the
replicative state of matter, whose properties derive from the special kind
of stability that characterizes replicating entities–DKS. That leads to
the following working definition of life: a self-sustaining kinetically
stable dynamic reaction network derived from the replication reaction.”
Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford
University Press. Pp. 163-4.
“As already stated, in the world of replicators the stability that matters
is DKS and not thermodynamic stability. And why is it that those entities
that are stable in a DKS sense are invariably unstable in a thermodynamic
sense? Simply, because DKS depends on the system continually reacting in
order to replicate, to make more of itself, and that actually requires the
system to be reactive, to be unstable.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life?
How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 168.
“The topology of the world of replicating systems is inherently
divergent.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes
Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 173.
“What we classify as individual living entities may themselves be thought
of as components of a network–the ever-expanding life network.” Pross,
Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University
Press. P. 186.
“So a biosphere that has overwhelmed our planet should not be interpreted
in terms of an invasion by billions of individual life forms, but by an
ever-expanding living network.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How
Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 189.
“The many definitions [of “political ecology”] together suggest that
political ecology represents an explicit alternative to ‘apolitical’
ecology, that it works from a common set of assumptions, and that it
employs a reasonably consistent mode of explanation.” Robbins, Paul. 2004.
“Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction. Blackwell Publishing. P. 5.
“The first lesson to draw is that the dominant contemporary accounts of
environmental crisis and ecological change (ecoscarcity and modernization)
tend to ignore the significant influence of political economic forces. As
we shall see, this is to ignore the most fundamental problems in
contemporary ecology. The other lesson is that apolitical ecologies,
regardless of claims to even-handed objectivity, are implicitly political.
It is not so much that political ecology is ‘more political’ than these
other approaches to the environment. Rather it is simply more explicit in
its normative goals and more outspoken about the assumptions from which
its research is conducted.” Robbins, Paul. 2004. “Political Ecology: A
Critical Introduction. Blackwell Publishing. P. 11.
“Indeed, as political ecologists continually emphasize, the environment is
not a malleable thing outside of human beings, or a tablet on which to
write history, but instead a produced set of relationships that include
people, who, more radically, are themselves produced.” Robbins, Paul.
2004. “Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction. Blackwell Publishing.
P. 209.
“For geographers, this process of categorization (binary or otherwise) is
of particular interest because basic themes within our particular subject
matter – environment, space and place – are frequently used in creating
collective and personal identities. Many of us identify with places, at a
variety of scales – from our home, through our street and neighbourhood,
town and region, up to a nation-state. In part, we are who we are because
of what places we choose to associate with.” Cloke, Paul & R. Johnston.
“Deconstructing Human Geography’s Binaries.” From Cloke, Paul & R.
Johnston, Eds. 2005. Spaces of Geographical Thought. SAGE Publications.
Pp. 1-20. P. 2.
“The aim of this book is to argue that the mind-body problem is not just a
local problem, having to do with the relation between mind, brain, and
behavior in living animal organisms, but that it invades our understanding
of the entire cosmos and its history.” Nagel, Thomas. 2012. Mind and
Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost
Certainly False. Oxford University Press. P. 3.
“As the plank-moving studies illustrate, affordances are different for
every kind of perception-action system, whether that is a system of an
individual completing a task with only their body, or an individual
completing a task with tools, or pairs of individuals completing a task.
Research on tool use in solo action offers an important demonstration of
the consequences of embedding for the individual. When we take up a tool,
for instance, it becomes a part of our perception-action system, extending
our body’s boundaries and allowing us to capitalize on other affordances
of our environment.” Marsh, Kerry, L. Johnston, M. Richardson & R.
Schmidt. 2009. “Toward a radically embodied, embedded social psychology.”
European Journal of Social Psychology. 39: 1217-1225. Pp.. 1218-9.
“We hypothesize that becoming a temporary unit of social action with
another person also involves creation of a new perception-action system
with new capabilities. The individual becomes embedded in a social unit,
with a reality of its own. By engaging in joint perception or joint action
with another, our actions serve to impact and define the social unit of
which we are a part, and in turn our actions are constrained and channeled
by participation in this relationship or group.” Marsh, Kerry, L.
Johnston, M. Richardson & R. Schmidt. 2009. “Toward a radically embodied,
embedded social psychology.” European Journal of Social Psychology. 39:
1217-1225. P. 1219.
“Importantly, the patterns of behavior that occur between two individuals,
rocking independently in separate chairs–with no mechanical linkages, only
informational links–obey the same universal dynamics as coupled components
(arms) within a single body.” Marsh, Kerry, L. Johnston, M. Richardson &
R. Schmidt. 2009. “Toward a radically embodied, embedded social
psychology.” European Journal of Social Psychology. 39: 1217-1225. P.
1219.
“The challenge to the normal way of thinking is to take rather seriously
that causality resides at the level of the interaction, rather than in our
head.” Marsh, Kerry, L. Johnston, M. Richardson & R. Schmidt. 2009.
“Toward a radically embodied, embedded social psychology.” European
Journal of Social Psychology. 39: 1217-1225. P. 1220.
“Someone touches us on the shoulder, calls our name, or a passing stranger
glances at us, and this is a catalyst, a rapid switching mechanism for
switching from an autonomous individual mode of action to being pulled
temporarily into a ‘social eddy’ with another, a dynamic patterning, a
dance that includes rich nonverbal (and perhaps verbal) behavior,
responsivity, mutuality, and coordination of behavior.” Marsh, Kerry, L.
Johnston, M. Richardson & R. Schmidt. 2009. “Toward a radically embodied,
embedded social psychology.” European Journal of Social Psychology. 39:
1217-1225. P. 1222.
“Converging evidence from neurophysiology, neuropsychology and
experimental psychology suggests that there are multiple representations
of space, each with its own properties, but in a simplified manner, we can
distinguish between three spatial representations originating from the
body: the space covering the surface of our body (personal space), the
space immediately surrounding our body (peripersonal space) and the space
that falls far away from our body and it is unreachable by a simple arm
movement (extrapersonal space).” Costantini, Marcello, E. Ambrosini, G.
Tieri, C. Sinigaglia & G. Committeri. 2010. “Where does an object trigger
an action? An investigation about affordances in space.” Exp Brain
Research. 207:95-103. P. 96.
“Another feature is equally important: systems are not inherently closed.
They have a relative stability and thus an organizational closure, but at
the same time they are open for influences from their surroundings.”
Rosslenbroich, Bernd. 2011. “Outline of a concept for organismic systems
biology.” Seminars in Cancer Biology. 21: 156-164. P. 158.
“... a system is relatively closed as well as relatively open at the same
time. Coincidences of this type, where two opposing principles are present
simultaneously, are a typical feature of organic life and can be found in
many other examples as well.” Rosslenbroich, Bernd. 2011. “Outline of a
concept for organismic systems biology.” Seminars in Cancer Biology. 21:
156-164. P. 158.
“Similarly, we now understand that in terms of both numbers and genetic
diversity, the microbial world not only dominates the biosphere but is
almost impossible to sample properly. This point is, of course, even more
emphatically made if one includes in this calculation the virosphere,
which we regard as an intrinsic aspect of the microbial world, not to be
separated from it.” Woese, Carl & N. Goldenfeld. 2009. “How the Microbial
World Saved Evolution from the Scylla of Molecular Biology and the
Charybdis of the Modern Synthesis.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology
Reviews. 73(1):14-21. P. 16.
“Biology is a study, not in being, but in becoming.... A discipline whose
perspective is that of classical 19th century physics is inherently
incapable of dealings with the problems of a nonlinear world, which is
nonreductionist, non-deterministic (acausal), and works in terms of fields
and emergent properties, not a static world of particles with linear
relationships among them....
“Thus, in the early decades of the 20th century, molecular biology’s
fundamental reductionist perspective was innocuous–especially when there
were many problems that could benefit from a (simple) reductionist
approach. It was another thing altogether when molecular biology began
reconceptualizing biology in an exclusively reductionist fashion.” Woese,
Carl & N. Goldenfeld. 2009. “How the Microbial World Saved Evolution from
the Scylla of Molecular Biology and the Charybdis of the Modern
Synthesis.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 73(1):14-21. P.
17.
“We have seen that molecular biology, the dominant biological discipline
of the time, did not even recognize the evolutionary process as a
scientific problem. Given its overview, molecular biology took evolution
simply as biological epiphenomenology, ‘historical accident’–which means
that evolutionary considerations have no bearing whatsoever on any
fundamental understanding of living systems.” Woese, Carl & N. Goldenfeld.
2009. “How the Microbial World Saved Evolution from the Scylla of
Molecular Biology and the Charybdis of the Modern Synthesis.” Microbiology
and Molecular Biology Reviews. 73(1):14-21. P. 18.
“What makes the treatment of evolution by biologists of the last century
insufferable scientifically is not the modern synthesis per se. Rather, it
is the fact that molecular biology accepted the synthesis as a complete
theory unquestioningly–thereby giving the impression that evolution was
essentially a solved scientific problem with its roots lying only within
the molecular paradigm.” Woese, Carl & N. Goldenfeld. 2009. “How the
Microbial World Saved Evolution from the Scylla of Molecular Biology and
the Charybdis of the Modern Synthesis.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology
Reviews. 73(1):14-21. P. 18.
“Despite the growing consensus in many disciplines about the important
role that the material world plays in the structuring of human cognitive
operations the precise question of the causal efficacy of things in the
human cognitive system, has, surprisingly, evoked limited collaboration
between archaeology, anthropology and neuroscience. This attitude of what
we may call ‘epistemic neglect of the object’, is symptomatic of a more
general tendency in the mainstream cognitive sciences to leave material
culture outside the cognitive equation proper. Even embodied and situated
perspectives in cognitive science, which explicitly recognize the
intrinsic relationship between brain/body and environment, often seem
oblivious to the actual material medium that envelops and shapes our
lives.” Malafouris, Lambros. 2010. “The brain-artefact interface (BAI): a
challenge for archaeology and cultural neuroscience.” SCAN. 5, 264-273. P.
265.
“Lastly, new imaging data show that neural circuits supporting stone
toolmaking partially overlap with language circuits, which suggests that
these behaviors share a foundation in more general human capacities for
complex, goal-directed action and are likely to have evolved in a mutually
reinforcing way.” Malafouris, Lambros. 2010. “The brain-artefact interface
(BAI): a challenge for archaeology and cultural neuroscience.” SCAN. 5,
264-273. P. 267.
“However, as Ludwik Fleck observed in 1935, ‘every new finding raises at
least one new problem: namely an investigation of what has just been
found’. New knowledge, in turn, allows for new options without delivering
secure criteria for how these new options need to be handled.
“The contemporary explosion of knowledge or the observation that our
current age is the beginning of a knowledge society thus has a little
remarked on corollary: new knowledge also means more ignorance. Thus,
surprising events will occur more frequently and become more and more
likely. If this is the case, handling ignorance and surprise becomes one
of the distinctive features of decision making in contemporary society.”
Gross, Matthias. 2010. Ignorance and Surprise: Science, Society, and
Ecological Design. MIT Press. P. 1. Reference is to Fleck, Ludwick. 1935
(1979). Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. University of
Chicago Press. P. 51.
“I believe that both interpretations–the one that claims that precaution
means paralysis and the one that says that precaution must be a key
feature in regulatory politics–have not dealt seriously with the
importance of ignorance and surprise. The critics ascribe a ‘better safe
than sorry’ attitude to the precautionary principle and recommend turning
back to cost-and-benefit analyses and risk assessments based on known
facts, thus ignoring the inevitability of uncertainty and ignorance.
Proponents of the precautionary principle have not yet delivered any
effective strategies for determining what exactly is to be done when
decisions have to be made promptly and risk assessments or computer models
cannot help in any meaningful way.” Gross, Matthias. 2010. Ignorance and
Surprise: Science, Society, and Ecological Design. MIT Press. P. 4.
“Hans-Jorg Rheinberger has argued that what makes the physical, technical,
and procedural basis for an experiment work is that it is deliberately
arranged to generate surprises.” Gross, Matthias. 2010. Ignorance and
Surprise: Science, Society, and Ecological Design. MIT Press. P. 5.
“In the following, a surprising event is understood as an occurrence that
triggers awareness of one’s own ignorance.” Gross, Matthias. 2010.
Ignorance and Surprise: Science, Society, and Ecological Design. MIT
Press. P. 5.
“Although there has been no consensus on a full definition for the word
‘niche’, a general description of the concept illustrates the key
underlying idea: a niche is a (hyper-) volume in a set of dimensions which
expresses the capability of a species to exploit resources.” Wennekes,
Paul, J. Rosindell & R. Etienne. 2012. “The Neutral–Niche Debate: A
Philosophical Perspective.” Acta Biotheor. 60:257-271. P. 261.
“Each species has a fundamental niche, which is the n-dimensional space in
which they can theoretically survive. However, most species will have
competitors whose niches may partially or wholly overlap their own. The
species that is more efficient in the overlapping part of their
fundamental niches will, in a process which is known as niche partitioning
or competitive exclusion, attempt to exclude the other species by
outcompeting them. This can lead to two scenarios; either one species will
win and the other will go extinct, or, in a reaction to the evolutionary
pressure, one or both species may undergo a change in specialization away
from the contested part (character displacement), effectively reducing the
niche-overlap between the two species, thus avoiding extinction. The
realized niche of a species is the part of their fundamental niche that
they actually occupy.” Wennekes, Paul, J. Rosindell & R. Etienne. 2012.
“The Neutral–Niche Debate: A Philosophical Perspective.” Acta Biotheor.
60:257-271. Pp. 261-2.
“The biosphere is dominated, in terms of both physical abundance and
genetic diversity, by primitive life forms, prokaryotes and viruses. These
ubiquitous organisms evolve in ways unimaginable and unforeseen in
classical evolutionary biology.... We now think of the entire world of
prokaryotes as a single, huge network of interconnected gene pools, and
the notion of the prokaryotic pangenome is definitely here to stay.”
Koonin, Eugene. 2009. “The Origin at 150: is a new evolutionary synthesis
in sight?” Trends in Genetics. Vol 25 (11) 473-5. P. 473.
“In general, the species concept does not apply to prokaryotes and is of
dubious validity for unicellular eukaryotes as well.” Koonin, Eugene.
2009. “The Origin at 150: is a new evolutionary synthesis in sight?”
Trends in Genetics. Vol 25 (11) 473-5. P. 474.
“Like the universal genetic code, the Krebs cycle and the ATP,
chemiosmosis is universal to all life, and appears to have been a property
of the last universal common ancestor, LUCA.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life
Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 31.
“And the great advantage of a gradient is that a single reaction can be
repeated again and again just to generate one single ATP molecule. If one
particular reaction releases a hundredth of the energy needed to generate
one ATP, the reaction is simply repeated a hundred times, building up the
gradient step by step until the proton reservoir is big enough to generate
a single ATP. Suddenly the cell can save up; it has a pocket full of small
change.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of
Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 32.
“Acids are defined in terms of protons: an acid is rich in protons, an
alkali poor. So bubbling alkaline fluids into acidic oceans produces a
natural proton gradient. In other words the mineral cells in Russell’s
alkaline vents are naturally chemiosmotic.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life
Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 32.
“This paints an extraordinary portrait of the last common ancestor of all
life on earth. If Martin and Russell are right–and I think they are–she
was not a free-living cell but a rocky labyrinth of mineral cells, lined
with catalytic walls composed of iron, sulphur and nickel, and energised
by natural proton gradients. The first life was porous rock that generated
complex molecules and energy, right up to the formation of proteins and
DNA itself.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of
Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 33. Reference is to Russell, M.J., & W.
Martin. 2004. “The rocky roots of the acetyl CoA pathway.” Trends in
Biochemical Sciences. 29:358-63.
“Predation escalates size, of course, driving arms races between predator
and prey.... With oxygen, then, predation pays; and with predators size
pays. So oxygen makes large organisms not just feasible but also
probable.”
“It also helps build them. The protein that gives animals their tensile
strength is collagen. This is the main protein of all connective tissues,
whether calcified in bones, teeth and shells, or ‘naked’ in ligaments,
tendons, cartilage and skin. Collagen is by far the most abundant protein
in mammals, making up a remarkable 25 per cent of total body protein....
Collagen is composed of some unusual building blocks, which require free
oxygen to form cross-links between adjacent protein fibres, giving the
overall structure a high tensile strength. The requirement for free oxygen
means that large animals, protected with shells or strong skeletons, could
only evolve when atmospheric oxygen levels were high enough to support
collagen production ...
“Is oxygen necessary to give strength or just a random ingredient that
happened to be incorporated and then forever remained part of the recipe?
We don’t really know, but it’s striking that higher plants, too, need free
oxygen to form their structural support, in the shape of the immensely
strong polymer lignin, which gives wood its flexible strength. Lignin is
formed in a chemically haphazard way, using free oxygen to form strong
cross-links between chains.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten
Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. Pp. 62-3.
“... there is around 26,000 times more ‘dead’ organic carbon trapped in
the earth’s crust than in the entire living biosphere. Each atom of carbon
is the antithesis of a molecule of oxygen in the air.... So far, despite
our vainglorious efforts to burn all the known reserves of fossil fuels,
we have lowered the oxygen content of the air by a mere two or three parts
per million, or about 0.001 per cent.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending:
The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 64.
“Once they had adopted the phagocytic way of life, eukaryotes were no
longer bound by the endless drudgery of bacterial life, and specifically
the need to streamline themselves for fast replication. Eukaryotes didn’t
have to compete with bacteria; they could just eat them and digest them
within, at their leisure. Freed from the need for speed, those first
eukaryotes could accumulate DNA and genes, giving them scope for
enormously greater complexity. Jumping genes helped swell eukaryotic
genomes up to thousands of times the normal bacterial size.” Lane, Nick.
2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton &
Co. P. 116.
“What is startling is that meiosis begins by duplicating all the
chromosomes, to give four sets per cell. These are then mixed and
matched–the technical term is ‘recombined’–to generate four entirely new
chromosomes, each one taking a bit from here and a bit from there.
Recombination is the real heart of sex.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending:
The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 126.
“The great advantage of sex is that it allows good genes to recombine away
from the junk residing in their genetic backgrounds, while at once
preserving a great deal of the hidden genetic variability in populations.”
Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution.
W.W. Norton & Co. P. 139.
“Intriguingly, the fossil record points to a rather abrupt change in
complexity following the greatest mass extinction in the history of our
planet, that at the end of the Permian period, 250 million years ago, when
95 per cent of all species are thought to have vanished. After this great
extinction wiped the slate clean, nothing was ever the same again.
“The world was complex enough before the Permian, of course. On land there
were giant trees, ferns, scorpions, dragonflies, amphibians, reptiles. The
seas were full of trilobites, fish, sharks, ammonites, lampshells, sea
lilies and corals. A cursory inspection might suggest that some of these
‘types’ have changed, but that the ecosystems were not so very different;
yet a detailed inventory says otherwise.
“The complexity of an ecosystem can be estimated by the relative number of
species: if a handful of species dominate, and the rest carve out a
marginal existence, then the ecosystem is said to be simple. But if large
numbers of species coexist together in similar numbers, then the ecosystem
is far more complex, with a much wider web of interactions between
species. By totting up the number of species living together at any one
time in the fossil record, it’s possible to come up with an ‘index’ of
complexity, and the results are somewhat surprising. Rather than a gradual
accrual of complexity over time, it seems there was a sudden gearshift
after the great Permian extinction. Before the extinction, for some 300
million years, marine ecosystems had been split roughly fifty-fifty
between the simple and complex; afterwards, complex systems outweighed
simple ones by three to one, a stable and persistent change that has
lasted another 250 million years to this day. So rather than gradual
change there was a sudden switch. Why?
“According to palaeontologist Peter Wagner, at the Field Museum of Natural
History in Chicago, the answer is the spread of motile organisms. The
shift took the oceans from a world that was largely anchored to the
spot–lampshells, sea lilies, and so on, filtering food for a meagre
low-energy living–to a new, more active world, dominated by animals that
move around, even if as inchingly as snails, urchins and crabs. Plenty of
animals moved around before the extinction, of course, but only afterwards
did they become dominant. Why this gearshift took place after the Permian
mass extinction is unknown, but might perhaps relate to the greater
‘buffering’ against the world that comes with a motile lifestyle. If you
move around, you often encounter rapidly changing environments, and so you
need greater physical resilience. So it could be that the more motile
animals had an edge in surviving the drastic environmental changes that
accompanied the apocalypse. The doomed filter feeders had nothing to
cushion them against the blow.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten
Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. Pp. 145-6.
“So motility brings with it a need to deal with rapidly changing
environments, more interactions between plants and other animals, new
lifestyles like predation, and more complex ecosystems. All these factors
encouraged the development of better senses and a faster pace of
evolution, simply to keep up, not just among animals, but among many
plants too.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of
Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 147.
“Sight is quite a rarity. Eyes are absent, at least in a conventional
sense, from the plant kingdom, as well as from the fungi, algae and
bacteria. Even in the animal kingdom eyes are not at all common property.
There are said to be thirty-eight fundamentally different models of body
plan – phyla – in the animal kingdom, yet only six of them ever invented
true eyes....
“If we add them all up, we find that 95 per cent of all animal species
have eyes: the handful of phyla that did invent eyes utterly dominates
animal life today.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great
Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 172.
“For now let’s just note that sight gives far more information about the
world than smell, hearing, or touch possibly can, for the earth is
drenched in light, and we can hardly avoid being seen. Many of the most
marvellous adaptations of life are a response to being seen, whether
strutting for sex in the case of a peacock or a flower, parading the great
armoured plates of a stegosaurus, or careful concealment in the world of a
stick insect.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions
of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 173.
“The human retina consumes even more oxygen than the brain, per gram,
making it the most energetic organ in the body,...” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life
Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P.
175.
“The cost of living for a mammal in the cold is a hundred times that of a
lizard. Even in temperate conditions, say around 20° C, a pleasant spring
day in much of Europe, the gap is huge, around thirtyfold. To support such
a prodigious metabolic rate, the mammal must burn up thirty times more
food than a reptile. It must eat as much in a single day, every single
day, as a lizard eats in a whole month. Given that there’s no such thing
as a free lunch, that’s a pretty serious cost.
“So there it is: the cost of being a mammal or a bird starts at around ten
times the cost of being a lizard and is often far higher. What do we get
for our expensive lifestyle? The obvious answer is niche expansion. While
hot blood may not pay in the desert, it enables nocturnal foraging, or an
active existence over winter in temperate climates, both of which are
denied to lizards.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great
Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 209.
“The onset of hot-bloodedness in the development of animals today lends
support to the idea that hot blood is more about turbocharging visceral
organs than heat production.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten
Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 214.
“It is then most significant that one of the things that the cosmologies
of Plato and Newton have in common is that they lack the notion of
evolution, in either the biological or the astronomical sense. Stuck with
a universe in which past and future cannot fundamentally differ from each
other, we see how those things that we now understand as born and bound in
time are instead set as timeless oppositions. Thus, both Plato’s myth [The
Statesman, pilot of the universe with hand on the rudder] and Newton’s
universe are framed in terms of a duality in which the intelligence of a
god who exists outside the universe is forever opposed to the imagined
tendency of material things to disintegrate to chaos.” Smolin, Lee. 1997.
The Life of the Cosmos. Oxford University Press. P. 143.
“In biology textbooks one reads that a living thing is something that
shares the characteristics of metabolism, reproduction, and growth. There
are, however, two problems with such a definition. The first is that it is
not very insightful; it tells us nothing, for example, about why those
characteristics are often found together, or about why things with these
characteristics exist in the universe. The second problem is that any
definition of life that may be applied to a single organism gives the
false impression that a solitary living thing could exist in our
universe.”
“In the first chapter, we examined the image of the warm, living Earth in
the midst of a cold and dead cosmos, and we have since seen the extent to
which this is an absurd idea. The same problems hold, even more strongly
and clearly for the notion of a living thing in isolation. Certainly on
Earth we never find a tree or an animal living alone on an otherwise dead
island. Instead, we know of no place on or even near the surface of the
Earth that does not contain life of some kind. Thus, the one planet we
know which is not dead is not just a rock decorated with life in a few
corners. It is a planet teeming with life.
“Of course, we don’t have access to any other life except on our own
planet. But it is impossible that a single individual of any of the
species with which we are familiar could live alone on any planet. It is
almost equally difficult to imagine a planet populated by only one
species. The reason is that each species plays a role in the great cycles
that circulate material around the biosphere. We breath in oxygen and
exhale carbon monoxide. Plants do the opposite, freeing the oxygen in
carbon dioxide for our later use. We could not survive very long without
plants for the elementary reason that all of the free oxygen now in the
biosphere was rather recently produced by them.
“This holds, not only for the oxygen we breath, but for the nutrients we
eat, and for the other gases in the atmosphere: the nitrogen, carbon, and
so forth. The life of any plant or animal cannot then be usefully
conceived, except as embedded in the great system of the biosphere. This
is particularly true if what we are interested in is a conception of life
that could be useful for our project of understanding why life exists from
the framework of physics and cosmology.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of
the Cosmos. Oxford University Press. Pp. 145-6.
“For example, when a species becomes extinct, those that eat it are in big
trouble, as are those that live in it, while those it eats are suddenly in
a different situation. In many cases, this is all; only a few other
species are affected by the extinction. But in some cases many species
will be affected, for example, if that species produced a waste product,
like oxygen, that is necessary for the life of many other species.
“By modeling the effects of mutations and extinctions in such a complex
network of relationships, Bak, Kauffman, and others have found that
collective effects dominate the patterns of extinction and successful
mutations, so that the evolution of the biosphere can only be understood
as a single, coupled system.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of the Cosmos.
Oxford University Press. P. 150.
“We may then turn to the first part of the definition [of life: “A living
system is a self-organized non-equilibrium system ...”] and ask what
conditions are necessary for the universe to contain self-organized,
non-equilibrium systems. The answer is that either their existence is
transitory, so that sooner or later the whole universe will come to
equilibrium, or the universe as a whole must itself be a self-organized,
non-equilibrium system. The reason for this is that it is impossible to
have a self-organized, non-equilibrium system which exists permanently
inside of a larger system which is itself in thermal equilibrium. It is
not hard to see why. Part of the definition of a self-organized,
non-equilibrium system is that it has a flow of energy through it. The
energy enters the system at one point from the outside, which we may call
the source, and leaves at another, which we may call the sink. Now, it
follows from elementary ideas about heat that the source and the sink must
be at different temperatures; in particular the source must be hotter than
the sink. This is because of the simple fact that heat flows from hot
regions to cold regions.
“This means that the source and the sink cannot themselves be parts of a
single system in thermal equilibrium because, if they were, they would be
at the same temperature and no heat would flow. As the source and the sink
are parts of the environment surrounding our self-organized,
non-equilibrium system, this means that the environment cannot itself be
in equilibrium.”
“This is the case with every living organism on Earth. We live because we
can take in energy that is at a higher temperature than the heat that we
relinquish to our environments.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of the
Cosmos. Oxford University Press. P. 158.
“We look around and see that our universe is beautiful and that, with its
enormous variety of phenomena spread out over every scale from the nuclear
to the cosmological, it resembles more the ancient city than the modern
shopping center. Could this beautiful universe be the result of the
construction of a single planner? Certainly, it is difficult to imagine
any human planner choosing the laws of nature carefully enough to result
in a universe with such a variety of phenomena. Indeed, as we saw in
earlier chapters, to choose the laws of physics so that such a variety of
phenomena results, let alone so that the universe is not simply a gas in
equilibrium, requires that many parameters be finely tuned, some to as
many as sixty decimal places. Of course, God is imagined to have infinite
power, and we cannot limit what might be possible for him. But exactly for
this reason, if we believe in the picture of a universe made by the
providential choice of an eternal and fundamental theory, must we not also
believe in God?
“On the other hand, perhaps for the first time in human history, we know
enough to imagine how a universe like ours might have come to be without
the infinite intelligence and foresight of a god. For is it not
conceivable that the universe is as we find it to be because it made
itself; because the order, structure and beauty we see reflected at every
scale are the manifestations of a continual process of self-organization,
of self-tuning, that has acted over very long periods of time? If such a
picture can be constructed, it may be possible to understand the fact that
the universe has structure and phenomena at every scale, not as some
enormous accident or coincidence requiring the fundamental theory to be so
finely tuned, but merely as evidence that the maker of the universe is
nothing more or less than the random and statistical process of its own
self-organization.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of the Cosmos. Oxford
University Press. P. 176.
“How is it possible for us to discover any truth that is true always? The
only reasonable answer to this question, which really just emphasizes
Kant’s point in a different way, is that mathematical and logical truths
may be true for all time because they are not really about anything that
exists. They are only about possible relations. Thus, it is a mistake–a
kind of category error–to imagine that the theorems of mathematics are
about some ‘other’ or ‘Platonic’ realm that exists outside of time. The
theorems of mathematics are outside of time because they are not about the
real. On the contrary, anything that exists must exist inside of time.
“If we insist that existence means existence bounded by time, we can
reverse the trap that the old metaphysics imposed on us, in which all that
really exists–the true Being–exists only eternally, while those things
that exist in time are only appearances, only faint reflections of what is
really real. If existence requires time, then there is no need and no
place for Being, for the absolute and transcendent Platonic world. That
which exists is what we find in the world. And that which exists is bound
by time, because to exist something must be created by processes that act
in time to create the novel out of what existed before.” Smolin, Lee.
1997. The Life of the Cosmos. Oxford University Press. P. 188.
“To be bothered by this [liar’s paradox, Goedel’s theorem], we must think
of mathematics as some timeless reality, such that anything that is true
about it is true forever. If we stick to the view that logic and
mathematics are about nothing, and that all that exists is bound in time,
then these difficulties may be seen in a different light. If we construct
a real system, say a computer or a living thing, that is capable of
self-reference, then what we have done is to construct a feedback loop.
Self-reference in a real entity must exactly be the possibility that its
state at the next moment is a function of its state now. In a real system,
which can have only one state at a time, self-reference must be understood
as something that happens in time.
“As we saw in the last few chapters, feedback is an essential element of
any process of self-organization. And processes of self-organization are
what gives our world structure. Thus, self-reference, which leads to
paradox when we try to envision knowledge as timeless, leads instead to
structure and organization when it is realized as a real process that acts
over time in the real world.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of the Cosmos.
Oxford University Press. P. 189.
“Thus, belief in a final theory shares with a belief in a god the idea
that the ultimate cause of things in this world is something that does not
live in the world but has an existence that, somehow, transcends it. This
is why the belief in god and belief in the existence in a final theory are
both related to the metaphysical idea that what is really true about the
world is true about a timeless transcendent realm and not about the world
of the things we see around us.
“There is still another issue that arises if we aim to give up on the idea
that the goal of physics is the discovery of a final theory, in which the
properties of the elementary particles are fixed by first principles,
independent of the history of the universe. For it might seem that if we
give up on the idea that there is a single final theory, we may also be
giving up on the possibility of gaining a complete and objective
description of the world. Is it possible then to have objective knowledge,
if that knowledge does not tell us how the world of appearances is
constructed out of what ultimately exists?
“I would like to argue that the answer to this question is, in fact, yes.
It is, to begin with, not really the case that the aspiration to discover
the final theory, or apprehend the true Being, has really helped the
project of gaining objective knowledge. It is true that it is often
presumed that objective knowledge, to the extent that it is possible, is
knowledge of some absolute reality that lies beyond the subjective
appearances. But it seems to me that to equate the world of appearances
with the subjective is to make a kind of category error. What we have
given to us, from which we will deduce all possible knowledge, is nothing
other than the appearances of the world. If objective knowledge exists at
all, must it not be knowledge about the world of appearances? Must it not
then be possible to construct or deduce any real knowledge from the
appearances alone? Do we, as observers who live in the world, have any
other choice?
“The idea that objective knowledge must be about something other than the
appearances carries with it a presumption that it is possible to imagine a
view or a picture of the world that is somehow more true than the views of
human observers. Such a view would not be limited to the incomplete and
incompletely reliable views of observers present in the world. It might be
a view of the world in its entirety, as it is.
“But such a view cannot be the view of any real observer living in the
world. It could only be the view of some imagined being who is outside the
world. In this way the idea that there is a world behind the appearances,
an absolute Being, a world as it is, carries with it, in every context in
which it appears, the dream that there is a view of the world from outside
of it. And if one subscribes to this dream, then it is clear that the
ultimate justification for objective knowledge must lie not in any
incomplete view from inside the world, but in this all encompassing view
from the outside. Thus, if one believes in the possibility of this view
from outside the world, one is led to identify objective knowledge with
knowledge of the absolute world behind the appearances. All other
knowledge is at best incomplete and tainted by subjectivity.
“If such a view were possible, then we would certainly like to aspire to
it, for we would all like to have a kind of knowledge which is liberated
from our situation, just as, indeed, we would all like not to die. The
questions is then, is such a view possible? Or, at least, is it
conceivable?
“I do not think that such a view can be achieved; we can learn this from
both relativity theory and quantum theory.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of
the Cosmos. Oxford University Press. Pp. 199-200.
“Thus the metaphor of the universe we are trying now to imagine, which I
would like to set against the picture of the universe as a clock, is an
image of the universe as a city, as an endless negotiation, an endless
construction of the new out of the old. No one made the city, there is no
city-maker, as there is a clock-maker. If a city can make itself, without
a maker, why can the same not be true of the universe?” Smolin, Lee. 1997.
The Life of the Cosmos. Oxford University Press. P. 299.
“Given a network of catalyzed chemical reactions, a (sub)set R of such
reactions is called:
“1. Reflexively autocatalytic (RA) if every reaction in R is catalyzed by
at least one molecule involved in any of the reactions in R;
“2. F-generated (F) if every reactant in R can be constructed from a small
‘food set’ F by successive application of reactions from R;
“3. Reflexively autocatalytic and F-generated (RAF) if it is both RA and
F.”
Hordijk, Wim, J. Hein & M. Steel. 2010. “Autocatalytic Sets and the Origin
of Life.” Entropy. 12, 1733-1742. P. 1735.
“Thus, autocatalytic cycles, hypercycles, and collectively autocatalytic
sets can all be seen as particular instances of RAF sets.” Hordijk, Wim,
J. Hein & M. Steel. 2010. “Autocatalytic Sets and the Origin of Life.”
Entropy. 12, 1733-1742. P. 1736.
“Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the RAF framework has provided
strong support for the claim that autocatalytic sets indeed have a high
probability of occurrence, even with very moderate levels of catalysis.
Our computational results in [previous journal article] indicate that only
a linear growth in catalytic activity (with system size) is necessary for
RAF sets to appear with high likelihood in Kauffman’s binary polymer
model. This was subsequently verified analytically. The level of catalysis
necessary for RAF sets to occur in our simulations is between 1 and 2
reactions per molecule, a number which is (bio)chemically quite realistic,
especially for proteins. This is in stark contrast to the exponential
growth required in Kauffman’s original argument, and therefore re-instates
his claim that in ‘sufficiently complex chemical reaction systems’
autocatalytic sets will arise almost inevitably. Moreover, we have
provided a formal way of quantifying ‘sufficiently complex’, in terms of
the level of catalysis required. These results, combined with existing
experimental evidence, make autocatalytic sets a serious and plausible
candidate for consideration in origin of life scenarios.” Hordijk, Wim, J.
Hein & M. Steel. 2010. “Autocatalytic Sets and the Origin of Life.”
Entropy. 12, 1733-1742. P. 1738. Reference is to Hordijk, W. & M. Steel.
“Detecting autocatalytic, self-sustaining sets in chemical reaction
systems.” J. Theor. Biol. 2004, 227, 451-461.
“Mimicry is a form of convergent evolution in which one species
independently evolves a morphology very similar to that of another species
simply in order to fool a third species.” McGhee, George. 2011. Convergent
Evolution: Limited Forms Most Beautiful. MIT Press. P. 8.
“Mimicry is similar to camouflage, where species evolve morphologies that
converge on the form of either a living or a nonliving model in order to
blend into the surroundings so that the camouflaged species cannot be
seen.” McGhee, George. 2011. Convergent Evolution: Limited Forms Most
Beautiful. MIT Press. P. 8.
“Hansell identifies five architectural behaviors found in nest-building
birds, listed here in terms of increasing behavioral complexity: stacking,
entangling, Velcro-fastening, stitching, and weaving.” McGhee, George.
2011. Convergent Evolution: Limited Forms Most Beautiful. MIT Press. P.
213. Reference is to Hansell, M. 2005. Animal Architecture. Oxford
University Press.
“We can easily visualize a universe in which every species is
morphologically different from every other species, and in which each
species has its own unique ecological role, or niche, in nature. That
universe does not exist. Instead, we live in a universe where convergence
in evolution is rampant at every level, from the external forms of living
organisms down to the very molecules from which they are constructed, from
their ecological roles in nature to the way in which their minds
function.” McGhee, George. 2011. Convergent Evolution: Limited Forms Most
Beautiful. MIT Press. Pp. 245-6.
“The hypothetical universe in which every species has its own unique
functional morphology, is morphologically different from every other
species, does not exist.” McGhee, George. 2011. Convergent Evolution:
Limited Forms Most Beautiful. MIT Press. Pp. 250-1.
“In modeling the evolution of the development of multicellular organisms,
Newman et al. start with four different kinds of physical and chemical
patterning mechanisms: diffusion gradients, sedimentation gradients,
reaction-diffusion mechanisms, and chemical oscillation mechanisms. Most
importantly, these four patterning mechanisms are found in nonliving as
well as living chemical systems. Then Newman et al. add two basic cell
properties: differential adhesion and cell ppolarity.” McGhee, George.
2011. Convergent Evolution: Limited Forms Most Beautiful. MIT Press. P.
258. Reference is to Newman, S., G. Forgacs & G. Mueller. 2006. “Before
programs: The physical origination of multicellular forms.” International
Journal of Developmental Biology. 50:289-299.
“In an extended study, Newman argues that nine ‘dynamical patterning
modules’ (or DPMs) in particular exist within the spectrum of hypothetical
developmental forms, and that ‘the DPMs, in conjunction with
cell-type-defining and switching networks, transformed simple, spherical
topologically solid cell clusters into hollow, multilayered, elongated,
segmented, folded, and appendage-bearing structures. They thus founded the
pathways that evolved into the developmental programs of modern animals.’
“In conclusion, Newman et al. and Newman suggest that the evolution of
development on Earth may have been a two-stage process: metazoans
originated from multicellular forms and structures first assembled by
predominantly physical mechanisms, and then subsequently evolved genetic
mechanisms to perpetuate the functionally successful morphologies formed
in the first stage.” McGhee, George. 2011. Convergent Evolution: Limited
Forms Most Beautiful. MIT Press. P. 259. References are: Newman, S., G.
Forgacs & G. Mueller. 2006. “Before programs: The physical origination of
multicellular forms.” International Journal of Developmental Biology.
50:289-299; Newman, S. 2010. “Dynamical patterning modules.” From
Evolution: The Extended Synthesis. Edited by M. Pigliucci & G. Mueller.
Pp. 281-306. MIT Press.
“Bodies can ‘express ecology’ by being sufficiently plastic, by taking on
different structure, form or composition in different environments. Part
of the phenotypic variation between organisms, especially differences
between isolated populations and unrelated individuals, may be fixed and
reflect differences in genetic make-up. Some of the variation develops in
interaction with the particularities of the environment in which an
organism finds itself. This part, indicated by the term phenotypic
plasticity, can be further subcategorized on the basis of whether
phenotypic changes are reversible and occur within a single individual,
and whether the changes occur, or do not occur, in seasonally predictable,
cyclical ways. The non-reversible phenotypic variation between genetically
similar organisms that originates during development, developmental
plasticity, has attracted much empirical and theoretical attention,
including the publication of several monographs. In contrast, the
subcategory of phenotypic plasticity that is expressed by single
reproductively mature organisms throughout their life, phenotypic
flexibility–reversible within-individual variation–has remained little
explored and exploited in biology. This is surprising, because, as we
shall discover, intra-individual variation most readily provides insights
into the links between phenotypic design, ecological demand functions
(performance) and fitness.” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The
Flexible Phenotype: A Body-Centred Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and
Behaviour. Oxford University Press. P. 3.
“The field that studies the balance between the elemental make-up of
animals and their food is called ‘ecological stoichiometry’, an area of
research that has flourished over the last decade. One of the best-known
applications of stoichiometric principles to ecology is the Redfield
ratio, named after Alfred C. Redfield, an oceanographer from Harvard and
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. He discovered a remarkably
constant ratio between carbon (C), nitrogen (N), and phosphorus (P), both
in the world’s oceans and in the phytoplankton living in them, and which
he explained by the continuous degradation of phytoplankton keeping this
ratio in the water column constant. In more recent times, larger datasets
and more precise measurements have yielded some small modifications here
and there, but overall they still support the generality of the magic
ratio 106:16:1 in the offshore ocean.” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils.
2011. The Flexible Phenotype: A Body-Centred Integration of Ecology,
Physiology, and Behaviour. Oxford University Press. P. 26.
“The term symmorphosis comes from Greek, as technical biological terms
tend to, with ‘morphosis’ meaning ‘formation’ and ‘symmorphosis’
literallly meaning ‘balanced formation’ (think of symmetry). In 1981,
Taylor and Weibel provided the following definition: ‘state of structural
design commensurate to functional needs resulting from regulated
morphogenesis, whereby the formation of structural elements is regulated
to satisfy but not exceed the requirements of the functional system’.
Symmorphosis thus predicts that all structural elements of a body, or at
the least its subsystems, are fine-tuned to each other and to overall
functional demand. Because a serial system is as strong as the weakest
link, any element in the chain that would be stronger than the weakest
would be wasteful.” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The Flexible
Phenotype: A Body-Centred Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and
Behaviour. Oxford University Press. P. 36. Reference is to Taylor, C. & E.
Weibel. 1981. “Design of the mammalian respiratory system. I. Problem and
strategy.” Respiratory Physiology. 44:1-10.
“Symmorphosis, the principle that evolved body designs avoid excess
capacity, e.g. in cascades of serial physiological processes, such as the
respiratory chain, is now widely accepted as a useful, heuristic design
principle. As we will see later in the book, like other criteria used in
optimality-driven evaluations of organismal performance, symmorphosis is
better seen as a useful null hypothesis, than as a hypothesis with very
precise and rigid criteria for rejection. The discussion of safety factors
has demonstrated how an evaluation of cases where simple, economy-based
expectations are not upheld, develops our biological insight.” Piersma,
Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The Flexible Phenotype: A Body-Centred
Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and Behaviour. Oxford University
Press. P. 49.
“So, if animals are pushed very hard, under some conditions, they can
raise the ceiling from working at 5 times BMR [basal metabolic rate] to
working at 7 times BMR. As we have seen, endurance athletes in energy
balance can push their performance levels to 5 times BMR, but not further.
We have also seen that free-living birds, except in the case of marathon
migrants, generally do not work harder than 4 times BMR. The considerable
gap between the maximum sustained working level of 4 times BMR that
hard-working parent birds are prepared to give, and the physiological
maxima of 5-7 times BMR that can be achieved under exceptional conditions,
makes evolutionary sense if working hard comes at a survival cost. If very
hard work precipitously increases the likelihood of death (e.g. because of
free-radical derived oxidative DNA and tissue damage), without leading to
compensatory increases in reproductive output, evolutionary trade-offs
would select for animals that are not prepared to work harder than what we
can call the ‘optimal working capacity’.” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils.
2011. The Flexible Phenotype: A Body-Centred Integration of Ecology,
Physiology, and Behaviour. Oxford University Press. P. 67.
“Highly predictable changing environments would select for polyphenism in
short-lived organisms and life-cycle staging in long-lived organisms. The
lower the predictability of environmental variation, the better it is for
organisms to respond opportunistically, rather than seasonally scheduled.
Developmental plasticity would then describe the kind of variable
responses: organisms encountering unpredictably variable environments in
the course of their life would benefit from plasticity being reversible,
i.e. showing phenotypic flexibility. If environmental variation cannot be
predicted, organisms might go into bet hedging (generating differently
adaptive phenotypes at random) in shorter-lived organisms. In theory at
least, especially longer-lived animals could also cope with extravagant
changeability of the environment by not adjusting the phenotype at all,
i.e. show robustness.” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The Flexible
Phenotype: A Body-Centred Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and
Behaviour. Oxford University Press. P. 94.
“If animals can combine prior information about the environment with new
information about a current option (be it a patch, a prey, a mate, or
whatever), they can markedly improve their assessment of the value of the
current option, and thus improve fitness. This is the essence of
‘Bayesian’ updating, named after Thomas Bayes (1702-61), an Anglican
priest interested in probability theory. Just to give you a simple example
of Bayesian updating in practice: imagine a patch in which a forager has
found two prey items during the first minute of search. Should it continue
searching or should it leave this patch? If the environment is structured
such that a patch can only contain two prey items at most, then the
forager should definitely move on. By contrast, if patches can contain
many more than just two items, then the forager should stay, especially if
it took little time to find these two items. Thus, knowing your
environment (in a statistical, probabilistic sense) greatly improves your
assessment abilities; without knowledge about your environment, it is much
harder to make the right choices. A popular example of Bayesian updating
in humans is the so-called ‘Monty Hall problem’, named after an American
quizmaster. Imagine you are participating in a TV game in which you have
to select one out of three closed doors. Behind one of these doors stands
a car, behind each of the other two doors stands a goat. You will take
home either a car or a goat, depending on which door you choose. Once you
have selected your door, the friendly quizmaster, who knows what stands
behind each door, helps you by opening one of the other two doors for you,
with a goat behind it. Knowing this, or, in Bayesian terms, updating your
prior expectation with new sampling information, should you switch to the
other closed door? The answer is yes; by switching, your chance of winning
the car increases from 1 in 3 to 2 in 3. The intuitive, but incorrect,
answer is that there is no need to switch doors, since your chances would
only increase from 1 in 3 to 1 in 2, irrespective of whether you switch or
not!” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The Flexible Phenotype: A
Body-Centred Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and Behaviour. Oxford
University Press. Pp. 122-3.
“In this book we have offered a progression of ideas that support the view
that, although bodies and environments are recognizable entities, they
really are inseparable. In this final chapter we extend this view to
evolution–the inheritance of, and selection for, randomly variable
phenotypic traits across generations. What we find is that evolutionary
change needs systems of inheritance, but we also find that the genetic
system that we all work with is just one of five such possible inheritance
systems. Since organisms not only provide the beginnings and nurture of
their offspring, but also build the environments in which they and their
offspring live, there are very tight feedbacks of reciprocal causation,
both in the development of organisms and in the relationships between the
developing organism and their environments. Bodies are earth, and we would
do well to acknowledge that in the ways that we study them.” Piersma,
Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The Flexible Phenotype: A Body-Centred
Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and Behaviour. Oxford University
Press. P. 184.
“It turns out there is something very special about the nanoscale when it
comes to converting different forms of energy into each other.
Intriguingly, only at the nanoscale are many types of energy, from elastic
to mechanical to electrostatic to chemical to thermal, roughly of the same
magnitude. This creates the exciting possibility that the molecules in our
bodies can spontaneously convert different types of energy into one
another. Molecules and small, nanoscale particles can have substantial
fluctuations in energy as they take energy from the molecular storm
(thermal energy), use it to convert, for example, chemical energy to
electrical energy, and then release the energy again into the surrounding
chaos. By contrast, smaller structures, such as atoms or nuclei, have
binding energies that are too large to allow thermal energy fluctuations,
unless the temperature (along with thermal energy) is extremely high
(thousands or millions of degrees). At such high temperatures, molecules
are unstable and the formation of complex structures needed for life is
impossible. On the other hand, at scales much larger than a nanometer,
mechanical and electrical energies are too high to be subject to thermal
fluctuations. At this scale, everything becomes deterministic, and objects
do not spontaneously change shape or assemble themselves–which are
attributes needed for life.
“Thus, the nanoscale is truly special. Only at the nanoscale is the
thermal energy of the right magnitude to allow the formation of complex
molecular structures and assist the spontaneous transformation of
different energy forms (mechanical, electrical, chemical) into one
another.” Hoffmann, Peter. 2012. Life’s Ratchet: How Molecular Machines
Extract Order from Chaos. Basic Books. Pp. 122-4.
“The hallmark of a tightly coupled molecular motor is that it goes through
well-defined cycles, using up a fixed number of ATP molecules during each
step. Nevertheless, random motion is the drive behind the motor’s
locomotion, as it ultimately moves the legs of the motor forward–of
course, rectified by the allosteric interaction of the motor’s legs with
ATP.
“Loosely coupled motors, by contrast, rely more heavily on random motion
and have no fixed step cycle.” Hoffmann, Peter. 2012. Life’s Ratchet: How
Molecular Machines Extract Order from Chaos. Basic Books. P. 162.
“As demonstrated, kinesin, a tightly coupled motor, uses the molecular
storm to push its feet forward. The allosteric tilting of the molecule
helps bias the movement in the forward direction, but where does the tilt
come from? Any change in shape of a molecule is ultimately the result of
the molecular storm’s pushing the molecule in the direction of reduced
energy, that is, into a valley of its energy landscape. A molecular motor
will simply not work if the temperature is too low to provide sufficient
random thermal motion. Even the most tightly controlled motor needs the
chaos of the thermal dance to traverse transition states and find its way
on an every-changing energy landscape.” Hoffmann, Peter. 2012. Life’s
Ratchet: How Molecular Machines Extract Order from Chaos. Basic Books. Pp.
167-8.
“In our cells, directed motion, ‘purposeful’ activity, is created by the
action of molecular ratchets–molecular machines, enzymes, and motors,
which by degrading free energy and due to their asymmetric structures, can
rectify the random motions of the molecular storm to create order.”
Hoffmann, Peter. 2012. Life’s Ratchet: How Molecular Machines Extract
Order from Chaos. Basic Books. P. 225.
“For our purposes, a shared lexicon is a consensus on a set of
distinctions.” Hutchins, Edwin & B. Hazlehurst. “How to invent a shared
lexicon: the emergence of shared form-meaning mappings in interaction.”
From Goody, Esther (Ed.) 1995. Social Intelligence and Interaction:
Expressions and Implications of the Social Bias in Human Intelligence.
Cambridge University Press. P. 55.
“Virtually all work in connectionist modelling today models aspects of the
cognition of individuals. Our theoretical stance suggests that it might be
useful to consider the properties of communities of networks. Of
particular interest here is the fact that in traditional connectionist
modelling, the programmer constructs the world of experience from which
the networks learn. In a community of networks the behaviour of other
networks might also be an important source of structure from which each
network could learn. Connectionist programmers refer to the output
patterns to be learned as the ‘teachers’ for their networks. With a
community of networks, we can let an important part of the teaching be
embodied in the behaviour of other networks. Thus, where traditional
network modelling is concerned only with the relation of structure in the
environment to internal structure, a model of interactions in a community
of networks adds the universe of communicational artifacts to the
picture.”
“It is easy to show that consensus among two networks can be achieved by
taking the output of each as the teacher for the other.” Hutchins, Edwin &
B. Hazlehurst. “How to invent a shared lexicon: the emergence of shared
form-meaning mappings in interaction.” From Goody, Esther (Ed.) 1995.
Social Intelligence and Interaction: Expressions and Implications of the
Social Bias in Human Intelligence. Cambridge University Press. P. 59.
“The hand and mouth are the two most complex and flexible effectors of the
human body and are regulated by neighbouring or even partialy overlapping
neural circuits.” Stout, Dietrich & T. Chaminade. 2009. “Making Tools and
Making Sense: Complex, Intentional Behaviour in Human Evolution.”
Cambridge Archaeological Journal. 19(1): 85-96. P. 86.
“Functional brain imaging results suggest that meaningful correspondences
do exist between language and ESA (early stone age) tool-making, and
furthermore that that [sic] these correspondences are to be found at
increasingly higher levels of organization in more sophisticated stone
technologies.” Stout, Dietrich & T. Chaminade. 2009. “Making Tools and
Making Sense: Complex, Intentional Behaviour in Human Evolution.”
Cambridge Archaeological Journal. 19(1): 85-96. P. 86.
“Kinematic studies reveal that grasping movements with the hand affect
concurrent movements of the mouth, with larger manual target objects being
associated with wider, faster opening of the mouth and with increased
power of the voice spectrum during syllable pronunciation. PMv [frontal
lobe ventral premotor cortex] has thus been characterized as producing an
‘action vocabulary’ across a wide array of different behaviours,
reflecting a more general role in processing sequentially structured
events.” Stout, Dietrich & T. Chaminade. 2009. “Making Tools and Making
Sense: Complex, Intentional Behaviour in Human Evolution.” Cambridge
Archaeological Journal. 19(1): 85-96. P. 87.
“Overlapping PMv [frontal lobe ventral premotor cortex] contributions to
phonological processing and object manipulation provide evidence of a
specific neurobehavioural correspondence between language and manual
action involving this region. In particular, this correspondence is found
at the level where discrete articulatory and prehensile elements are
assembled into short goal directed action units, such as grasping an
object or pronouncing an intonational phrase.” Stout, Dietrich & T.
Chaminade. 2009. “Making Tools and Making Sense: Complex, Intentional
Behaviour in Human Evolution.” Cambridge Archaeological Journal. 19(1):
85-96. P. 88.
“It is nothing new to propose an evolutionary link between language and
tool-making. In 1871, Darwin himself argued that ‘To chip a flint into the
rudest tool... demands the use of a perfect hand... the structure of the
hand in this respect may be compared with that of the vocal organs’. In
more recent years, however, many archaeologists have instead stressed the
dissimilarities between language and stone tool-making. Brain-imaging
studies of ESA [early stone age] tool-making provide important new
empirical support for the early intuitions of Darwin, as well as for more
recent proposals regarding the co-evolution of language and technology.”
Stout, Dietrich & T. Chaminade. 2009. “Making Tools and Making Sense:
Complex, Intentional Behaviour in Human Evolution.” Cambridge
Archaeological Journal. 19(1): 85-96. Pp. 91-2. Reference is to Darwin,
Charles. 2004 (1871). Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex.
Penguin Books. P. 69.
“The conclusions we may draw from these observations are that humans are
generally oblivious to rates and proportions (which are transitory) and
that they constantly search for causal relations (which are invariant).”
Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. Cambridge
University Press. P. 182.
“The word ‘counterfactual’ is a misnomer, since it connotes a statement
that stands contrary to facts or, at the very least, a statement that
escapes empirical verification. Counterfactuals are in neither category;
they are fundamental to scientific thought and carry as clear an empirical
message as any scientific law.” Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models,
Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. Cambridge University Press. P. 217.
“These possibilities trigger an important basic question: “is
‘explanation’ a concept based on general causes (e.g., ‘Drinking hemlock
causes death’) or singular causes (e.g., ‘Socrates’ drinking hemlock
caused his death’)? Causal effect expressions P(y |do(x)) belong to the
first category whereas counterfactual expressions P(Yx’ = y’ | x,y) belong
to the second, since conditioning on x and y narrows down world scenarios
to those compatible with the most specific information at hand: X = x and
Y = y.” Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000.
Cambridge University Press. P. 222.
“If, on the other hand, we base explanations solely on singular-event
considerations (i.e., necessary causation), then various background
factors that are normally present in the world would awkwardly qualify as
explanations. For example, the presence of oxygen in the room would
qualify as an explanation for the fire that broke out, simply because the
fire would not have occurred were it not for the oxygen. That we judge the
match struck, not the oxygen, to be the actual cause of the fire indicates
that we go beyond the singular event at hand (where each factor alone is
both necessary and sufficient) and consider situations of the same general
type–where oxygen alone is obviously insufficient to start a fire.
Clearly, some balance must be struck between the necessary and the
sufficient components of causal explanation, and the present chapter
illuminates this balance by formally explicating the basic relationships
between these two components.” Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning,
and Inference. 2000. Cambridge University Press. P. 285.
“Yet despite its ubiquity in natural thoughts, actual causation is not an
easy concept to formulate. A typical example considers two fires advancing
toward a house. If fire A burned the house before fire B, we (and many
juries nationwide) would surely consider fire A ‘the actual cause’ for the
damage, though either fire alone is sufficient (and neither one was
necessary) for burning the house. Clearly, actual causation requires
information beyond that of necessity and sufficiency; the actual process
mediating between the cause and the effect must enter into consideration.”
Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. Cambridge
University Press. P. 309.
“Thus, the distinction between type and token claims is a matter of degree
in the structural account. The more episode-specific evidence we gather,
the closer we come to the ideals of token claims and actual causes.”
Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. Cambridge
University Press. P. 311.
“The overriding ideas in this solution [to the second riddle of causation
– figuring out what difference it makes to know that something is causal]
are:
“First – treating causation as a summary of behavior under interventions;
and
“Second – using equations and graphs as a mathematical language within
which causal thoughts can be represented and manipulated.
“And to put the two together, we need a third concept: Treating
interventions as a surgery over equations.” Pearl, Judea. Causality:
Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. Cambridge University Press. P.
344.
“In summary, intervention amounts to a surgery on equations (guided by a
diagram) and causation means predicting the consequences of such a
surgery.” Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000.
Cambridge University Press. P. 347.
“Changes in size are not a consequence of changes in shape, but the
reverse: changes in size often require changes in shape. To put it another
way, size is a supreme regulator of all matters biological. No living
entity can evolve or develop without taking size into consideration. Much
more than that, size is a prime mover in evolution. There is abundant
evidence for the natural selection of size, for both increases and
decreases. Those size changes have the remarkable effect that they guide
and encourage novelties in the structure of all organisms. Size is not
just a by-product of evolution, but a major player.” Bonner, John Tyler.
2006. Why Size Matters: From Bacteria to Blue Whales. Princeton University
Press. P. 2.
“The rules [“correlations in which various properties of organisms vary
with size”] are as follows:
“RULE 1 Strength varies with size.
“RULE 2 Surfaces that permit diffusion of oxygen, of food, and of heat in
and out of the body, vary with size.
“RULE 3 The division of labor (complexity) varies with size.
“RULE 4 The rate of various living processes varies with size, such as
metabolism, generation time, longevity, and the speed of locomotion.
“RULE 5 The abundance of organisms in nature varies with their size.”
Bonner, John Tyler. 2006. Why Size Matters: From Bacteria to Blue Whales.
Princeton University Press. P. 5.
“... a larger animal could not even exist unless its cells had a reduced
rate of metabolism. It would either starve or burst into flames, or both.”
Bonner, John Tyler. 2006. Why Size Matters: From Bacteria to Blue Whales.
Princeton University Press. P. 124.
“There is good evidence that a tree starts declining in its growth when it
becomes so tall that the water and nutrients can no longer effectively
reach the growing tips of the outer stems.” Bonner, John Tyler. 2006. Why
Size Matters: From Bacteria to Blue Whales. Princeton University Press. P.
133.
“The present research examined a dynamic way in which cognition may be
shaped and maintained by culture and found evidence that culturally
specific patterns of attention may be at least partially afforded by the
perceptual environment.” Miyamoto, Yuri, R. Nisbett & T. Masuda. 2006.
“Culture and the Physical Environment.” Psychological Science. Vol. 17,
No. 2, Pp. 113-9. P. 118.
“The present research suggests a dynamic process through which attention
can be shaped and sustained by the perceptual environment. Given the fact
that such perceptual environments have been historically constructed and
maintained by people repeatedly exposed to a culturally specific
perceptual environment, we believe that the current exploration sheds
light on possible processes of mutual constitution of cognitive processes
and sociocultural environment.” Miyamoto, Yuri, R. Nisbett & T. Masuda.
2006. “Culture and the Physical Environment.” Psychological Science. Vol.
17, No. 2, Pp. 113-9. P. 118.
“Cells are characterized by the presence of genetic information, of a
metabolism and of compartments; there has been an ongoing debate on the
features that came first. This debate has also been complicated by an
excessive simplification of positions. But the simultaneous requirement of
two or all of the sub-systems can be considered a likely possibility as
well. Independent of that choice, a metabolic contribution cannot be
precluded as the presence of genetic material or that of membrane
components requires synthetic pathways supporting, for example, a
preparatory metabolism variant of the genetic polymer first option.
Therefore, the chemical free energy released or used in these pathways
represents an essential component in the majority of the hypotheses on the
origin of life.” Pascal, Robert & L. Boiteau. 2011. “Energy flows,
metabolism and translation.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society: B. 366, 2949-2958. P. 2949.
“A trait has high ‘broad sense’ heritability in a population to the extent
that the existing variation for that trait in the population is due to
genetic variation. If variance in a trait is entirely due to genetic
variance, broad sense heritability is 1.0; if it is entirely due to
variance in non-genetic factors, broad sense heritability is 0.0.” Bateson,
Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and
Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 13.
“The developmental biologist Frederik Nijhout has proposed a formal
approach to robustness in which he suggests that the developing organism
is robust if it is unable to detect changes in the environment or is
resistant to them.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity,
Robustness, Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 21.
Reference is to Nijhout, H.F. 2002. “The nature of robustness in
development.” Bioessays. 24, 553-563.
“William Homan Thorpe brought together the insights of European ethology
and holistic psychology with the vast corpus of work on the various
mechanisms of learning from American and Russian laboratories, as well as
those from psychology departments worldwide. Thorpe classified learning
into five categories: habituation, classical conditioning, instrumental
conditioning, latent learning and insight learning. Some forms of learning
such as behavioural imprinting, which Thorpe discussed in his chapter on
insight learning, and the acquisition of song in birds may be restricted
to early development, but most can take place throughout life.
“One of the most primitive changes in behaviour in response to experience
is non-specific. Sensitisation usually results from exposure to an
alarming stimulus (such as a blow-up toy snake suddenly becoming
inflated), which elicits a variety of defensive or aversive reactions from
the animal. Subsequently, many other potentially aversive stimuli (such as
loud sounds) will have the same effect even though this would not have
been the case had the animal not been previously sensitised.” Bateson,
Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and
Evolution. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 39-40. Reference is to Thorpe,
W. H. 1956. Learning and Instinct in Animals. Methuen.
“DNA sequences that do not code for proteins were previously called ‘junk
DNA’ and comprise the bulk of the mammalian genome. However, much of this
codes for RNAs that are not translated into proteins. The recognition of
the critical biological significance of these sequences has been one of
the major discoveries of recent years. Many non-coding RNA molecules act
as regulatory factors either by association with intra-nuclear proteins or
by binding to the DNA. They are likely to play a major role in conferring
specificity to these epigenetic processes.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman.
2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and Evolution. Cambridge
University Press. Pp. 57-8.
“Unlike the forms of plasticity that occur early in development, much of
the capacity to learn can occur throughout life.” Bateson, Patrick & P.
Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and Evolution.
Cambridge University Press. P. 76.
“Various mechanisms that generate robustness and are involved in
plasticity coexist to allow the development of an integrated phenotype or
a variety of alternative phenotypes. Successful lineages of sexually
reproducing organisms require compatibility between the genomic
architecture and the phenotypes at a number of levels. This requires a
level of robustness in development. But organisms living within variable
environments also require plasticity to cope with environmental change. To
ensure their utility, these mechanisms must be integrated with those that
maintain the species’ characteristics.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman.
2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and Evolution. Cambridge
University Press. P. 79.
“Two fundamental issues have remained in bridging the gap between the
neo-Darwinist camp and those who seek to emphasise the importance of
development in evolution. The first has been the need to provide molecular
mechanisms that would explain the role of development in evolutionary
processes. The second has been the need to demonstrate the generality of
developmental processes impacting on evolution.” Bateson, Patrick & P.
Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and Evolution.
Cambridge University Press. P. 82.
“For example, robustness due to insensitivity to the environment might
simply reflect a species having been stable in an unchanging ecological
niche over evolutionary time; plasticity would have had relatively little
utility. Alternatively, where sensitivity to environmental cues might
induce harm, mechanisms to render the developing organism insensitive to
the environment may be under active Darwinian selection. Viviparity in
some reptiles and fish, the firm eggshell of birds, and the placental
barrier of mammals all represent evolved systems to create environmental
insensitivity.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity,
Robustness, Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 85.
“These terms [“nature and nurture”] refer to different domains and should
not be contrasted directly; one is a state and the other a process.
Nature, we argued, should refer to the fully developed characteristics of
an organism, and nurture to the ways in which those characteristics were
derived.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness,
Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 124.
“A robust phenotype is often supposed to be one produced by processes that
are difficult to disrupt (developmental non-malleability), and one that is
difficult to modify once it has developed (post-developmental
non-malleability). However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, developmental
and post-developmental robustness do not necessarily go together and are
not based on unitary processes. A trait that is robust with respect to its
development may not also be robust with respect to its continuance, and
vice versa. As noted in Chapter 3, developmental malleability may be
followed by non-malleability, as in many examples of alternative
phenotypes found throughout the animal kingdom. The same is true for
humans, as in the case of sexual differentiation or differentiation of the
visual pathway. Conversely developmental non-malleability may be followed
by considerable malleability, as in the case of the human smile, which
reliably appears in infants during the fifth or sixth week after birth and
is successively greatly modified by social interactions and cultural
influences.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness,
Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 125-6.
“The realisation that the many processes of development interact and are
intertwined is crucial in order to make progress in biology and cognitive
science.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness,
Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 129.
“Robustness and plasticity are complementary and intertwined and must be
considered together.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity,
Robustness, Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 130.
“Disturbance can be thought of as any more or less sudden environmental
circumstance which makes resources newly available for exploitation. It is
often caused by human beings. Fire, toxic pollutants, extreme weather
conditions, wave action and ploughing all provide examples of ‘destructive
disturbance’ which eliminate established biological communities or parts
of communities. By contrast, taking the lid off a pot of jam, pruning a
tree, and burying animal or plant remains in soil are examples of
‘enrichment disturbance’ which adds or exposes resources to living
systems.
“Disturbance therefore results in temporary plenty. In so doing it causes
what is known as ‘R’- or ‘r’-selection. This kind of selection favours
open-bounded entities that are quick to arrive on the scene, exploit the
most readily assimilable resources and then reproduce as supplies become
restricted. Such entities are competitive with respect to arrival and
exploitation, i.e. in terms of ‘primary resource capture’. They also have
relatively unspecialized requirements for resources and little need to
adjust to heterogeneous conditions other than by reproducing. Regenerative
processes are therefore emphasized, allowing very rapid rates of
proliferation and dissemination of reproductive units through space and
time. Variation produced by recombinatorial, developmental or behavioural
mechanisms tends to be minimized.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom:
Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. Pp. 187-8.
“After the goldrush [a disturbance], increased access to resources by any
one entity or group can only be achieved by means of trade or takeover.
The ability of each entity to retain or gain resources now depends on
mechanisms affecting the self-integration and degeneration of contextual
boundaries.... For the moment, their [mechanisms] main significance lies
in the fact that they result in the ‘combative’ and ‘collaborative’
ecological strategies of entities that develop in circumstances where
there is a potentially high incidence of competitors. Such circumstances
cause ‘C’-selection.
“Since C-selected entities inhabit heterogeneous environments over
relatively long time intervals, during which they may have a wide variety
of close encounters with others, they tend to possess a high degree of
versatility. This versatility is associated with an emphasis on
conversional processes–which permit retention of resources, and
distributive processes–which enable invasion of hostile territory.
Recycling processes that enable redistribution to defensive or invasive
‘battlefronts’ are often also important. The formation of co-operative
networks and partnerships allows new capabilities that can also enhance
combative prowess. C-selected entities can be expected to be genetically
variable at the population level of organization and developmentally or
behaviourally variable at the individual level.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of
Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. Pp.
188-9.
“Stress or adversity can be thought of as any more or less continuously
imposed kind of environmental extreme, other than a high incidence of
competitors, which inhibits the proliferation of the majority of entities
under consideration. Particularly in terrestrial environments, many stress
factors may ultimately operate by compromising the mechanisms that
circumvent or protect from oxygen toxicity.
“Those relatively few ‘S’- or ‘A’-selected entities which can tolerate, or
indeed develop best in the relative absence of competitors under stressed
conditions, do so because they have specialized attributes. For example,
organisms inhabiting deserts have attributes which protect them from
desiccation and extremes of temperature.
“S-selection, like C-selection, is a feature of relatively stable
environments (hence both C- and S-selection represent different aspects of
K-selection) and especially favours attributes associated with protective,
conversional processes. Co-operative interactions and distributive
processes that allow emigration can also be an asset. Purely S-selected
entities, in being highly specialized, tend to lack versatility. However,
S-selection is often associated with individual life cycle stages or
alternative phenotypes of versatile organisms.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of
Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P.
189